Mobile security

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Mobile Application Security

Android and iOS hardening: exported components, ATS, keychain, certificate pinning, root/jailbreak detection

ALWAYS

• Android: every <activity>, <service>, <receiver>, <provider> in AndroidManifest.xml either has android:exported="false" or explicitly declares an intent filter and is intentionally exported. As of Android 12 (API 31), android:exported is required when an intent-filter is declared.
• Android: store secrets in the Android Keystore (KeyStore / EncryptedSharedPreferences with MasterKey). Never in plain SharedPreferences, plain files, or BuildConfig.
• iOS: store secrets in the Keychain with kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly or stricter. Don't store in UserDefaults, plist, or files.
• iOS: keep App Transport Security (ATS) enabled in Info.plist. If an exception is required, scope it to a specific host with NSExceptionDomains.
• Validate the server's TLS certificate with certificate pinning (public key pinning preferred) for backends you control. Use OkHttp.CertificatePinner on Android, URLSessionDelegate didReceiveChallenge on iOS, or your framework's pinning module.
• Obfuscate / shrink release builds (Android R8 / ProGuard with proguard-rules.pro; iOS bitcode + Swift symbol stripping). Strip debug logs from release builds.
• Detect rooted / jailbroken devices for high-risk apps (banking, payment, enterprise) and reduce sensitivity (block payments, refuse to attach to a managed profile). Use the Play Integrity API on Android and DeviceCheck / AppAttest on iOS as the authoritative attestation.

NEVER

• Ship API keys, signing keys, or backend secrets in source / resources / strings.xml / BuildConfig / Info.plist. Issue short-lived, device-scoped tokens from a backend instead.
• Set android:allowBackup="true" for apps that store credentials — the backed-up data is readable on developer machines. Use android:fullBackupContent to exclude sensitive paths.
• Set android:debuggable="true" in release builds, or <application android:networkSecurityConfig> that allows cleartext to arbitrary hosts.
• Disable ATS app-wide on iOS (NSAllowsArbitraryLoads=true). If you must weaken it, scope per-host.
• Implement custom TLS / certificate handling that returns "trust all" (X509TrustManager.checkServerTrusted empty body, URLSessionDelegate always-trust). This is the #1 Android security finding shipped to production.
• Pass user input to WebView.loadUrl / WKWebView.load without scheme validation; never enable WebSettings.setAllowFileAccessFromFileURLs(true) or setUniversalAccessFromFileURLs(true).
• Implement biometric auth without BiometricPrompt's setUserAuthenticationRequired(true) binding the key — biometric "true" alone proves nothing without a cryptographic challenge.
• Log full request/response bodies including Authorization headers — e.g. an OkHttp HttpLoggingInterceptor left at Level.BODY (or URLSession / Alamofire debug logging) in a release build. The dump lands in Logcat / oslog, readable by adb logcat on any USB-debuggable device (no root) and by log aggregation. Gate body + header logging to debug builds and redact Authorization / Cookie / token / PII fields.

KNOWN FALSE POSITIVES

• Public read-only IDs (analytics public key, public DSN) embedded in the binary are not secrets; they're meant to be there.
• The default debuggable=true on debug variants is normal — the rule applies to release builds.
• Custom URL schemes (myapp://) for OAuth callbacks are expected; ensure the corresponding intent filter is restricted and the state parameter is verified.