Iac security

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Infrastructure-as-Code Security

Hardening rules for Terraform, CloudFormation, and Pulumi: state, providers, drift, secrets

ALWAYS

• Pin every provider/module to an exact version or a pessimistic constraint (~> 5.42); never >= 0 or unpinned latest.
• Configure a remote backend with encryption at rest, server-side state locking, and versioning (Terraform: s3 + DynamoDB lock table with kms_key_id; Pulumi: the managed backend or s3://?kmskey=; CloudFormation: managed by AWS).
• Encrypt every persistent resource by default with a customer-managed KMS key: S3 buckets, EBS volumes, RDS, EFS, DynamoDB, SQS, SNS, CloudWatch log groups.
• Tag every resource with owner, environment, cost-center, and data-classification via a default tags block.
• Run terraform plan (or pulumi preview, aws cloudformation deploy --no-execute-changeset) in CI and require a human approval before apply on production stacks.
• Add a drift-detection job that runs daily and opens an issue when actual cloud state diverges from code (Terraform Cloud drift detection, pulumi refresh, cfn-drift-detect).
• Use IAM Conditions to scope every role: aws:SourceArn, aws:SourceAccount, aws:PrincipalOrgID, and TLS-only access policies on storage.

NEVER

• Hardcode provider credentials in the code or .tfvars (access_key, secret_key, client_secret, service_account_key). Use OIDC federation from CI, the provider's instance metadata service, or a secret manager.
• Commit terraform.tfstate, terraform.tfstate.backup, .pulumi/, or any *.tfvars containing real secrets. They contain plaintext secrets even if the code references variables.
• Use local_exec / null_resource to fetch secrets at apply time and stash them in state. State is queryable plaintext by anyone with backend read access.
• Open security groups / firewall rules to 0.0.0.0/0 for ports 22, 3389, 3306, 5432, 1433, 6379, 27017, 9200, 11211 — even for "just dev". Use bastion or VPN.
• Grant *:* (wildcard action on wildcard resource) IAM policies. Use iam:PassRole with explicit resource ARNs.
• Disable provider TLS verification (skip_tls_verify, insecure = true).
• Use count = 0 to "soft-delete" resources you actually want gone — destroy them.

KNOWN FALSE POSITIVES

• Bastion hosts intentionally exposed on port 22 to the internet with hardened configurations are not the same risk as opening RDS to the world. Document the exception inline.
• Public CloudFront distributions, ALB listeners on 80/443, API Gateways, and Lambda function URLs that are meant to be internet-facing.
• Bootstrap resources (the S3 bucket and DynamoDB lock table the backend itself uses) must exist before remote state can; this chicken-and-egg is usually bootstrapped by a one-time local backend that's then migrated.