Threat modeling
Some of my Agents & Skills, compatible with most AI coding tools
npx -y skills add uwuclxdy/agenticat --skill threat-modelingAssembled from the repository path, not quoted from the project. Check it against their README if it does not work.
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Threat modeling with STRIDE, attack trees, security-requirement extraction, mitigation and control-library selection (defense-in-depth), and compliance mapping (PCI-DSS/HIPAA/GDPR/OWASP-ASVS). Use when doing a security review, choosing mitigating controls, hardening a design, or building a threat-model doc.
SKILL.md
3.0 KB, as published. Nobody here has run it
Threat Modeling
This threat-models a system's components and data flows, not its code. Pick the one reference the task needs; don't load all four.
| Task | File |
|---|---|
| Identify threats per component/interaction (STRIDE questionnaires, DFD trust-boundary analysis, threat-model doc template) | references/stride.md |
| Map attack paths (OR/AND node model, path + coverage analysis, worked account-takeover example) | references/attack-trees.md |
| Turn threats into requirements (STRIDE -> requirement patterns, compliance mapping with PCI-DSS/HIPAA/GDPR/OWASP-ASVS control IDs; SOC2/NIST CSF/ISO 27001 have no control-id table) | references/requirements.md |
| Choose and prioritize controls (standard-controls library, defense-in-depth layering, coverage + gap analysis) | references/mitigations.md |
Core Model
STRIDE categories and the property each violates:
| Threat | Property violated |
|---|---|
| Spoofing | Authentication |
| Tampering | Integrity |
| Repudiation | Non-repudiation |
| Information disclosure | Confidentiality |
| Denial of service | Availability |
| Elevation of privilege | Authorization |
Attack trees: root = attacker goal; OR nodes (any child suffices), AND nodes (all children required), leaves = concrete attack steps scored by difficulty, cost, and detection risk. Cheapest complete path = priority defense target.
Control categories, in layering order: preventive (stop), detective (notice), corrective (recover). Deterrent and compensating controls sit outside that order. A threat counts as covered only when both a preventive control and a detective control apply.
Workflow
- Define scope and trust boundaries.
- Draw the data flow diagram (flows and boundaries, not just components).
- Identify assets and entry points.
- Apply STRIDE per element and per interaction (
references/stride.md). - Build attack trees for the critical paths (
references/attack-trees.md). - Score and prioritize (likelihood × impact).
- Extract requirements and map controls (
references/requirements.md,references/mitigations.md). - Document residual risks; revisit when components, trust boundaries, or data flows change.
The reference tables and templates are material to read and adapt per session, not a library to install.
Gotchas
references/requirements.mdTemplate 1 names 7 compliance frameworks, but Template 3's control-id mapping table only covers PCI DSS, HIPAA, GDPR, and OWASP ASVS. SOC2, NIST CSF, and ISO 27001 have no control-id table anywhere in this skill.
Delegating
For a standalone modeling run, if the threat-modeler agent is installed, spawn it; otherwise follow the Workflow above directly.