Flare security

Flare-Specific Security Standards

This skill has two halves you should read together:

1. Foundational secure-coding patterns that apply to every EVM contract, but are non-negotiable here. These are the defaults. Deviating from any of them without a documented reason should fail review.
2. Flare-specific overlays — things the generic audit / audit-contract skills don't catch because they're not chain-aware.

Philosophy: assume hostile. Every external surface — function inputs, token calls, oracle reads, signatures, calldata, RPCs — is adversarial. Defense in depth always. The audit reports we've seen on Flare contracts are clear: most real exploits come from token edge cases, signature replay, missing access control on admin functions, and FTSO/oracle manipulation. None of those are exotic — all are preventable with the patterns below.

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Part 1 — Foundational secure-coding patterns

Ownership

ALWAYS use Ownable2Step from OpenZeppelin, never Ownable.

import {Ownable2Step, Ownable} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable2Step.sol";

contract MyContract is Ownable2Step {
    constructor(address initialOwner) Ownable(initialOwner) { }
}

Why: a single-step ownership transfer is a critical vulnerability if the target address is wrong (typo'd, hardware-wallet path mismatch, contract that can't accept the role). Ownable2Step requires the new owner to call acceptOwnership(), eliminating the silent-handoff failure mode. The cost is two transactions instead of one — non-issue.

For Flare deployments, the deploy → handoff dance is:

1. Deploy from a hot EOA (deployer key).
2. Call transferOwnership(<Ledger or multisig address>) — this stages the pendingOwner.
3. Have the Ledger / multisig call acceptOwnership() to finalize.

After step 3, the deployer EOA has zero privileged access. Verify by reading owner() and pendingOwner() (must be 0x0 post-handoff).

For multi-role systems, prefer AccessControl from OpenZeppelin with explicit role-grants. Never invent your own role mapping.

Reentrancy guards

Use ReentrancyGuardTransient (post-EIP-1153, ~2k gas per call) over the storage-slot ReentrancyGuard whenever your pragma >=0.8.24.

import {ReentrancyGuardTransient} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/ReentrancyGuardTransient.sol";

contract MyContract is ReentrancyGuardTransient {
    function externalEntry() external nonReentrant {
        // ...
    }
}

Critical: nonReentrant MUST come BEFORE all other modifiers in a function's modifier list. This ensures the guard is set before any other modifier could make an external call. Modifier order is not commutative — it executes left-to-right.

// good — guard sets first
function withdraw(uint256 amount) external nonReentrant onlyOwner whenNotPaused {

// BAD — onlyOwner could (in some patterns) hit external code first
function withdraw(uint256 amount) external onlyOwner nonReentrant whenNotPaused {

Cross-function reentrancy is the harder case. If two functions touch the SAME state variable, both must be nonReentrant. Read-only reentrancy (a view function returning stale state during a callback) bites view-based price oracles — mitigate by validating the read against an independent source.

Token transfers

Always use SafeERC20, never raw transfer / transferFrom. Many tokens on Flare (USDT0, eUSDT, similar Tether forks) don't return bool — a raw call either reverts your transaction at compile-time-bool-decode-fail or silently proceeds with a stale-state assumption. SafeERC20 handles both.

import {SafeERC20} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol";
import {IERC20} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol";

using SafeERC20 for IERC20;

IERC20(token).safeTransfer(to, amount);
IERC20(token).safeTransferFrom(from, to, amount);
IERC20(token).forceApprove(spender, amount);  // NEVER plain approve()

Use forceApprove, not approve. Some tokens (USDT-family, KNC) reject a non-zero → non-zero approval transition; forceApprove resets to 0 first when needed.

For fee-on-transfer tokens (FLX, FLRFROG on Flare), safeTransferFrom does NOT validate the recipient's balance change matches the requested amount. The recipient receives strictly less. Patterns for handling FoT:

• Read balance before/after if the contract's logic depends on the actual transferred amount.
• Use a probe to detect FoT rate up front (see flare-network for the pattern when integrating with V2 routers via Permit2).
• Document explicitly in your contract that FoT tokens are not supported, and add a require check that compares balance delta to amount.

Checks-Effects-Interactions (CEI)

Always: validate inputs → update state → make external calls. Never reverse this order.

function withdraw(uint256 amount) external nonReentrant {
    // CHECKS
    if (amount == 0) revert MyContract__ZeroAmount();
    if (balances[msg.sender] < amount) revert MyContract__InsufficientBalance();

    // EFFECTS — update state BEFORE the external call
    balances[msg.sender] -= amount;
    emit Withdrawn(msg.sender, amount);

    // INTERACTIONS — last
    IERC20(token).safeTransfer(msg.sender, amount);
}

The reentrancy guard is a backstop. CEI is the primary defense. If you find yourself writing state changes AFTER an external call, stop and refactor.

Custom errors over require strings

Custom errors with contract-name prefixes:

error MyContract__ZeroAmount();
error MyContract__InsufficientBalance(uint256 have, uint256 want);

function f() external {
    if (x == 0) revert MyContract__ZeroAmount();
}

Why prefix with contract name + __: error selector collisions across contracts confuse decoder libraries when an error bubbles through a multi-hop revert. Prefixing makes it unambiguous. The __ is convention to distinguish from CamelCase variable names.

Custom errors are cheaper at deploy time (no string in bytecode) and at runtime (4-byte selector + ABI-encoded args vs. variable-length string). They also let auditors and frontend code decode the EXACT failure with rich data.

Immutable + constant for unchangeable values

contract MyContract {
    uint256 public constant FEE_BPS = 10_000;        // compile-time, free to read
    address public immutable WRAPPED_NATIVE;          // constructor-set, ~3 gas to read

    constructor(address wrappedNative) {
        if (wrappedNative == address(0)) revert MyContract__ZeroAddress();
        WRAPPED_NATIVE = wrappedNative;
    }
}

SLOAD is 2,100 gas; immutable is essentially free (loaded from bytecode). For a value read 10× per transaction, that's a 21,000-gas savings — meaningful.

Apply immutable to: external contract addresses (oracles, wrappers, registries), deploy-time-known constants (deployer, wrapped-native, fee receivers if fixed).

Function visibility

• external over public for functions only called from outside (calldata args are cheaper than memory).
• internal over private for testability (allow inheriting test contracts to override).
• public only when both internal and external callers exist.
• Explicit visibility on every state variable. Solidity warns on missing visibility but internal is cheap to type and removes ambiguity.

Modifier order (memorize this)

function f() external nonReentrant onlyOwner whenNotPaused {
//                    ^1            ^2        ^3
}

1. nonReentrant — must run first to lock the guard before any other modifier could make an external call.
2. Access control (onlyOwner, onlyRole).
3. State checks (whenNotPaused, whenInitialized).

Modifiers should NEVER make external calls (except the reentrancy guard's transient storage write). External calls in modifiers are unauditable and break the CEI invariant.

Bounded loops only

Never iterate over an unbounded array of user-controlled length. The block gas limit on Flare-family chains is ~15M; an unbounded loop hits it eventually and bricks the function.

// BAD — user can grow `pending` indefinitely until withdrawAll() reverts
mapping(address => uint256[]) pending;
function withdrawAll() external {
    uint256[] storage list = pending[msg.sender];
    for (uint256 i; i < list.length; ++i) {  // ← unbounded
        // ...
    }
}

// GOOD — pull pattern, batch size enforced
function withdrawSome(uint256 maxCount) external {
    uint256 n = pending[msg.sender].length;
    uint256 stop = maxCount < n ? maxCount : n;
    for (uint256 i; i < stop; ++i) {
        // ...
    }
}

Constants for hard caps:

uint256 public constant MAX_BATCH_SIZE = 50;

Pull over push for ETH / token transfers

Never transfer ETH to user-supplied addresses inside a loop. A single contract recipient that reverts on receive() (or address.transfer's 2300-gas gate) bricks your loop.

// BAD — one bad recipient kills the whole batch
for (uint256 i; i < recipients.length; ++i) {
    recipients[i].transfer(amounts[i]);
}

// GOOD — credit balances, let each user pull
for (uint256 i; i < recipients.length; ++i) {
    pendingWithdraw[recipients[i]] += amounts[i];
}
function claim() external nonReentrant {
    uint256 amt = pendingWithdraw[msg.sender];
    if (amt == 0) revert MyContract__NothingToClaim();
    pendingWithdraw[msg.sender] = 0;
    payable(msg.sender).transfer(amt);
}

For tokens, the same principle applies but you can wrap individual transfers in try/catch and redirect failures to a fallback recipient (the "treasury redirect" pattern when blacklisted tokens block a treasury address).

Never use tx.origin for authentication

tx.origin is the EOA at the start of the call chain. Using it for auth lets any contract the user has approved (or accidentally interacts with) trick the contract into authorizing as the user. Use msg.sender always.

Don't trust block values for randomness

block.timestamp, block.number, blockhash(N) are all miner-influenceable. Use Flare's secure random source (flare-general documents this). Never use any block value to gate financial outcomes.

Use block.timestamp only for long intervals

Miners can shift block.timestamp by a few seconds. Don't use it for sub-minute deadlines. For DEX deadlines, ~10 minutes is the standard floor.

Avoid selfdestruct and delegatecall

• selfdestruct is being deprecated; in EIP-6780 it only works in the same tx as deploy. Don't rely on it.
• delegatecall to a user-controlled target = full takeover of your contract. Even to a "trusted" target it's a major audit-flag pattern. Justify case by case with a documented threat model.

abi.encode over abi.encodePacked for hashing

abi.encodePacked with two dynamic-size inputs (string, bytes, uint256[]) is hash-collision-vulnerable: ("ab","c") and ("a","bc") hash to the same value. For hashing dynamic data, use abi.encode (length-prefixed).

Validate every external input

• address(0) for any address parameter that shouldn't be zero (revert with a named error).
• Bounded ranges on numeric parameters.
• Array length validation when an array's length must equal another's.
• Sanity-check token decimals if they affect math (some tokens have 6, some 24).

Never silently ignore return values

// BAD — returns false on failure for ERC-20s without revert
token.transfer(to, amount);

// GOOD — SafeERC20 reverts on false-return
IERC20(token).safeTransfer(to, amount);

// For low-level calls — always check ok
(bool ok, bytes memory data) = target.call(data);
if (!ok) revert MyContract__CallFailed(target, data);

Front-running mitigations

For any transaction whose value depends on observable state (price, deadline, nonce), apply at least one of:

1. Slippage gate — minimum-output parameter the caller signs.
2. Deadline — caller-supplied expiry; fail if block.timestamp > deadline.
3. Commit-reveal — for high-value actions where front-running would extract meaningful value.
4. Permit2 / EIP-712 signed permits — bind the spender into the hash so replays across contracts are impossible.

Pause / emergency-stop

Every contract that holds value or controls user funds should have an owner-callable pause:

bool public paused;

modifier whenNotPaused() {
    if (paused) revert MyContract__Paused();
    _;
}

function setPaused(bool paused_) external onlyOwner {
    paused = paused_;
    emit PausedSet(paused_);
}

Pause should NEVER affect user-fund-recovery paths. If the contract holds user tokens and is paused, users must still be able to withdraw what they put in.

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Part 2 — Flare-specific overlays

These are the things that bit real Flare deployments and are NOT covered by generic audit checklists. Apply on top of Part 1 for any contract you ship to Flare/Songbird/Coston2.

Permit2 chain availability

The canonical Uniswap Permit2 (0x000000000022D473030F116dDEE9F6B43aC78BA3) is deployed only on Flare (chain 14). NOT on Songbird, NOT on Coston2.

cast code 0x000000000022D473030F116dDEE9F6B43aC78BA3 --rpc-url <chain>
# Returns full bytecode on Flare; returns 0x on Songbird/Coston2

If your contract takes a Permit2 address as an immutable, document this; if it hardcodes the canonical address, gate deployment on a chain-id check.

For Songbird/Coston2 canary-testing of Permit2-dependent contracts, your only options are: deploy your own Permit2 (~3000 LOC of Uniswap source — substantial), mock-only test, or skip canary and validate via Flare fork.

Fee-on-transfer (FoT) token surface

Multiple tokens on Flare apply a transfer fee — the recipient receives strictly less than the sender debited. Examples: FLX (0x22757fb83836e3F9F0F353126cACD3B1Dc82a387, ~3% FoT), FLRFROG, others.

Threats this creates:

• Your contract calls transferFrom(user, this, X) and receives X * (1-r).
• Your contract then calls safeTransferFrom(this, downstream, X) — reverts with TransferHelper::transferFrom because you don't have X anymore.
• Pair-side V2 swap math may underflow if the actual liquidity received differs from what was quoted.

Mitigations:

1. Probe the FoT rate before encoding the swap calldata — measure balanceOf(this) change over a single transferFrom, then encode the downstream amount as that delta.
2. Read-and-call pattern in the contract — balanceOf(this) after the input transfer to determine the actual amount available, then use that for any downstream transfer.
3. Document non-support — explicit revert if received != amount on input, so the user gets a clean failure instead of weird behavior deeper in the call.

Blacklistable stablecoin surface

USDT0, USDC.e, eUSDT, exUSDT, and similar admin-controlled stablecoins can freeze any address (including your contract) at the token issuer's discretion.

Implications for your design:

• A blacklisted contract cannot transfer the token outbound — pending state is stuck.
• Treasury fee splits to a blacklisted treasury address freeze that share — the rest of the operation should NOT revert (use try/catch to fall through to a redirect).
• Don't add an admin rescue function that pulls user-deposited tokens. That's a bigger threat than the blacklist itself. Instead document the risk and let users avoid the contract for blacklist-prone tokens.

FTSO redistributor proxy upgradeability

Enosys's FtsoRewardRedistributorForNft (the contract you call to claim FTSO delegation rewards on V3 NFTs) is an upgradeable proxy. The implementation can change without warning. Implications:

• The interface (function selectors, return shapes) is stable in practice but not guaranteed in the contract code itself.
• A future upgrade could route claimed rewards somewhere new. Audit-time verification is point-in-time only.
• Always wrap claim calls in try/catch so a redistributor regression doesn't brick your contract's main flow.

try IFtsoRewardRedistributorForNft(redistributor).claim(ids, recipient) {
    // ok
} catch {
    // redistributor reverted or mis-routed; continue without rewards
}

For per-DEX rotation patterns and recovery via historical addresses, see enosys-dex-v3.

Native-currency basefee floor

block.basefee on Songbird and Coston2 is often 1 wei or 2 wei. Any incentive-math gate that uses basefee * gasEstimate * coverageMultiple to require a minimum fee collapses to near-zero on those chains.

If your contract has a fee-incentive-coverage check, add a minBasefeeWei floor (typical: 25 gwei to match Flare's mainnet basefee, owner-tunable up to a hard cap of 1000 gwei).

uint256 effectiveBasefee = block.basefee > minBasefeeWei ? block.basefee : minBasefeeWei;
uint256 required = effectiveBasefee * gasEstimate * minCoverageMultiple;

Public RPC eth_getLogs 30-block cap

The public RPC endpoints on Flare/Songbird/Coston2 cap historical log queries to 30 blocks per request. Don't build features that require scanning longer history off the public RPC.

Workarounds:

1. Pairwise factory queries via Multicall3 — factory.getPool(t0, t1, fee) is cheap and scales O(pairs).
2. Ankr (paid) — IP-locked or domain-locked keys, lifts to ~5k blocks.
3. Self-hosted node — full history, no caps.

Multicall3 not auto-registered in viem

Multicall3 lives at 0xcA11bde05977b3631167028862bE2a173976CA11 on every Flare-family chain, but viem's defineChain does NOT auto-add it. If you call publicClient.multicall(...) against a custom-defined chain, it throws silently with a confusing error. Always register it explicitly:

defineChain({
  id: 14,
  name: 'Flare',
  // ...
  contracts: {
    multicall3: { address: '0xcA11bde05977b3631167028862bE2a173976CA11', blockCreated: 3002461 },
  },
})

EIP-3855 (PUSH0) status on Coston2

Coston2 emits an EIP-3855 warning when running Solidity 0.8.20+. It's cosmetic — deployments and execution work fine. Don't downgrade solc to 0.8.19 over this warning.

WFLR transfer hooks

WFLR's transfer / transferFrom invoke an FTSO delegation-state hook (updateAtTokenTransfer). The hook is internal state-only on the WFLR contract itself — it does NOT call into the recipient. A recipient that reverts in receive()/fallback() cannot block delivery. Empirically verified 2026-05-08 with a Flare-fork test (WFLR.transfer(evil, 1 ether) to a contract whose receive() reverts succeeds).

The hook DOES revert with SafeMath: subtraction overflow when a SENDER has phantom balance (deal(WFLR, addr, X) writes the balance slot but skips the delegation state init). That's a test-setup pitfall, not a production DoS surface.

Test setup correction: use vm.deal(user, X) + vm.prank(user); WFLR.deposit{value: X}() instead of deal(WFLR, user, X). The latter writes the balance slot but skips the delegation state init.

Implication for audit findings: claims that protocol-fee safeTransfer of WFLR can be DoS'd by a malicious recipient are categorically false positives. Add a fork test to lock the answer down before re-litigation:

function test_WflrSafeTransfer_ToRevertingReceiver_Succeeds() external {
    vm.createSelectFork("flare");
    vm.deal(address(this), 10 ether);
    IWNat(WFLR).deposit{value: 10 ether}();
    address evil = address(new RevertingReceiver()); // receive() reverts
    IERC20(WFLR).safeTransfer(evil, 1 ether);        // succeeds
    assertEq(IERC20(WFLR).balanceOf(evil), 1 ether);
}

Token decimals

Sanity-check decimals at integration time. Common confusions:

Token	Decimals
WFLR / WSGB / WC2FLR	18
USDT0 / USDC.e / FXRP / eUSDT	6
YAM-V2-style oddities	24

Math involving cross-decimal tokens MUST normalize. The classic precision-loss bug is (a / b) * c — multiply BEFORE dividing.

Owner-key threat model on Flare

Standard Flare-family ownership pattern: hardware wallet (Ledger) owner via Ownable2Step, optionally graduating to a multisig (Safe/Gnosis on Flare).

If owner() on a deployed contract is a deployer EOA, that's a one-key compromise away from total loss. Audit findings should flag this and recommend ownership handoff before mainnet.

The owner controls only what the contract's admin functions allow — review those individually:

• Pause? Ok if it doesn't lock user funds.
• Set fee parameters? Ok if bounded.
• Withdraw user balances? Critical finding — never allow.
• Set new oracle addresses? Risky — needs timelock or multisig at minimum.

Algebra dynamic-fee snapshot drift

Algebra V1.9+ pools (SparkDEX V4) have plugin-driven dynamic fees that adjust per-block. If your contract snapshots the fee at order-create time and uses it for incentive math at fill time, the actual fee may drift (typically modestly, but during volatility regime changes it can shift meaningfully).

Acceptable as approximation in spam-filter contexts. NOT acceptable when the fee determines a user's payout — read fresh in that case.

Algebra MintParams.deployer = address(0) only safe for default-deployer pools

Algebra's NPM derives the destination pool via CREATE2(deployer, salt(t0, t1)). Passing deployer = address(0) uses the factory's default deployer. If a future DEX registers pools with a custom deployer, mints with deployer = address(0) silently route to the wrong pool.

Mitigation: pre-mint check that factory.computePoolAddress(t0, t1) matches the user's intended pool address. Revert if not.

Algebra communityFee cuts LP fees BEFORE distribution

globalState().communityFee is the protocol's cut taken off LP fees before distributing to LPs. SparkDEX V4 WFLR/USDT0 has communityFee = 250 (25%). Any contract that estimates "LP-fee share to executor" must apply this factor:

uint256 lpShareBps = 10_000 - globalState.communityFee * 10;  // communityFee is 1/1000

Frontend-supplied calldata trust

Contracts that take router calldata as a passthrough (sweeper-style designs) must enforce TWO layers:

1. Router-address allowlist (isRouter[router])
2. Function-selector allowlist (allowedSelector[router][selector])

Both layers AND-gated. The selector check is critical — V3's SwapRouter has a multicall(bytes[]) that lets calldata chain arbitrary internal calls. Do NOT seed multicall for any router unless you've audited the implications.

Sandwich-floor enforcement on FTSO-anchored swaps

Any time a contract swaps an asset whose price has an FTSO feed (FAsset → WFLR, WFLR → vault collateral, etc.), the slippage gate should be FTSO-anchored, not pool-quote-anchored. The pattern:

// 1. Read the FTSO-implied output for amountIn — the "fair" value.
uint256 ftsoImpliedOut = (amountIn * rateScaled1e36) / 1e36;

// 2. minOut floors at (1 - swapDownsideMaxBps). swapDownsideMaxBps is
//    bounded (typically 50 = 0.5%); never make this caller-controlled.
uint256 minOut = (ftsoImpliedOut * (BPS_DENOM - swapDownsideMaxBps)) / BPS_DENOM;

// 3. Pass minOut to the router AND verify post-swap balance delta.
//    The router enforces minOut against its quote; the balance delta
//    catches FoT tokens that under-deliver while reporting full output.
uint256 wflrBefore = IERC20(WFLR).balanceOf(address(this));
router.exactInput(ExactInputParams({path: path, recipient: address(this), ...}));
uint256 amountOut = IERC20(WFLR).balanceOf(address(this)) - wflrBefore;
if (amountOut < minOut) revert SwapBelowMinOut(amountOut, minOut);

What this defends against:

• Sandwich attacks: a bot pre-positions liquidity to make the router pay below FTSO-anchored expectation. Loss is bounded by swapDownsideMaxBps — typically 0.5% of swap volume. Below that, the swap reverts entirely and harvest is retried later.
• Fee-on-transfer FAsset upgrade: if a future FAsset proxy upgrade adopts FoT, the router-reported amountOut would lie. Balance-delta verification catches the actual delivered amount.

Bounded extraction is acceptable; complete DoS is not. 0.5% is the break-even point: attackers profit on average less than they spend on LP fees + gas. Tightening to 0.1% in low-liquidity regimes is fine; loosening beyond 1% is a finding.

MEV exposure on owner-only setters

Owner-only parameter setters (setSwapPath, setProtocolFeeBps, etc.) are trust-gated by access control, but if the owning multisig is publicly executable (Safe/Gnosis with visible queued transactions, on-chain governance with mempool-visible voting), an attacker can pre-position liquidity to extract slippage on the NEXT operation that uses the changed parameter.

Concrete attack: owner queues setSwapPath(FXRP, newPath) switching from a deep pool to a thinner one. Attacker sees the queued tx, drains the new pool just before execution, and the next harvest pays the slippage floor.

Bound: the same swapDownsideMaxBps that protects ordinary swaps. Attacker cannot force routing through a pool they fully control because the owner sends the literal path; front-running can't change tx contents.

Mitigations:

• Schedule parameter changes during low-balance harvest windows.
• Add a no-harvest-flag for N blocks after the path update.
• For high-stakes parameters, require a timelock (24h+) so the FE can display "next harvest will route through new path" warnings.

Document, don't hide. List the exposed setters in CLAUDE.md alongside the bounded extraction estimate. Auditors will flag this otherwise.

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Pre-deploy checklist (Flare mainnet)

Run this BEFORE every Flare mainnet broadcast. Don't ship without all green.

• Compile clean — forge build no warnings, forge build --sizes shows all contracts under 24 KB runtime.
• Tests pass — forge test (unit) + forge test --fork-url flare (fork) all green.
• Slither clean — slither src/ --exclude-informational reports no high or medium findings.
• Owner is not the deployer EOA — transferOwnership to Ledger / multisig + acceptOwnership complete. Verify via owner() and pendingOwner() reads.
• Ownable2Step used (not Ownable). Verify by reading the bytecode dispatch table for pendingOwner() / acceptOwnership() selectors.
• Reentrancy guards present on every state-changing external function that makes external calls or could be re-entered.
• CEI compliance verified — state changes BEFORE external calls in every function.
• SafeERC20 + forceApprove used for every token interaction.
• No tx.origin in source.
• No unbounded loops over user-controlled data.
• Pause + emergency stop present and tested.
• Custom errors prefixed with contract name + __.
• flare-network registry consulted — chain IDs, RPC endpoints, token addresses match what you're deploying against.
• Permit2 chain availability — if your contract depends on Permit2, verified deployed on the target chain.
• FoT-token surface considered — design either supports them or explicitly reverts on FoT input.
• Blacklistable token surface considered — if you hold blacklistable tokens (USDT0, USDC.e, eUSDT), the design has no admin rescue path AND treasury fee paths use try/catch redirects.
• Basefee floor present in any incentive-math (if you have one).
• Audit run — audit (checklist) + audit-contract (adversarial) both completed; findings either fixed or accepted with documented reasoning.
• Verification dry-run — after deploy, contract verifies cleanly on both flare-explorer and flarescan (use the commands in flare-network).

Audit run instructions

Two skills to run, in order:

1. /audit src/MyContract.sol

Checklist-driven, 115+ items, SWC classification, weird-ERC20 catalogue. This is the systematic baseline review.

2. /audit-contract src/MyContract.sol

Adversarial multi-agent attack. Auto-selects 5–7 specialist attackers based on the contract's surface (signature handling → signatures agent; external calls → reentrancy agent; ERC-20 interactions → ERC20-edge-cases agent; multi-party flows → economic agent; etc.). Writes Foundry PoC tests for any CRITICAL or HIGH findings.

For Flare deployments specifically, after the two audit skills run, reread this skill's Part 2 to verify the Flare-specific overlays are addressed — especially Permit2, FoT, blacklistable tokens, and basefee floor. Those items won't be in the generic audit output.

For a Full Audit workflow that combines both audit skills with gas optimization and test extension, see the /Full Audit block at the top of the project's CLAUDE.md — it sequences audit → audit-contract → gas-optimize → test-foundry against a single target file and consolidates findings into one ranked report.

Threat model summary (one-page)

Threat	Defense	Skill section
Re-entry	nonReentrant first + CEI	Part 1
Owner-key compromise	Ownable2Step + Ledger/multisig + bounded admin powers	Part 1
Token weirdness (no-return, FoT, blacklist)	SafeERC20 + balance-delta checks + try/catch on fee paths	Parts 1 + 2
Signature replay	EIP-712 with chainId + nonce + spender binding	Part 1
Front-running	Slippage + deadline + Permit2	Part 1
Block-value manipulation	Don't use for randomness or short timing	Part 1
Permit2 chain gap	Verify availability + chain-id gate	Part 2
Algebra dynamic fees	Read fresh OR document drift acceptance	Part 2
FTSO redistributor changes	try/catch wrap + historical-allowlist recovery	Part 2
Public RPC log limits	Use Multicall3 / Ankr / self-hosted	Part 2
MEV / sandwich	Slippage + deadline + commit-reveal for high-value	Part 1