Infinity
Skill sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills/plugins/agentic-awesome-skills-claude/skills/infinity
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npx -y skills add sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill infinityAssembled from the repository path, not quoted from the project. Check it against their README if it does not work.
What its author says it does
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Enforces a strict input boundary protocol (detect, classify, filter, verify) to ensure untrusted data never reaches business logic raw.
SKILL.md
7.0 KB, ~1.4k tokens by cl100k_base, as published. Nobody here has run it
infinity — Input Boundary & Validation Protocol
Core Philosophy
Nothing untrusted ever reaches the core — it is stopped before contact. No external data touches the codebase raw. Every boundary where data enters the system must have a filter.
The #1 source of silent bugs, crashes, and vulnerabilities is external data that arrives in an unexpected shape and gets used directly without checking. This skill enforces a filter layer at every entry point, every time.
When to Use This Skill
- Use when you need to handle an API response
- Use when reading user input or adding a form handler
- Use when working with environment variables or CLI arguments
- Use when parsing webhooks or reading from the filesystem
- Use when any code calls
.body,.params,.query,.env,fs.read, or a third-party SDK response
The Four Phases
PHASE 1 — Boundary Detection
Before writing or modifying any code that involves external data, the AI must identify and list every entry point in scope:
- HTTP request bodies, headers, query params
- User form inputs and UI-submitted data
- Environment variables and config files
- Third-party API responses
- Webhook payloads
- File reads from disk
- CLI arguments
- Database query results from external sources
- WebSocket messages
The AI must not write any data-handling logic until every entry point in scope is listed.
PHASE 2 — Classify Each Input
For every entry point identified, the AI classifies it into one of three trust levels:
| Level | Definition | Examples |
|---|---|---|
TRUSTED | Internal constants, hardcoded values, your own compile-time config | Enum values, hardcoded defaults, internal constants |
SEMI-TRUSTED | Your own internal services, internal APIs, controlled infrastructure | Internal microservice responses, your own database reads |
UNTRUSTED | Anything from users, the internet, third parties, or the filesystem | User input, external API responses, uploaded files, env vars, CLI args |
Rule:
TRUSTEDinputs may be used directly.SEMI-TRUSTEDandUNTRUSTEDinputs must pass through a filter layer before any use.
The AI outputs this classification before writing any handling code:
INFINITY — BOUNDARY MAP
─────────────────────────────────────────
Entry Point | Trust Level | Filter Required
─────────────────────────────────────────
req.body.email | UNTRUSTED | ✓ format + sanitize
process.env.API_KEY | UNTRUSTED | ✓ presence + non-empty
internalService.getData()| SEMI-TRUSTED | ✓ schema validate
PAGINATION_LIMIT = 20 | TRUSTED | ✗ none needed
─────────────────────────────────────────
PHASE 3 — Mandatory Filter Layer
Every UNTRUSTED and SEMI-TRUSTED input must pass through validation before it reaches any business logic, storage, or rendering. The AI must apply the right filter type for the right context:
Type Checking
- Verify the input is the expected type before using it
- Never assume a string is a string, a number is a number, or an array is an array
Schema Validation
- For objects and API responses, validate shape before accessing nested fields
- If a required field is missing, reject — do not use a fallback that hides the problem
Sanitization
- Strip or escape content before rendering to UI (prevent XSS)
- Normalize strings before storage (trim whitespace, consistent casing where appropriate)
Presence & Format Checks
- Env vars: must exist and be non-empty before use
- IDs and tokens: must match expected format before use
Rejection Rule
- On invalid input: reject explicitly and return a clear error
- Never silently use bad data with a fallback
- Never let bad data pass through to fix itself "downstream"
// WRONG — using raw input directly
const user = await db.find(req.params.id);
// RIGHT — validate before use
const id = req.params.id;
if (!id || typeof id !== 'string' || !isValidUUID(id)) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid ID format' });
}
const user = await db.find(id);
PHASE 4 — Self-Check Before Done
Before the AI declares any data-handling code complete, it traces each entry point and confirms:
INFINITY — VERIFICATION
─────────────────────────────────────────
Entry Point | Filter Exists | Filter Type
─────────────────────────────────────────
req.body.email | ✓ YES | format + sanitize
process.env.API_KEY | ✓ YES | presence check
internalService.getData()| ✓ YES | schema validation
─────────────────────────────────────────
Unfiltered inputs reaching logic: NONE ✓
─────────────────────────────────────────
If any UNTRUSTED or SEMI-TRUSTED input reaches logic, storage, or rendering without a filter — the AI flags it. It does not silently pass.
Hard Rules (Never Violated)
- No raw external data in business logic. Ever.
- No silent fallbacks on bad input. Reject explicitly.
- No assuming shape. Even if the API "always" returns a string — validate it.
- No skipping env var checks. Missing env vars must fail loudly at startup, not silently at runtime.
- No partial filtering. If you validate presence but not format, it is not filtered.
- No filtering in the wrong place. Filters go at the entry point — not somewhere downstream after the data has already been used once.
What This Skill Prevents
- SQL injection via unvalidated query params
- Crashes from unexpected API response shapes
- XSS from unescaped user content rendered to UI
- Silent failures from missing env variables discovered at runtime
- Type errors from assuming external data matches expected shape
- Security vulnerabilities from untrusted data reaching sensitive operations
Quick Reference
| Phase | Action | Writes Code? |
|---|---|---|
| 1 — Detect | List all entry points in scope | ❌ No |
| 2 — Classify | Assign trust level to each input | ❌ No |
| 3 — Filter | Write filter layer for all UNTRUSTED + SEMI-TRUSTED | ✅ Yes |
| 4 — Verify | Trace each input, confirm filter exists | ❌ No |
Limitations
- Does not apply to purely internal logic with no external data involvement.
- May add verbosity to trivial scripts where strict validation is not required.