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Serverless security

Skill ShieldNet-360/secure-vibe/dist/claude-skills/.claude/skills/serverless-security

Lambda / Cloud Functions / Azure Functions hardening: IAM, timeouts, secrets, event injection — Applies to: when generating AWS Lambda / GCP Cloud Functions / Azure Functions code; when generating serverless.yml / SAM templates / functions framework; when wiring API Gateway, EventBridge, SQS, S3 triggersFrom its SKILL.md

Install
npx -y skills add ShieldNet-360/secure-vibe --skill serverless-security

Assembled from the repository path, not quoted from the project. Check it against their README if it does not work.

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  • 2 stars2 stars. Stars are a popularity signal and not a quality one, but at this level it is likely that nobody has read this closely except its author, and you would be relying on your own review.

SKILL.md

3.3 KB, 631 tokens by cl100k_base, as published. Nobody here has run it

<!-- Native skill bundle for Claude Code. Generated by `secure-vibe dev regenerate`. --> <!-- Do not edit by hand; the source of truth is skills/serverless-security/SKILL.md. -->

Serverless Security

Lambda / Cloud Functions / Azure Functions hardening: IAM, timeouts, secrets, event injection

ALWAYS

  • Give each function its own IAM execution role with the minimum permissions needed. Never share roles across functions; never reuse the bootstrap / developer role.
  • Set a concrete function timeout (≤ 30s for synchronous APIs, ≤ 15min for background jobs). Defaults like 6s or 900s are footguns in different directions.
  • Set reserved or provisioned concurrency limits per function to avoid bill blow-outs and to keep one noisy tenant from starving the rest of the account.
  • Pull secrets at cold-start from a secret manager (AWS Secrets Manager / GCP Secret Manager / Azure Key Vault) with caching, not from plaintext environment variables.
  • Validate every event payload against a schema before any code that touches it. Lambda doesn't care that the event arrived from "your" SQS queue — it could be a poison message.
  • Enable structured logging that redacts known secret patterns (delegate to the logging-security skill).
  • Enable X-Ray / OpenTelemetry tracing and CloudWatch / Cloud Monitoring alerts on error rate, throttle count, duration p95.
  • Use a VPC for functions that touch a private database or service; otherwise the function gets full outbound internet, which is rarely desirable.

NEVER

  • Use arn:aws:iam::*:role/* (wildcard PassRole), *:* action/resource, or iam:* permissions on a function role.
  • Put secrets in environment variables in plaintext (use Secrets Manager references / aws_lambda_function.environment with kms_key_arn).
  • Pass user-controlled strings to exec, os.system, child_process, subprocess.Popen(shell=True) — function URLs become RCE shortcuts when someone shells out.
  • Trust the Lambda function URL or API Gateway resource as authentication. Function URLs with AUTH_TYPE=NONE are unauthenticated; require IAM, Cognito, or a Lambda authorizer.
  • Disable aws_lambda_function.code_signing_config_arn for production functions; sign and verify on deploy.
  • Use the latest image tag for container-image functions; pin by digest.
  • Use long-lived static AWS access keys to call AWS from Lambda — use the execution role.
  • Skip validation of S3 / SQS / EventBridge event payloads — assume any caller can post any shape, even if the trigger is "trusted".

KNOWN FALSE POSITIVES

  • Custom CloudFormation / Lambda resource handlers (cfn-response) sometimes legitimately need broad permissions for short-lived setup.
  • Cold-start warmer hacks (pinging the function on a CloudWatch Events schedule) are not, themselves, a security issue.
  • Step Functions iterators with thousands of map states are not an "untracked concurrency" problem if the StateMachine has its own concurrency cap.

What ships with it: 1 file

1.0 KB alongside SKILL.md

Gives 0 of the 12 instructions most security skills give in 631 tokens

Counted across 648 of the 828 authors here whose files we hold, read 2026-08-07

  • Parameterize all database queriesin 68 of 648, across 51 files
  • Hash passwords using bcrypt, scrypt, or argon2in 49 of 648, across 36 files
  • Apply rate limiting to authentication endpointsin 48 of 648, across 24 files
  • Configure security headersin 35 of 648, across 19 files
  • Validate all inputsin 32 of 648, across 24 files
  • Validate all external input at the system boundaryin 29 of 648, across 19 files
  • Run containers as a non-root userin 28 of 648, across 15 files
  • Use httponly secure samesite cookies for sessionsin 26 of 648, across 15 files
  • Run dependency audits before every releasein 21 of 648, across 10 files
  • Encode output to prevent cross-site scriptingin 21 of 648, across 11 files
  • Copy dependencies before source codein 20 of 648, across 9 files
  • Store secrets in environment variablesin 20 of 648, across 18 files

Said here and by no other author read

  • set a concrete function timeout
  • set reserved or provisioned concurrency limits per function
  • pull secrets at cold-start from a secret manager with caching
  • validate every event payload against a schema
  • enable structured logging that redacts known secret patterns
  • enable tracing and alerts on error rate, throttle count, duration p95

Grouped from the skills themselves: near-identical wordings counted once, and counted by distinct author, so one author publishing three of these counts once. Length counted with cl100k_base; the agent that loads this file may tokenize it differently.

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