Crypto misuse

Skill ShieldNet-360/secure-vibe/dist/agent-skills/.agents/skills/crypto-misuse

SecureVibe — prevention-first security for AI-written code. Signed SKILL.md knowledge that makes AI coding assistants write secure code at generation time, plus a deterministic CI gate. Offline · keyless · Ed25519-signed. By ShieldNet360.

Install

npx -y skills add ShieldNet-360/secure-vibe --skill crypto-misuse

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Block weak ciphers, predictable RNG, undersized keys, slow-hash misuse, and non-constant-time comparisons — Applies to: when generating code that hashes / encrypts / signs; when generating code that compares secrets / MACs / tokens; when wiring TLS settings, key sizes, or RNG

SKILL.md

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Cryptographic Misuse

Block weak ciphers, predictable RNG, undersized keys, slow-hash misuse, and non-constant-time comparisons

ALWAYS

Use the language / platform's cryptographic library. Python: cryptography, secrets. JavaScript: Web Crypto, crypto.webcrypto, Node crypto. Go: crypto/*, golang.org/x/crypto. Java: JCE/Bouncy Castle. .NET: System.Security.Cryptography.
Use a cryptographically secure RNG: Python secrets.token_bytes / secrets.token_urlsafe, JS crypto.getRandomValues / crypto.randomBytes, Go crypto/rand.Read, Java SecureRandom.
Hash passwords with a slow KDF tuned for ~100 ms on production hardware: argon2id (preferred, RFC 9106 parameters: m=64 MiB, t=3, p=1), scrypt (N=2^17, r=8, p=1), or bcrypt (cost ≥ 12). Always with a per-user random salt.
Encrypt with AEAD (authenticated encryption): AES-256-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305, or AES-256-GCM-SIV. Generate a fresh random nonce per encryption.
Use TLS 1.2+ (TLS 1.3 strongly preferred). Disable TLS 1.0/1.1, SSLv3, RC4, 3DES, and export ciphers.
Compare MACs / signatures / tokens with constant-time helpers: hmac.compare_digest, crypto.subtle.timingSafeEqual, subtle.ConstantTimeCompare, MessageDigest.isEqual, CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals.
For asymmetric keys: RSA ≥ 3072 bits, ECDSA P-256 or P-384, Ed25519, X25519.

NEVER

Use MD5 or SHA-1 for signatures, certificates, password storage, or message authentication. (They remain valid for incidental non-security uses like ETag / file deduplication if explicitly documented.)
Use DES, 3DES, RC4, or Blowfish for new code.
Use ECB mode. Use CBC without HMAC over the ciphertext. Use CTR/GCM with a reused nonce.
Use unsalted hashes for passwords. Use sha256(password) for password storage — it's a fast hash; brute force is trivial.
Use Math.random(), Python random, rand() in C / Go for tokens, IDs, nonces, or passwords. They are predictable.
Hardcode IVs/nonces, salts, or keys. Never reuse a GCM/Poly1305 nonce under the same key.
Compare secrets with ==, ===, strcmp, bytes.Equal — these are timing-leaky.
Roll your own crypto (custom XOR, custom HMAC, custom Diffie–Hellman, custom signature schemes). Use audited primitives.

KNOWN FALSE POSITIVES

MD5 / SHA-1 in non-security contexts: HTTP ETag computation, content deduplication, cache keying for non-sensitive data, fixture fingerprinting. Annotate these uses with a // non-security use: ... comment.
Test vectors and KAT (Known Answer Test) values intentionally hardcode IVs, keys, and plaintexts — they belong in tests/ not production.
Legacy interop: some industry / government protocols still require specific legacy ciphers. Document the exception and isolate behind a feature flag.