Threat modeling
Skill ulises-jeremias/agent-toolkit/skills/agentic-security/threat-modeling
STRIDE + agentic threat modeling — architecture discovery → assets/trust boundaries/data flows/actors → STRIDE + agentic threats → risk-ranked mitigations → incremental review → security acceptance criteria. Swarm-friendly.From its SKILL.md
npx -y skills add ulises-jeremias/agent-toolkit --skill threat-modelingAssembled from the repository path, not quoted from the project. Check it against their README if it does not work.
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SKILL.md
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Threat Modeling — STRIDE + Agentic Threats
Guide architecture → threat model → security review → security acceptance criteria. Produces a STRIDE table augmented with agentic-specific threats (prompt injection, tool poisoning, excessive agency, inter-agent trust), risk-ranked with mitigations and acceptance criteria.
Evidence-linked, portable, incremental. Architecture discovery reuses C4/Mermaid inputs (#369); outputs feed agentic-security-reviewer + owasp-agentic-review + security-reviewer.
Sources: Microsoft STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege) + OWASP Threat Modeling + OWASP Agentic Security (prompt injection, tool poisoning, excessive agency, data leakage, insecure plugin/MCP). See https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/develop/threat-modeling-tool-threats and https://owasp.org/www-project-threat-model/ .
When to use
- New system/C4 design (
architectoutput), new data flow (user → agent → tool → external), new trust boundary (skill composition, MCP addition, swarm handoff) - Before
security-reviewer/owasp-agentic-reviewprioritizes mitigations - On architecture change — incremental mode re-runs only on deltas
Inputs
| Input | Source | Required |
|---|---|---|
| Architecture diagram | architect / C4/Mermaid (#369) — docs/architecture/*.md, Mermaid C4Context/flowchart | Yes (or textual description for small scopes) |
| Assets | Code + docs: skills, agents, MCP registry, secrets, data stores | Yes |
| Trust boundaries | User ↔ agent, agent ↔ MCP, agent ↔ external host, inter-agent, skill composition | Yes |
| Data flows | audit-capability.py shell/network/MCP/hooks surface, registry YAML, hook configs | Yes |
| Actors | Users, agents (by persona), MCP servers, external services | Yes |
Outputs
threat-model.mdperreferences/threat-model-template.md: assets/boundaries/flows/actors → STRIDE + agentic threats table (severity, likelihood, impact, confidence, evidence) → mitigations → security acceptance criteria- Incremental diff when
architecture discoverychanged - Handoff:
agentic-security-reviewerconsumes findings for OWASP review;security-reviewerfor app-layer vulns
STRIDE + agentic checklist
| STRIDE | Meaning | Agentic extension | Evidence to check |
|---|---|---|---|
| S Spoofing | Impersonate user/agent/MCP | Identity spoofing (AGNT01), prompt hierarchy violation (AGNT06) | agents/*/AGENT.md identity, MCP auth.env, delegation tables |
| T Tampering | Modify data/code/instructions in transit | Tool poisoning (AGNT02), training-data/supply-chain poisoning (LLM03) | mcp/registry/*.yaml tool descriptions with imperative injection, capabilities/upstream.lock digests |
| R Repudiation | Deny action without audit trail | Missing output-handshake, Swarm handoff without logging | output-handshake gates, ops/swarm-handoff audit |
| I Information disclosure | Leak secrets/PII via tool output | Data leakage (AGNT04), sensitive info disclosure (LLM06), model theft (LLM10) | security.network_hosts, secret_storage, scans for ghp_, sk-, PII |
| D Denial of service | Exhaust tokens/compute | Model DoS (LLM04) — unbounded skill context, swarm fan-out | Skill token count, subagent fan-out limits, docs/research context audit |
| E Elevation of privilege | Gain permissions beyond least privilege | Excessive agency (LLM08), permission creep (AGNT05), insecure plugin design (LLM07) | approval.default, security.dangerous_permissions, composed skill chain |
Map each finding to STRIDE letter(s) + agentic IDs (LLM01–LLM10, AGNT01–AGNT06) where applicable. One finding can map to multiple STRIDE categories (e.g., tool poisoning = T + E).
Workflow
- Discover scope: Identify assets + trust boundaries + data flows + actors from architecture diagram (or
git diff HEADdeltas in incremental mode). Enumerate: skills (skills/**), agents (agents/**), MCP servers (mcp/registry/*.yaml+ templates), hooks, subagents, external hosts. - Enumerate threats: For each asset/flow/boundary, apply STRIDE + agentic checklist above. Ask per element: who can spoof? what can be tampered? what lacks repudiation? what leaks? what DoS? what elevates? Add agentic prompts: can tool description inject? can MCP exfiltrate? can agent over-act?
- Risk-rank: Score
Impact(who/what compromised) ×Likelihood(Low/Med/High) ×Confidence(High/Med/Low) →SeverityCritical/High/Medium/Low (or Blocking/Major/Minor). Cite evidence:file:line, registry YAML path,audit-capability.pyoutput, diagram node. - Mitigate + acceptance criteria: Per finding:
mitigation(least-privilege, pin + provenance, sanitize, gate),residual risk,security acceptance criteria(testable, e.g., "tool descriptions contain no imperative injectionviaaudit-capability.pyclean"). Applyoutput-handshakebefore final artifact. - Incremental review: On architecture change, diff
threat-model.mdprevious version: keep unchanged findings, re-evaluate only changed assets/flows. For large systems, shard by trust boundary or swarm agent.
Risk table shape
| # | Asset / Flow (diagram ref) | Trust boundary | STRIDE | Agentic ID | Threat (observation, file:line) | Attack path (actor → boundary → asset) | Impact | Likelihood | Severity | Confidence | Mitigation | Residual | Acceptance criteria | Evidence |
|---|
Sort by Severity (Critical → Low), then Likelihood. Include Residual risk after mitigation.
Incremental mode
- Input:
git diff+ previousthreat-model.md(from repodocs/security/threat-model*.mdor prior PR). - Behavior: Carry forward findings for unchanged elements with
status: unchanged; marknew/updated/removedfor deltas; re-rank only affected rows. - Swarm-friendly: Split large architectures by trust boundary (e.g.,
user ↔ agentvsagent ↔ MCP) and run parallel subagents; merge tables, dedupe by asset+STRIDE.
Collaboration
| Need | Delegate to |
|---|---|
| System design, C4/Mermaid, ADRs | architect / platform-engineer (references/WORKSTATION_OPS.md) — provides Inputs architecture diagram |
| App/code vulns (OWASP Web) | security-reviewer / agents/security-reviewer — consumes threat model for prioritized review |
| Agentic / LLM / MCP / supply-chain | agentic-security-reviewer + agentic-security/owasp-agentic-review (LLM01-10 + AGNT01-06) — joint risk table |
| Full supply-chain surface | agentic-security/supply-chain-audit |
| MCP config/impl depth | agentic-security/mcp-audit |
| Output gate | output-handshake |
| Swarm decomposition | ops/swarm-handoff |
Sequence: architecture discovery → threat-modeling (this skill) → security review (owasp-agentic + security-reviewer) → security acceptance criteria.
Anti-patterns
- Do not hallucinate STRIDE findings without evidence (cite
file:lineor registry path). - Do not collapse STRIDE into single category — one flow often maps to S+T+E.
- Do not claim full coverage from automated checks alone — mark
Not assessed (requires manual review)where needed (per #380 a11y analog). - Do not run full model on every file change — use incremental mode.
References
references/threat-model-template.md— report template- Microsoft STRIDE: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/develop/threat-modeling-tool-threats
- OWASP Threat Modeling: https://owasp.org/www-project-threat-model/
- OWASP Agentic Security: https://owasp.org/www-project-agentic-security/
mcp/registry/*.yaml+ static Grep for shell/network/mcp/hooks (repo checkout/CI:scripts/audit-capability.vsh)architect/ C4/Mermaid (#369) — discovery inputs