Security guidance
Skill srg-sphynx/MDForge/Sources/MDForge/Resources/SkillLibrary/Development/security-guidance
PreToolUse security-anti-pattern hook for Claude Code. Catches 12 common security risks (command injection, XSS, SQL injection, unsafe deserialization, GitHub Actions workflow injection, eval/new Function code injection) BEFORE the Edit/Write/MultiEdit operation completes. Session-state caching prevents duplicate warnings on the same file+rule combo. Stdlib only — no dependencies. Use when you want a safety net during Claude Code sessions that touch security-sensitive code (auth, payments, user input handling, IaC). Disable with ENABLE_SECURITY_REMINDER=0 if you need to perform a verified-safe operation that would otherwise trip a pattern. Triggers — "add security hook", "block unsafe code", "detect command injection before write", "prevent SQL injection patterns", "security warning hook".From its SKILL.md
npx -y skills add srg-sphynx/MDForge --skill security-guidanceAssembled from the repository path, not quoted from the project. Check it against their README if it does not work.
One thing to look at
- 0 stars0 stars. Stars are a popularity signal and not a quality one, but at this level it is likely that nobody has read this closely except its author, and you would be relying on your own review.
SKILL.md
7.5 KB, ~1.6k tokens by cl100k_base, as published. Nobody here has run it
Security Guidance Hook
A PreToolUse hook that blocks 12 common security anti-patterns before Claude Code writes them.
This skill is a hook, not a slash command. Once installed, it runs automatically before every Edit, Write, or MultiEdit operation and warns + blocks if it detects a known dangerous pattern.
What It Catches
The hook scans both:
- The file path being edited — flags GitHub Actions workflow files with risky
${{ }}patterns - The content being written — substring matches against 11 anti-patterns
| Pattern | Category | Risk |
|---|---|---|
| GitHub Actions workflow expressions | Path-based | Workflow command injection via untrusted inputs |
child_process.exec, exec(, execSync( | Substring | Node.js command injection |
new Function | Substring | JS code injection |
eval( | Substring | JS code injection |
dangerouslySetInnerHTML | Substring | React XSS |
document.write | Substring | DOM XSS |
.innerHTML = | Substring | DOM XSS |
pickle | Substring | Python deserialization RCE |
os.system, from os import system | Substring | Python command injection |
shell=True (subprocess) | Substring | Python command injection |
f-string SQL or .format SQL | Substring | SQL injection |
yaml.load(, yaml.unsafe_load | Substring | YAML deserialization RCE |
How It Works
- Claude Code is about to run
Edit,Write, orMultiEdit - PreToolUse hook fires → invokes
security_reminder_hook.pywith the tool input as JSON on stdin - The hook extracts file_path + content + checks against the pattern table
- If a pattern matches AND this warning hasn't been shown for this file+rule in this session:
- Print the warning to stderr (Claude sees it)
- Exit code 2 → blocks the tool call
- Save the warning key to
~/.claude/security_warnings_state_<session>.json
- If a pattern matches BUT the warning was already shown this session:
- Allow the tool call (exit code 0) — Claude already saw the warning once
- If no pattern matches:
- Allow the tool call (exit code 0)
Installation
This plugin ships as a Claude Code plugin with hooks.json wiring:
# In Claude Code:
/plugin marketplace add alirezarezvani/claude-skills
/plugin install security-guidance@claude-code-skills
Once installed, no further configuration needed — the hook runs automatically.
Configuration
Disable per-session via environment variable:
ENABLE_SECURITY_REMINDER=0 claude
# Hook is bypassed for this session
Use sparingly — the hook is most useful exactly when you're tempted to disable it (because you're under deadline pressure to ship something you know is sketchy).
Per-File Override Pattern
If a specific file legitimately needs eval() or pickle (e.g., a sandboxed REPL, a deliberately unsafe parser for a fuzzer), document it in the file with a comment:
# SAFETY: pickle is the required serialization format for this internal tool.
# This file does NOT accept untrusted input. See SECURITY.md for boundary analysis.
import pickle
The hook will still warn on first edit per session. After acknowledging, subsequent edits in the same session are allowed (session-state caching).
Why The Patterns Are Substring-Based (Not AST-Based)
Trade-off: AST-based detection would be more precise (no false positives on string literals containing "eval("). Substring-based is:
- Faster — runs in ms, doesn't parse the file
- Cross-language — same hook works for JS/TS/Python/YAML/etc.
- Conservative — false positives are easy to dismiss (one keystroke); false negatives are dangerous
For 90%+ of cases, substring detection is sufficient. If you need stricter detection, layer in a proper SAST tool (semgrep, CodeQL) as a CI step.
State Files
The hook caches "warning shown" state in ~/.claude/security_warnings_state_<session_id>.json. These files:
- Are auto-cleaned after 30 days (10% chance per hook invocation)
- Are session-scoped (each Claude session gets its own)
- Contain a JSON list of
<file_path>-<rule_name>keys
You can safely delete ~/.claude/security_warnings_state_*.json files at any time — the hook regenerates them on next run.
Debug Log
The hook writes to ~/.claude/security-warnings-log.txt for debugging hook misfires:
tail -f ~/.claude/security-warnings-log.txt
# Shows JSON decode errors, state-file save failures, etc.
(Upstream version wrote to /tmp/security-warnings-log.txt — we moved it to ~/.claude/ for persistence across reboots.)
Source + Attribution
This plugin is ported from David Dworken's MIT-licensed implementation in alirezarezvani/aeo-box.
Verbatim: the original 9 patterns (GitHub Actions, child_process.exec, new Function, eval, dangerouslySetInnerHTML, document.write, innerHTML, pickle, os.system) are preserved with their exact warning text.
Modifications:
- Added 3 patterns:
subprocess shell=True, SQL injection via f-string or.format,yaml.unsafe_load - Debug log moved from
/tmp/security-warnings-log.txt→~/.claude/security-warnings-log.txt - Restructured as a claude-skills plugin with
attributionblock inplugin.json
Anti-Patterns
Disabling the hook by default
Defeats the purpose. If ENABLE_SECURITY_REMINDER=0 becomes your default, you've trained yourself to ignore the safety net. Use it only for specific verified-safe operations.
Modifying the pattern list without security review
Anyone can add a pattern. Removing one requires a security review — patterns exist because they map to real CVE classes.
Treating session-state as immutable security policy
The cache prevents nag-spam but is per-session. Don't rely on "I dismissed this once" as long-term policy — use the per-file documentation pattern instead (comment justifying the use).
Related Skills
engineering-team/skills/red-team— adversarial pen-testingengineering-team/skills/threat-detection— threat modeling + detection designengineering-team/skills/ai-security— AI-specific security (prompt injection, etc.)engineering/ship-gate— pre-production audit (8-category, ~89 checks)engineering/skill-security-auditor— security scan for skill packages
Trigger Phrases
- "add security hook"
- "block unsafe code before write"
- "detect command injection"
- "prevent SQL injection patterns"
- "warn on eval / pickle / os.system"
- "GitHub Actions security hook"
Version: 2.7.3
Source: Ported from alirezarezvani/aeo-box .claude/plugins/security-guidance/ (originally by David Dworken at Anthropic, MIT)
License: MIT
What ships with it
Read from the repository
Just SKILL.md. No reference files, no scripts.
Gives 0 of the 12 instructions most vulnerability scanning skills give in ~1.6k tokens
Counted across 223 of the 238 authors here whose files we hold, read 2026-09-06
- Fix critical findings immediatelyin 21 of 223, across 14 files
- Fix high findings before productionin 18 of 223, across 12 files
- Check and install AgentShield before scanningin 18 of 223, across 12 files
- Scaffold a secure configuration with initin 16 of 223, across 10 files
- Add the AgentShield GitHub Action to CIin 16 of 223, across 10 files
- Run the three-agent opus pipeline for deeper analysisin 14 of 223, across 8 files
- Apply safe auto-fixes onlyin 14 of 223, across 8 files
- Use JSON output for CI/CD integrationin 13 of 223, across 7 files
- Filter findings with a minimum severityin 12 of 223, across 10 files
- Classify each finding by severityin 10 of 223
- Use parameterized queries for all database accessin 10 of 223, across 9 files
- Write tests before writing the rulein 9 of 223, across 4 files
Grouped from the skills themselves: near-identical wordings counted once, and counted by distinct author, so one author publishing three of these counts once. Length counted with cl100k_base; the agent that loads this file may tokenize it differently.