Electron security

Skill Sheshiyer/skill-clusters/skills/electron-security

The Electron hardening checklist — context isolation, sandbox, no nodeIntegration, strict CSP, navigation/window.open allowlists, IPC input validation, and safe handling of remote content. USE WHEN auditing or hardening an Electron app, reviewing webPreferences, or before shipping. Follows Electron's official security recommendations.From its SKILL.md

Install

npx -y skills add Sheshiyer/skill-clusters --skill electron-security

Assembled from the repository path, not quoted from the project. Check it against their README if it does not work.

One thing to look at

0 stars0 stars. Stars are a popularity signal and not a quality one, but at this level it is likely that nobody has read this closely except its author, and you would be relying on your own review.

SKILL.md

2.6 KB, 541 tokens by cl100k_base, as published. Nobody here has run it

Electron Security

The renderer runs web content with a powerful process behind it; a single XSS in a misconfigured window can become full RCE on the user's machine. This is the checklist (aligned with Electron's official "Security" guidance).

Window configuration (every BrowserWindow)

✅ contextIsolation: true — never disable.
✅ nodeIntegration: false (and nodeIntegrationInWorker/InSubFrames: false).
✅ sandbox: true.
✅ webSecurity: true (never disable to "fix" CORS).
❌ No @electron/remote.

Content & navigation

Strict CSP via response headers or <meta> — no unsafe-inline/unsafe-eval; allowlist sources.
Allowlist navigation: handle will-navigate and setWindowOpenHandler — deny by default, open external URLs in the user's browser (shell.openExternal after validating the URL).
Only load content you trust. Prefer bundled local files; if you must load remote content, treat it as hostile and never give it Node/IPC power.
Validate any URL passed to shell.openExternal (no file:/arbitrary schemes).

IPC & data

Validate every IPC argument in main (type, range, path). The renderer is the attacker.
No path traversal: resolve and confine file paths to expected roots.
Don't expose privileged operations as generic ("runCommand") bridge methods.

Process & supply chain

Keep Electron up to date — you inherit Chromium/V8 CVEs; track the supported release line.
Audit dependencies (renderer deps run in the page); pin and review native modules.
Set app.enableSandbox() early; consider a fuse/@electron/fuses to disable runAsNode etc.

Pre-ship checklist

All windows: contextIsolation✓ nodeIntegration✗ sandbox✓ webSecurity✓
Minimal typed contextBridge API; no raw ipc/Node on window
Strict CSP; navigation + window.open deny-by-default
All IPC inputs validated in main
Electron on a current supported version; deps audited
App signed + notarized (electron-builder-packaging)

Guardrails

If any item above is unchecked, the app is not ship-ready. Hardening is not optional for an app that ships Chromium + Node to end users.

What ships with it

Read from the repository

Just SKILL.md. No reference files, no scripts.