Secure access control

Secure access control (access.authz / access.privileged / access.authn) — authoring-time guidance

Scope: this skill helps you implement the technical access-control controls in code. It does not make a system "compliant" — certification is the auditor's call. It makes the code satisfy the control and produces machine-detectable evidence.

Framework-neutral by design. Code emits stable Throughproof control keys (access.authz, access.privileged), not framework ids. The crosswalk resolves them to SOC 2 (CC6.1–CC6.3), ISO 27001 (A.8.2 / A.8.3 / A.8.5), PCI-DSS v4 (Req 7.2 / 7.2.5 / 8.3), and HIPAA (164.312(a)(1) / 164.308(a)(4) / 164.312(d)) at once.

When this applies

Apply this skill whenever the code under edit enforces or grants access:

• Authorization decision: a check that gates an action or resource on a role, permission, ownership, or scope (require_role, policy check, if not user.can(...)).
• Privileged / admin operation: impersonation, granting/revoking access, changing another user's data, config or feature-flag overrides, destructive admin jobs.
• Authentication: login, password set/verify/reset, session/token issuance, MFA.

If the code is an ordinary, already-authorized read with no access decision, do not add an access event — over-logging is itself a finding.

1. Authorization — deny by default, least privilege

• Deny by default. The absence of an explicit allow is a deny. Never allow unless a check passed; never fall through to permit on an unknown role/branch.
• Check at the boundary, before the side effect — not after.
• Least privilege. Grant the narrowest scope that works; don't reach for admin/superuser.
• Emit the decision as an audit event on both allow and deny — the deny path is the detection signal for privilege-escalation attempts.

# authorization decision — sensitive: access.authz
def open_invoice(actor, invoice_id, correlation_id):
    inv = repo.get_invoice(invoice_id)
    if not actor.can_view(inv):                       # deny-by-default
        logger.info("audit", audit=True, control="access.authz", action="invoice.view",
                    actor=actor.id, target={"type": "invoice", "id": invoice_id},
                    outcome="denied", reason="not_owner",
                    ts=now(), correlation_id=correlation_id)
        raise Forbidden()
    logger.info("audit", audit=True, control="access.authz", action="invoice.view",
                actor=actor.id, target={"type": "invoice", "id": invoice_id},
                outcome="allowed", ts=now(), correlation_id=correlation_id)
    return inv

2. Privileged operations — access.privileged

Grant/revoke access, impersonation, and admin overrides emit an audit event with control="access.privileged", on success and failure, using ids (never PII) for actor/target. Same canonical shape as access.authz; only the control key and action differ.

3. Authentication — access.authn (static control)

• Hash passwords with a strong, salted KDF: bcrypt, argon2, scrypt, or PBKDF2. Never md5, sha1, or plaintext. Never compare passwords with == — use the library's constant-time verify.
• Sessions/tokens: high-entropy, httpOnly + secure cookies, sensible expiry, rotate on login, invalidate on logout/password-change.
• Prefer MFA for privileged accounts.
• Apply compliant-logging hygiene: never log passwords, tokens, or session ids.

# secure authentication — access.authn
import bcrypt
def set_password(user, raw):
    user.pw_hash = bcrypt.hashpw(raw.encode(), bcrypt.gensalt())   # ✅ salted, strong KDF
def verify_password(user, raw):
    return bcrypt.checkpw(raw.encode(), user.pw_hash)              # ✅ constant-time verify

Anti-patterns (do NOT do this)

if user.password == submitted:            # ❌ plaintext compare
stored = hashlib.md5(pw.encode())         # ❌ weak, unsalted hash
def admin(): do_admin()                   # ❌ no authorization check (implicit allow)
# (grant role with no audit event)        # ❌ missing detection signal on a privileged op

How to apply (checklist while editing)

1. Is this an access decision, privileged op, or auth code? If no → add nothing.
2. Make authorization deny-by-default; check before the side effect; grant least privilege.
3. Emit access.authz / access.privileged audit events on allow and deny / success and failure.
4. For auth: strong salted hashing, constant-time verify, safe sessions, no secrets in logs.
5. Use the project's existing auth + logger; do not add a new dependency.

Why the shape matters

The stable control + action + outcome shape lets a deterministic verifier trace each access decision to the control it satisfies — and access.authn insecurities (md5/sha1, plaintext compare) are statically detectable — so evidence maps to SOC 2 / ISO 27001 / PCI-DSS / HIPAA without LLM guesswork.