Side channel auditor
Skill Yue-Zhou1/zkcrypto-audit/plugins/implementation-safety/skills/side-channel-auditor
Audit timing, cache, memory-access, and power-analysis leakage patterns, including compiler and feature-flag regressions that break constant-time assumptions.From its SKILL.md
npx -y skills add Yue-Zhou1/zkcrypto-audit --skill side-channel-auditorAssembled from the repository path, not quoted from the project. Check it against their README if it does not work.
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SKILL.md
2.9 KB, 580 tokens by cl100k_base, as published. Nobody here has run it
side-channel-auditor
Domain auditor for constant-time assumptions and microarchitectural leakage risk.
When to Use
- Reviewing secret-dependent control-flow and memory-access behavior
- Auditing cache, branch-predictor, and power-related leakage surfaces
- Checking compiler/feature-flag combinations for constant-time regressions
- Verifying zeroization and error-handling latency do not leak secrets
When NOT to Use
- Protocol-level correctness audits without side-channel threat surfaces
- Purely functional bugs unrelated to timing/cache/power leakage
- Active fault-injection attacks where the attacker glitches/corrupts the
computation (RSA-CRT Bellcore, DFA, verification-skip) ->
fault-injection-auditor; this skill covers PASSIVE leakage only - Declaring side-channel concerns confirmed without evidence-backed verification
Core Review Areas
- Secret-dependent branches and control-flow decisions
- Table lookups and cache-line dependent access patterns
- Variable-time arithmetic and modular-reduction hotspots
- Compiler/feature-flag regressions that reintroduce leakage
- Operational side effects (logging, errors, zeroization) that leak validity
Workflow
Phase 1: Secret-bearing inventory
- Read
references/side-channel-checklist.md - Execute
workflows/constant-time-review.md - Enumerate secret-bearing values and trace their influence on control/data flow
Phase 2: Constant-time path analysis
- Validate constant-time helper usage and fallback behavior
- Inspect branch and memory-access patterns under secret variation
- Review compiler settings and feature flags for regression risk
Phase 3: Pattern hunt
- Read
references/finding-patterns.md - If the codebase includes a ZK prover, read
references/zk-prover-patterns.mdbefore completing the pattern hunt - Prioritize secret-branch, table-index, optimization, and error-latency findings
Phase 4: Handoff
- Send surviving findings to
crypto-fp-check - Use
zkbugs-indexonly after the finding survives verification
Output Contract
Produce a side-channel-specific handoff that includes:
- The secret-bearing value and affected control/data path
- The leakage class (timing, cache, memory, power, or operational)
- Tool-backed evidence status (
dudect,ctgrind, microbenchmarks) if available - The next verification or reporting route
Reference Index
What ships with it: 5 files
5.5 KB alongside SKILL.md
agents/
- openai.yaml436 B
references/
- finding-patterns.md595 B
- side-channel-checklist.md1.2 KB
- zk-prover-patterns.md2.1 KB
workflows/
- constant-time-review.md1.1 KB