Electron ipc security
Use when Electron work adds or audits BrowserWindow privileges, preload APIs, IPC, filesystem, URLs, subprocesses, secrets, permissions, remote content, or CSP. Do not use as a substitute for a full product review, penetration test, feature implementation, or release authorization.From its SKILL.md
npx -y skills add SuShuheng/making-things --skill electron-ipc-securityAssembled from the repository path, not quoted from the project. Check it against their README if it does not work.
One thing to look at
- 1 stars1 stars. Stars are a popularity signal and not a quality one, but at this level it is likely that nobody has read this closely except its author, and you would be relying on your own review.
SKILL.md
1.5 KB, as published. Nobody here has run it
Electron IPC Security
Treat every renderer-originated request as untrusted local API input.
- Read
references/security-standard.md,references/security-checklist.md, the sidecar contract, matching backend/integration track, and affected task. - Inventory BrowserWindow preferences, navigation/window handlers, permissions, preload exports, IPC channels, filesystem roots, external URLs, subprocesses, remote content, and secret flows in the task scope.
- Run only evidence-backed repository security commands that actually exist;
otherwise record
NOT RUNand the reason in the task evidence. - Require narrow capabilities, shared schemas, runtime validation, sender authorization, allowlists, bounds, cancellation, cleanup, and stable redacted errors. Add tests for invalid, unauthorized, oversized, cancelled, traversal, URL, and command rejection paths.
- Attach findings, residual risk, and approved exceptions with owner/expiry to the backend or integration task. Reopen or block that task when needed.
Never fix a problem by disabling sandbox, context isolation, web security, CSP, validation, or tests. A clean static scan is not a security proof.