Graphql security testing

Graphql Security Testing

penkit51 AI — professional penetration testing skill pack. Authorized testing only.

Deep Exploitation Guide

GraphQL

Security testing for GraphQL APIs. Focus on resolver-level authorization, field/edge access control, batching abuse, and federation trust boundaries.

Attack Surface

Operations

• Queries, mutations, subscriptions
• Persisted queries / Automatic Persisted Queries (APQ)

Transports

• HTTP POST/GET with application/json or application/graphql
• WebSocket: graphql-ws, graphql-transport-ws protocols
• Multipart for file uploads

Schema Features

• Introspection (__schema, __type)
• Directives: @defer, @stream, custom auth directives (@auth, @private)
• Custom scalars: Upload, JSON, DateTime
• Relay: global node IDs, connections/cursors, interfaces/unions

Architecture

• Federation (Apollo, GraphQL Mesh): _service, _entities
• Gateway vs subgraph authorization boundaries

Reconnaissance

Endpoint Discovery

POST /graphql         {"query":"{__typename}"}
POST /api/graphql     {"query":"{__typename}"}
POST /v1/graphql      {"query":"{__typename}"}
POST /gql             {"query":"{__typename}"}
GET  /graphql?query={__typename}

Check for GraphiQL/Playground exposure with credentials enabled (cross-origin with cookies can leak data via postMessage bridges).

Schema Acquisition

If introspection enabled:

{__schema{types{name fields{name args{name}}}}}

If disabled, infer schema via:

• __typename probes on candidate fields
• Field suggestion errors (submit near-miss names to harvest suggestions)
• "Expected one of" errors revealing enum values
• Type coercion errors exposing field structure
• Error taxonomy: different codes for "unknown field" vs "unauthorized field" reveal existence

Schema Mapping

Map: root operations, object types, interfaces/unions, directives, custom scalars. Identify sensitive fields: email, tokens, roles, billing, API keys, admin flags, file URLs. Note cascade paths where child resolvers may skip auth under parent assumptions.

Key Vulnerabilities

Authorization Bypass

Field-Level IDOR

Test with aliases comparing owned vs foreign objects in single request:

query {
  own: order(id:"OWNED_ID") { id total owner { email } }
  foreign: order(id:"FOREIGN_ID") { id total owner { email } }
}

Edge/Child Resolver Gaps

Parent resolver checks auth, child resolver assumes it's already validated:

query {
  user(id:"FOREIGN") {
    id
    privateData { secrets }  # Child may skip auth check
  }
}

Relay Node Resolution

Decode base64 global IDs, swap type/id pairs:

query {
  node(id:"VXNlcjoxMjM=") { ... on User { email } }
}

Ensure per-type authorization is enforced inside resolvers. Verify connection filters (owner/tenant) apply before pagination; cursor tampering should not cross ownership boundaries.

Mutation Bypass

• Probe mutations for partial updates bypassing validation (JSON Merge Patch semantics)
• Test mutations that accept extra fields passed to downstream logic

Batching & Alias Abuse

Enumeration via Aliases

query {
  u1:user(id:"1"){email}
  u2:user(id:"2"){email}
  u3:user(id:"3"){email}
}

Bypasses per-request rate limits; exposes per-field vs per-request auth inconsistencies.

Array Batching

If supported (non-standard), submit multiple operations to achieve partial failures and bypass limits.

Input Manipulation

Type Confusion

{id: 123}      vs {id: "123"}
{id: [123]}    vs {id: null}
{id: 0}        vs {id: -1}

Duplicate Keys

{"id": 1, "id": 2}

Parser precedence varies; may bypass validation. Also test default argument values.

Extra Fields

Send unexpected keys in input objects; backends may pass them to resolvers or downstream logic.

Cursor Manipulation

Decode cursors (usually base64) to:

• Manipulate offsets/IDs
• Skip filters
• Cross ownership boundaries

Directive Abuse

@defer/@stream

query {
  me { id }
  ... @defer { adminPanel { secrets } }
}

May return gated data in incremental delivery. Confirm server supports incremental delivery.

Custom Directives

@auth, @private and similar directives often annotate intent but do not enforce—verify actual checks in each resolver path.

Complexity Attacks

Fragment Bombs

fragment x on User { friends { ...x } }
query { me { ...x } }

Test depth/complexity limits, query cost analyzers, timeouts.

Wide Selection Sets

Abuse selection sets and fragments to force overfetching of sensitive subfields.

Federation Exploitation

SDL Exposure

query { _service { sdl } }

Entity Materialization

query {
  _entities(representations:[
    {__typename:"User", id:"TARGET_ID"}
  ]) { ... on User { email roles } }
}

Gateway may enforce auth; subgraph resolvers may not. Look for cross-subgraph IDOR via inconsistent ownership checks.

Subscription Security

• Authorization at handshake only, not per-message
• Subscribe to other users' channels via filter args
• Cross-tenant event leakage
• Abuse filter args in subscription resolvers to reference foreign IDs

Persisted Query Abuse

• APQ hashes leaked from client bundles
• Replay privileged operations with attacker variables
• Hash bruteforce for common operations
• Validate hash→operation mapping enforces principal and operation allowlists

CORS & CSRF

• Cookie-auth with GET queries enables CSRF on mutations via query parameters
• GraphiQL/Playground cross-origin with credentials leaks data
• Missing SameSite and origin validation

File Uploads

GraphQL multipart spec:

• Multiple Upload scalars
• Filename/path traversal tricks
• Unexpected content-types, oversize chunks
• Server-side ownership/scoping for returned URLs

WAF Evasion

Query Reshaping

• Comments and block strings ("""...""")
• Unicode escapes
• Alias/fragment indirection
• JSON variables vs inline args
• GET vs POST vs application/graphql

Fragment Splitting

Split fields across fragments and inline spreads to avoid naive signatures:

fragment a on User { email }
fragment b on User { password }
query { me { ...a ...b } }

Bypass Techniques

Transport Switching

Content-Type: application/json
Content-Type: application/graphql
Content-Type: multipart/form-data
GET with query params

Timing & Rate Limits

• HTTP/2 multiplexing and connection reuse to widen timing windows
• Batching to bypass rate limits

Naming Tricks

• Case/underscore variations
• Unicode homoglyphs (server-dependent)
• Aliases masking sensitive field names

Cache Confusion

• CDN caching without Vary on Authorization
• Variable manipulation affecting cache keys
• Redirects and 304/206 behaviors leaking partial responses

Testing Methodology

1. Fingerprint - Identify endpoints, transports, stack (Apollo, Hasura, etc.), GraphiQL exposure
2. Schema mapping - Introspection or inference to build complete type graph
3. Principal matrix - Collect tokens for unauth, user, premium, admin roles with at least one valid object ID per subject
4. Field sweep - Test each resolver with owned vs foreign IDs via aliases in same request
5. Transport parity - Verify same auth on HTTP, WebSocket, persisted queries
6. Federation probe - Test _service and _entities for subgraph auth gaps
7. Edge cases - Cursors, @defer/@stream, subscriptions, file uploads

Validation Requirements

• Paired requests (owner vs non-owner) showing unauthorized access
• Resolver-level bypass: parent checks present, child field exposes data
• Transport parity proof: HTTP and WebSocket for same operation
• Federation bypass: _entities accessing data without subgraph auth
• Minimal payloads with exact selection sets and variable shapes
• Document exact resolver paths that missed enforcement

Platform Methodology

Graphql Security Testing

penkit51 AI — professional penetration testing skill pack. Authorized testing only.

Deep Exploitation Guide

GraphQL

Security testing for GraphQL APIs. Focus on resolver-level authorization, field/edge access control, batching abuse, and federation trust boundaries.

Attack Surface

Operations

• Queries, mutations, subscriptions
• Persisted queries / Automatic Persisted Queries (APQ)

Transports

• HTTP POST/GET with application/json or application/graphql
• WebSocket: graphql-ws, graphql-transport-ws protocols
• Multipart for file uploads

Schema Features

• Introspection (__schema, __type)
• Directives: @defer, @stream, custom auth directives (@auth, @private)
• Custom scalars: Upload, JSON, DateTime
• Relay: global node IDs, connections/cursors, interfaces/unions

Architecture

• Federation (Apollo, GraphQL Mesh): _service, _entities
• Gateway vs subgraph authorization boundaries

Reconnaissance

Endpoint Discovery

POST /graphql         {"query":"{__typename}"}
POST /api/graphql     {"query":"{__typename}"}
POST /v1/graphql      {"query":"{__typename}"}
POST /gql             {"query":"{__typename}"}
GET  /graphql?query={__typename}

Check for GraphiQL/Playground exposure with credentials enabled (cross-origin with cookies can leak data via postMessage bridges).

Schema Acquisition

If introspection enabled:

{__schema{types{name fields{name args{name}}}}}

If disabled, infer schema via:

• __typename probes on candidate fields
• Field suggestion errors (submit near-miss names to harvest suggestions)
• "Expected one of" errors revealing enum values
• Type coercion errors exposing field structure
• Error taxonomy: different codes for "unknown field" vs "unauthorized field" reveal existence

Schema Mapping

Map: root operations, object types, interfaces/unions, directives, custom scalars. Identify sensitive fields: email, tokens, roles, billing, API keys, admin flags, file URLs. Note cascade paths where child resolvers may skip auth under parent assumptions.

Key Vulnerabilities

Authorization Bypass

Field-Level IDOR

Test with aliases comparing owned vs foreign objects in single request:

query {
  own: order(id:"OWNED_ID") { id total owner { email } }
  foreign: order(id:"FOREIGN_ID") { id total owner { email } }
}

Edge/Child Resolver Gaps

Parent resolver checks auth, child resolver assumes it's already validated:

query {
  user(id:"FOREIGN") {
    id
    privateData { secrets }  # Child may skip auth check
  }
}

Relay Node Resolution

Decode base64 global IDs, swap type/id pairs:

query {
  node(id:"VXNlcjoxMjM=") { ... on User { email } }
}

Ensure per-type authorization is enforced inside resolvers. Verify connection filters (owner/tenant) apply before pagination; cursor tampering should not cross ownership boundaries.

Mutation Bypass

• Probe mutations for partial updates bypassing validation (JSON Merge Patch semantics)
• Test mutations that accept extra fields passed to downstream logic

Batching & Alias Abuse

Enumeration via Aliases

query {
  u1:user(id:"1"){email}
  u2:user(id:"2"){email}
  u3:user(id:"3"){email}
}

Bypasses per-request rate limits; exposes per-field vs per-request auth inconsistencies.

Array Batching

If supported (non-standard), submit multiple operations to achieve partial failures and bypass limits.

Input Manipulation

Type Confusion

{id: 123}      vs {id: "123"}
{id: [123]}    vs {id: null}
{id: 0}        vs {id: -1}

Duplicate Keys

{"id": 1, "id": 2}

Parser precedence varies; may bypass validation. Also test default argument values.

Extra Fields

Send unexpected keys in input objects; backends may pass them to resolvers or downstream logic.

Cursor Manipulation

Decode cursors (usually base64) to:

• Manipulate offsets/IDs
• Skip filters
• Cross ownership boundaries

Directive Abuse

@defer/@stream

query {
  me { id }
  ... @defer { adminPanel { secrets } }
}

May return gated data in incremental delivery. Confirm server supports incremental delivery.

Custom Directives

@auth, @private and similar directives often annotate intent but do not enforce—verify actual checks in each resolver path.

Complexity Attacks

Fragment Bombs

fragment x on User { friends { ...x } }
query { me { ...x } }

Test depth/complexity limits, query cost analyzers, timeouts.

Wide Selection Sets

Abuse selection sets and fragments to force overfetching of sensitive subfields.

Federation Exploitation

SDL Exposure

query { _service { sdl } }

Entity Materialization

query {
  _entities(representations:[
    {__typename:"User", id:"TARGET_ID"}
  ]) { ... on User { email roles } }
}

Gateway may enforce auth; subgraph resolvers may not. Look for cross-subgraph IDOR via inconsistent ownership checks.

Subscription Security

• Authorization at handshake only, not per-message
• Subscribe to other users' channels via filter args
• Cross-tenant event leakage
• Abuse filter args in subscription resolvers to reference foreign IDs

Persisted Query Abuse

• APQ hashes leaked from client bundles
• Replay privileged operations with attacker variables
• Hash bruteforce for common operations
• Validate hash→operation mapping enforces principal and operation allowlists

CORS & CSRF

• Cookie-auth with GET queries enables CSRF on mutations via query parameters
• GraphiQL/Playground cross-origin with credentials leaks data
• Missing SameSite and origin validation

File Uploads

GraphQL multipart spec:

• Multiple Upload scalars
• Filename/path traversal tricks
• Unexpected content-types, oversize chunks
• Server-side ownership/scoping for returned URLs

WAF Evasion

Query Reshaping

• Comments and block strings ("""...""")
• Unicode escapes
• Alias/fragment indirection
• JSON variables vs inline args
• GET vs POST vs application/graphql

Fragment Splitting

Split fields across fragments and inline spreads to avoid naive signatures:

fragment a on User { email }
fragment b on User { password }
query { me { ...a ...b } }

Bypass Techniques

Transport Switching

Content-Type: application/json
Content-Type: application/graphql
Content-Type: multipart/form-data
GET with query params

Timing & Rate Limits

• HTTP/2 multiplexing and connection reuse to widen timing windows
• Batching to bypass rate limits

Naming Tricks

• Case/underscore variations
• Unicode homoglyphs (server-dependent)
• Aliases masking sensitive field names

Cache Confusion

• CDN caching without Vary on Authorization
• Variable manipulation affecting cache keys
• Redirects and 304/206 behaviors leaking partial responses

Testing Methodology

1. Fingerprint - Identify endpoints, transports, stack (Apollo, Hasura, etc.), GraphiQL exposure
2. Schema mapping - Introspection or inference to build complete type graph
3. Principal matrix - Collect tokens for unauth, user, premium, admin roles with at least one valid object ID per subject
4. Field sweep - Test each resolver with owned vs foreign IDs via aliases in same request
5. Transport parity - Verify same auth on HTTP, WebSocket, persisted queries
6. Federation probe - Test _service and _entities for subgraph auth gaps
7. Edge cases - Cursors, @defer/@stream, subscriptions, file uploads

Validation Requirements

• Paired requests (owner vs non-owner) showing unauthorized access
• Resolver-level bypass: parent checks present, child field exposes data
• Transport parity proof: HTTP and WebSocket for same operation
• Federation bypass: _entities accessing data without subgraph auth
• Minimal payloads with exact selection sets and variable shapes
• Document exact resolver paths that missed enforcement

Validation & Reporting

• Confirm every finding with reproducible PoC before reporting
• Document: severity (CVSS), affected asset, steps, evidence, remediation
• Use record_vulnerability when running inside the penkit51 platform
• Chain low-severity findings into higher-impact attack paths
• Never report without evidence — distinguish hypothesis from confirmed vuln

Validation & Reporting

• Confirm every finding with reproducible PoC before reporting
• Document: severity (CVSS), affected asset, steps, evidence, remediation
• Use record_vulnerability when running inside the penkit51 platform
• Chain low-severity findings into higher-impact attack paths
• Never report without evidence — distinguish hypothesis from confirmed vuln