Board dynamics wargame
CEO 被罢免的 Boardroom 博弈推演引擎。不是讲「怎么开好 board meeting」,而是「VC + 独董如何联合 fire 你」「CEO coup 如何预防」「产品战略分歧如何不变成 personnel 分歧」。含 10 个经典 CEO 罢免 / board 政变案例 + 5 种 faction 动态 + 12 种 boardroom move。From its SKILL.md
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Board Dynamics Wargame — CEO 去留的博弈推演
核心命题:Series A 之后,创始人是否能保住 CEO 位置,取决于 board 政治,不取决于业绩。Travis Kalanick 的 Uber 在他被 fire 时 valuation 是 $70B,Sam Altman 在 2023/11 被 fire 时 OpenAI 是全球最重要 AI 公司。业绩不是护身符。
定位:
founder-fundraising-wargame= 融资阶段博弈(pre-close)term-sheet-negotiator= 条款博弈(TS 阶段)vc-due-diligence-simulator= DD 博弈(TS 到 close)board-dynamics-wargame= 融后董事会博弈(post-close,ongoing)
卫星文件:
board-coup-casebook.md:10 个 CEO 罢免案例深度拆解 + 5 个 CEO 守位成功案例
Part 1:董事会的 faction 结构
5 类 board member
| 类型 | 行为模式 | 在 coup 中的角色 |
|---|---|---|
| Founder(you) | 产品/愿景驱动,emotional stake | 核心被 target |
| VC Preferred(Lead VC) | Fund return 驱动 | 最可能主导 coup 或 veto 你 |
| VC Preferred(Follow-on VC) | 跟随 lead VC | Swing vote,可 swing either way |
| Founder-chosen Independent | 你选的 advisor,通常忠诚 | Your 核心支持者 |
| VC-chosen or Negotiated Independent | VC network,通常偏 VC | VC 的核心支持者 |
Typical board 演进
Seed 阶段:1-2 founder only (ideal) 或 1 founder + 1 VC observer Series A:2 founder + 1 VC + 1 independent (5 seats total) Series B:2 founder + 2 VC + 1 independent (5 seats total) Series C+:2-3 founder + 3-4 VC + 2-3 independent (7-9 seats total)
关键数学
创始人被 fire 的数学条件:
- 5-person board:VC + 1 independent vs founder + 1 ally = 2:2 tie → independent 决定胜负
- 7-person board:2 VC + 2 independent = 4 vs 3 founder-aligned
结论:只要 board 不是 founder majority,你 always 在 risk 区。
Part 2:12 种 Boardroom Move
Move 1:Quiet Polling
VC 在 board meeting 之前 单独 call 每个 independent + other VC,试探意见。如果发现 majority 支持 fire CEO,才在 meeting 提议。
你的 counter:你自己 quiet poll。任何 board meeting 之前,知道每个 member 的 position。
Move 2:CEO Succession Sub-committee
VC 提议成立 "CEO succession planning committee"(看起来是 governance best practice)。这是 coup preparation,目的是 formalize 谁接替 CEO 的讨论。
你的 counter:proactively 提议 succession planning(从位置主导),或者要求 founder participation in committee。
Move 3:Independent 任命
VC 推动 board 加 "independent director",提供 "industry expertise"。实际是 VC 网络的 loyalist。
你的 counter:Approval right on independent directors 是 TS 时必须争取的。没有这个的话,永远在 risk。
Move 4:Information Asymmetry Attack
VC 要求额外的 monthly CEO metrics + direct access to team(超出 standard info rights)。这是 building own intel channel,绕过 CEO。
你的 counter:所有 team communication 必须 through CEO 或 CEO-approved channel。Info right 不是 "inspect whenever"。
Move 5:Back-channel to Key Employee
VC 直接 call 你的 CTO / CFO / VP Sales,了解 "real situation"。这是 building employee loyalty outside CEO。
你的 counter:在 closing TS 时就 set expectation 「all board/employee interactions go through me」。如果 VC 违反,这是严重信号。
Move 6:Portfolio Founder Referrals
VC 让其他 portfolio company founder "meet" 你,实际是评估是否是 CEO material。这是 secret assessment。
你的 counter:任何 founder intro 要求 context(why are we meeting?)。Proactively propose your own peer groups.
Move 7:Performance Framing
VC 在 board meeting 重新 frame 过去 12 月的执行——把 "original plan" 改为更严厉的 KPI,然后 claim CEO "missed goals"。
你的 counter:每个 board meeting start with a recap of agreed goals (get them in minutes). 不要让 goalpost 被后移。
Move 8:"Consultant" Engagement
VC 提议请 "management consultant" 评估 org effectiveness。Consultant 通常 report to VC 不是 founder,结论 predetermined。
你的 counter:Consultant 的 engagement letter 必须 require founder approval + report 必须 simultaneously go to founder and VC.
Move 9:Financial Pressure Tactic
VC 在 budget 审批时 squeeze you——cut budget,force hard decisions,然后 blame "missed metrics" on CEO。
你的 counter:Budget approvals 必须 tied to agreed plan,不是 arbitrary 重新定义。每个 budget cut 的 rationale 必须 documented.
Move 10:Pre-meeting Coalition Building
VC 在每个 board meeting 前 24-48 小时,和 other board members 有 "pre-meeting call"——实际是 alignment session。Founder 通常被 excluded。
你的 counter:Propose "All board members have pre-meeting 1-on-1 with CEO" as standard. Or at minimum, request inclusion in VC pre-meeting.
Move 11:Confidential 1-on-1 with Independent
VC 和 independent director 有 "friendly dinner",frame 为 board building。实际是 recruit independent 去 coup 阵营。
你的 counter:Proactively have your own dinners with independents. Build your relationship capital before VC does.
Move 12:The Surprise Motion
Coup 的最后一步:在 board meeting 突然 propose "resolution to remove CEO and appoint interim CEO [name]",before founder 能 prepare。
你的 counter:Pre-meeting,demand 所有 resolutions 24 小时 before meeting 发给所有 member. 如果 surprise motion 出现,你有 standing objection "improperly noticed"(依赖 company bylaws).
Part 3:Coup 的 Triggering Events(12 类)
Category A:Performance-based triggers
Trigger 1:Missed 3+ major milestones 连续 Trigger 2:Revenue forecast miss > 30% Trigger 3:Cash runway < 6 months unexpected Trigger 4:Major customer churn concentration
Category B:People-based triggers
Trigger 5:Cofounder departure(especially co-CEO) Trigger 6:C-level turnover > 2 in 12 months Trigger 7:Board complaint from 3+ employees (through VC channel) Trigger 8:Pattern of "bad hire" decisions
Category C:Governance/trust triggers
Trigger 9:Missed board disclosure (material info VC didn't know about) Trigger 10:Related party transaction without approval Trigger 11:Legal / regulatory issue not disclosed Trigger 12:Founder personal issue affecting work (divorce, illness, substance)
Part 4:Coup-Proofing 7-Layer Defense
Layer 1:TS Level Defense
- Board composition:至少 odd number + founder 或 founder-chosen independent 多数
- Protective provisions 不覆盖 CEO hire/fire(keep this at board level,don't add preferred veto)
- Dual-class stock:如果可以,争取 super-voting on CEO election(controversial but effective)
Layer 2:Relationship Defense
- 每个 board member 每月 1-on-1(30 minutes,formal)
- Every independent 每季度 informal dinner
- Quarterly "where are we heading" alignment discussion
- 知道每个 member 的 personal incentive (what makes their fund look good)
Layer 3:Information Defense
- Weekly or bi-weekly CEO update email 给全 board
- Proactive flagging of 问题 (VC 发现 problem before you told them = huge trust loss)
- Monthly KPI dashboard standardized(保证你定义 the metrics, 不是他们后来重新 frame)
Layer 4:Coalition Defense
- Relationship capital with 2 of 3 non-founder board members
- Cultivate independent directors' loyalty through meaningful engagement
- If possible, have a non-VC institutional investor (like strategic corporate投资 or large angel) on board
Layer 5:Governance Defense
- Enforce proper notice for board meetings + resolutions (24 小时 advance copy)
- Standing "CEO's agenda" 在每个 meeting(不让 VC 主导 agenda)
- Detailed board minutes (prevent revision history of "agreed goals")
Layer 6:Performance Defense
- Over-communicate on execution (weekly metrics + monthly summary)
- Set conservative goals + systematically over-deliver
- If you're going to miss: pre-announce 4-6 weeks before, with mitigation plan
Layer 7:Succession Defense
- Preemptively propose "CEO development framework"(get in front of it)
- Identify + groom 2 internal CEO candidates (gives board comfort that succession doesn't have to be external)
- Counter-intuitive move: make yourself "more replaceable" in operations → harder to fire you for being "indispensable"
Part 5:Coup 发生的 Playbook
如果 coup 已经在进行(你 detect signals),步骤:
Step 1:Detect (Month 0)
识别信号:
- VC 开始 "pre-meeting" calls
- Independent 变 distant
- VC 提议 new board member / committee
- Info request 变密集
- Key employee 被 directly reached out
Step 2:Assess (Day 1-7)
- Quiet call 每个 board member: assess their position
- Talk to trusted advisors(lawyer + founder mentors)
- Determine if coup is truly happening or you're paranoid
Step 3:Leverage (Day 7-14)
如果 coup is real,你的 leverage 是什么:
- Financial:是否有 cash runway? If crisis needs you to raise, you have leverage
- Operational:是否有 key customer relationships dependent on you? Key employees who would follow you out?
- Strategic:是否有 critical M&A or partnership in flight?
- Legal:founder 的 IP assignments 条款、employment rights
Step 4:Negotiate (Day 14-30)
选择路径:
Path A:Fight to stay
- Line up support from your side (independent you have relationship with)
- Prepare "reconciliation" plan to address board concerns
- Request "cooling off" period
Path B:Negotiate exit package
- Accept you're out,negotiate:
- Severance (6-12 months)
- Accelerated vesting (100% preferred)
- Consulting agreement (stay connected, potentially transition smoothly)
- Non-compete relaxation
- Stock / IPO / acquisition participation rights
Path C:Nuclear option
- Resign + take team + sue for contractual violations
- 只在 you have strong legal position + cash to fight + willing to go public
Step 5:Execute (Day 30+)
- If fighting:board meeting prep, line up your votes
- If exiting:ensure contracts signed before announcement
Part 6:Post-Coup Options
Outcome 1:CEO stays
- 需要 rebuilding trust with VC
- Accept some concessions (more oversight, new hires)
- Document agreements in writing
Outcome 2:CEO stays with reduced role
- "Executive Chairman" or "Chief Product Officer"
- 通常是 transitional (6-12 months)
- Signal is you're being "managed out gracefully"
Outcome 3:CEO transitions out
- Negotiate exit package (see above)
- Retain board seat if possible (for founder perspective)
- Retain meaningful equity
Outcome 4:Nuclear exit
- Legal battle with VC
- Public narrative war
- Often results in years of litigation
Part 7:经典案例快速回顾(详见 board-coup-casebook.md)
| 案例 | 公司 | 年份 | CEO | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sam Altman | OpenAI | 2023 | Fire → Reinstate (4 days) | Full recovery |
| Travis Kalanick | Uber | 2017 | Fire | Permanent exit |
| Steve Jobs | Apple | 1985 | Fire | Exile + Return |
| Steve Jobs | Apple | 1997 | Coup succeeded | Reinstated |
| Jack Dorsey | 2008 | Fire | Returned 2015 | |
| Parker Conrad | Zenefits | 2016 | Forced resign | Founded Rippling later |
| Adam Neumann | WeWork | 2019 | Forced resign | $1.7B severance |
| Bob Swan | Intel | 2021 | Replaced | Out |
| Kenneth Lin | Credit Karma | 2020 (acquisition) | Stayed | Full exit |
| Andy Rubin | Android | 2014 | Forced out | Founded Essential |
Pattern:
- Founder who are visionaries but not operators 最脆弱
- Founder who have super-voting stock 最 resilient
- Timing matters: growth phase 比 maturity phase 更容易 fire CEO
Part 8:Red Flag / Yellow Flag Catalog
Red Flags (Existential)
- VC 要求 CEO succession planning committee (and you're not leading)
- 3+ board members 有 "quiet 1-on-1s" excluding you
- Key employee 被 VC direct approach
- Board agenda 被 VC 主导
- Protective provisions 新增 CEO-related items
Yellow Flags (Warning)
- VC 开始用 formal language in board meetings (less casual)
- Info requests 超出 standard
- Independent director becomes distant
- Founders being asked "succession plans" more frequently
Green Flags (Healthy)
- Board debates issues openly
- Founder relationship with each board member has trust
- VC supports founder in tough decisions
- Independent directors bring expertise not politics
执行指令(给 LLM 代理)
使用此 skill 的 prompt 模板:
Scenario A:Board 设计 (Pre-TS)
我在谈 Series A TS,VC 提议 board composition [describe]. 帮我:
1. 分析这个 composition 对 coup risk 的影响
2. 提出我应该 counter 的 TS 条款
3. 给我 independent director 选择的 criteria
Scenario B:Ongoing Board 管理
我是 CEO,我的 board composition 是 [describe]. 最近感觉 [specific signal]. 帮我:
1. 识别这是 Red/Yellow/Green flag
2. 如果 coup is happening,assess my leverage
3. Propose 具体应对策略
Scenario C:Coup 发生时
我 detected coup signals: [list them]. 帮我:
1. 评估 coup 是否 real (or paranoia)
2. 如果 real,我的 4 个 options (fight / negotiate / nuclear / exit) 的 pros/cons
3. Specific playbook for 下 30 days
与其他 skills 的协作
- 前置:
term-sheet-negotiator(board composition 在 TS 时 set) - 前置:
founder-fundraising-wargame(理解融资 + board 整体) - 并行:
vc-due-diligence-simulator(post-close 也需要 ongoing diligence on board)
校准锚点 (V1.0)
- 2023-2024 environment:LP pressure on VC to show returns → more aggressive CEO replacement
- Post-OpenAI drama:Some VCs more cautious about coups (bad PR)
- AI-native companies:Founder concentration higher → dual-class and super-voting more common
changelog
- v1.0 2026-04-17:首版。提出「5 类 board member + 12 种 boardroom move + 12 类 coup triggers + 7 层 coup-proofing defense + coup 发生时 playbook + 4 种 post-coup outcomes」。基于 OpenAI/Uber/Apple 经典案例。卫星文件
board-coup-casebook.md待完成。
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