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Offensive bluetooth classic

Skill SnailSploit/Claude-Red/Skills/wireless/offensive-bluetooth-classic

claude-red is a curated library of offensive security skills designed for the Claude skills system. Each skill is a structured SKILL.md file that primes Claude with expert-level methodology for a specific attack surface — from SQLi to shellcode, EDR evasion to exploit development.

Install
npx -y skills add SnailSploit/Claude-Red --skill offensive-bluetooth-classic

Assembled from the repository path, not quoted from the project. Check it against their README if it does not work.

What its author says it does

Copied from the file, not written here

Bluetooth Classic (BR/EDR) attack methodology — device discovery, service enumeration via SDP, LMP/L2CAP layer attacks, legacy PIN cracking (BlueBorne / KNOB), Bluetooth file-transfer abuse (BlueSnarfing legacy), unauthenticated profile abuse (HSP, HFP, OPP), and modern relevance against older industrial / automotive / accessory targets. Use when in-scope devices use Bluetooth Classic (Bluetooth ≤ 4.0 BR/EDR) — common in legacy car kits, industrial sensors, older medical devices, and audio accessories.

SKILL.md

5.3 KB, as published. Nobody here has run it

Bluetooth Classic (BR/EDR) Attacks

Older than BLE, less commonly attacked today, but still present in cars, industrial sensors, audio gear, and legacy enterprise hardware. Many of the well-known historic attacks (BlueSnarf, BlueBug) are mitigated; KNOB and the BlueBorne family remain relevant against unpatched devices.

Quick Workflow

  1. Discover devices with hcitool / bluetoothctl / redfang
  2. Enumerate exposed services via SDP
  3. Test each service profile for unauth access
  4. Check pairing crypto (KNOB applicability)
  5. Proximity-physical attacks for legacy / unpatched

Discovery

# Modern adapter (built-in or USB Bluetooth 4.0+)
sudo hciconfig hci0 up
sudo hcitool inq                       # inquiry
sudo hcitool scan --length=12          # 12-second scan

# bluetoothctl interactive
bluetoothctl
> scan on
> devices

# Discoverable-mode-only devices appear; non-discoverable need address brute
sudo redfang -r 00:00:00:00:00:00-FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF
# (very slow — ~7 hours per OUI prefix)

Service Discovery (SDP)

# List all services on a device
sdptool browse AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF
sdptool records AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF

Common profiles and their attack relevance:

ProfileUUIDAttack
OBEX Object Push (OPP)0x1105BlueSnarf/BlueBug on legacy phones (mostly extinct)
OBEX File Transfer (FTP)0x1106Browse / write filesystem on legacy devices
Headset (HSP/HFP)0x1108 / 0x111EEavesdrop active call audio
Serial Port Profile (SPP)0x1101Industrial/IoT debug ports — often unauthenticated
HID0x1124Keyboard/mouse impersonation
Audio Sink/Source (A2DP)0x110B / 0x110AAudio injection/eavesdrop

SPP Abuse

The Serial Port Profile (SPP) tunnels arbitrary data over Bluetooth as a virtual COM port. Industrial / IoT devices use it for debug or telemetry, often without authentication.

# Connect to SPP service, channel typically 1
sudo rfcomm bind /dev/rfcomm0 AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF 1
sudo screen /dev/rfcomm0 9600
# Then interact with the device's CLI / debug menu

KNOB (CVE-2019-9506)

Forces Bluetooth pairing to negotiate a 1-byte encryption key — making the link key trivially brute-forceable.

# Test with internalblue (requires Broadcom firmware patch)
git clone https://github.com/seemoo-lab/internalblue
internalblue
> log keys
# Patch firmware to allow 1-byte key; pair with target; observe weak key

Patched in firmware on most modern devices. Still works against:

  • Older Broadcom-based devices (pre-2019 BCM chipsets)
  • Embedded automotive Bluetooth stacks
  • Cheap consumer audio gear

BlueBorne (CVE-2017-1000251 et al.)

A family of buffer overflows / info leaks in major Bluetooth stacks (Linux BlueZ, Android, Windows, iOS). Mostly patched 2017–2018, but unpatched embedded Linux devices are common.

# Armis blueborne-scanner — checks for patch-level
git clone https://github.com/ArmisSecurity/blueborne
python blueborne_scanner.py AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF

HID Spoofing (PoC)

If pairing succeeds via Just Works or weak PIN, you can register as a HID device — keystroke injection on an unattended Bluetooth-paired host.

# bdaddr + HID example — register custom HID on rfcomm
hcitool dev
hciconfig hci0 class 0x000540   # HID device class
sdptool add HID
# Use a HID descriptor crafted as keyboard, send keystrokes

Audio Eavesdropping

If a target has Bluetooth headset paired and active, and you can re-pair (PIN brute or KNOB):

  • HSP/HFP profiles let you become the peer and receive audio
  • Some firmware allows simultaneous peer connections — eavesdrop without disrupting

Engagement Cheatsheet

# 1. Discover
sudo hcitool inq

# 2. Enumerate services per device
sdptool browse <MAC>

# 3. SPP (industrial/IoT) — connect and explore
sudo rfcomm bind /dev/rfcomm0 <MAC> 1
sudo screen /dev/rfcomm0 9600

# 4. Patch-level scan
python blueborne_scanner.py <MAC>

# 5. KNOB testing (with adapter that supports internalblue)
internalblue → log keys → re-pair target

# 6. Document profiles, auth state, exposed commands per device

Detection

  • No native Bluetooth Classic IDS in most environments
  • Active inquiry visible to nearby Bluetooth-aware monitoring (rare)
  • Re-pairing prompts on target devices may surface to users

Reporting

  • Identify chipset + firmware version per device (often visible in service records)
  • Map CVE applicability (BlueBorne, KNOB, BlueFrag, et al.)
  • Document specific profile abuses (SPP exposed without auth, HID spoofing successful, etc.)

Key References

Keep looking

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