Attack tree construction
Skill wshobson/agents/plugins/security-scanning/skills/attack-tree-construction
Multi-harness agentic plugin marketplace for Claude Code, Codex CLI, Cursor, OpenCode, GitHub Copilot, and Gemini CLI
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What its author says it does
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Build comprehensive attack trees to visualize threat paths. Use when mapping attack scenarios, identifying defense gaps, or communicating security risks to stakeholders.
SKILL.md
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Attack Tree Construction
Systematic attack path visualization and analysis.
When to Use This Skill
- Visualizing complex attack scenarios
- Identifying defense gaps and priorities
- Communicating risks to stakeholders
- Planning defensive investments
- Penetration test planning
- Security architecture review
Core Concepts
1. Attack Tree Structure
[Root Goal]
|
┌────────────┴────────────┐
│ │
[Sub-goal 1] [Sub-goal 2]
(OR node) (AND node)
│ │
┌─────┴─────┐ ┌─────┴─────┐
│ │ │ │
[Attack] [Attack] [Attack] [Attack]
(leaf) (leaf) (leaf) (leaf)
2. Node Types
| Type | Symbol | Description |
|---|---|---|
| OR | Oval | Any child achieves goal |
| AND | Rectangle | All children required |
| Leaf | Box | Atomic attack step |
3. Attack Attributes
| Attribute | Description | Values |
|---|---|---|
| Cost | Resources needed | $, $$, $$$ |
| Time | Duration to execute | Hours, Days, Weeks |
| Skill | Expertise required | Low, Medium, High |
| Detection | Likelihood of detection | Low, Medium, High |
Templates and detailed worked examples
Full template library lives in references/details.md. Read that file when you need concrete templates for this skill.
Best Practices
Do's
- Start with clear goals - Define what attacker wants
- Be exhaustive - Consider all attack vectors
- Attribute attacks - Cost, skill, and detection
- Update regularly - New threats emerge
- Validate with experts - Red team review
Don'ts
- Don't oversimplify - Real attacks are complex
- Don't ignore dependencies - AND nodes matter
- Don't forget insider threats - Not all attackers are external
- Don't skip mitigations - Trees are for defense planning
- Don't make it static - Threat landscape evolves