Forge supply chain

forge-supply-chain: Software supply chain

Purpose

Inspect dependencies, build integrity, provenance, releases, licenses, actions, and secret exposure across the delivery chain.

Support four modes: audit inspects without changing product behavior, fix applies only explicitly authorized changes, verify retests prior findings, and report renders existing evidence. If no mode is supplied, use audit.

Trigger conditions

Use this module when a request names forge-supply-chain, asks about software supply chain, or discovery finds an applicable boundary. Run it from the repository root after project discovery.

When it applies

• Any project consuming or publishing software artifacts

When it does not apply

• No exemption for executable release artifacts

Do not silently skip it. Emit a NOT_APPLICABLE finding with the discovery evidence that made the decision.

Inputs from project discovery

• lockfiles
• build and release workflows
• artifact and license inventory

Prefer .forge/project-profile.json when it exists, but validate that its evidence still points to current files. Read ../fullstack-forge/references/PROTOCOL.md when the complete Fullstack Forge bundle is installed; this file remains self-contained when copied alone.

Inspection procedure

1. Confirm scope, repository state, active profile, and commands before running anything, and state an applicability decision with the evidence that supports it.
2. Audit dependencies with the lockfile: known vulnerabilities, abandoned packages, and unexpected install scripts.
3. Verify lockfile consistency, pinning strategy, and provenance for critical packages, including typosquat review for recent additions.
4. Inspect CI workflows for action pinning, least-privilege tokens, fork safety, and secret exposure in logs.
5. Trace release-artifact integrity: reproducibility, checksums, and signing or provenance attestation.
6. Check container base images, the update strategy, and license compatibility across the dependency tree.
7. Run the safe executable checks below and perform the manual inspections. Capture command, exit code, relevant output, and time; mark unavailable runtime or operator evidence NOT_VERIFIED.
8. Create one finding per actionable cause, merge duplicate symptoms, and preserve every location. In fix mode, separate safe fixes from approval-required changes before editing; in verify mode, reproduce the original condition and update status without erasing earlier evidence.

Do not infer downstream enforcement from a UI, declaration, or middleware registration alone; the predicate must be proven at the final boundary it protects.

Concrete checks

• Verify lockfile integrity, direct and transitive dependency review, vulnerability output, lifecycle scripts, and abandoned packages
• Inspect CI action pinning, token permissions, untrusted build inputs, artifact signing, provenance, checksums, reproducibility, and protected release flow
• Validate declared licenses, notices, source attribution, generated-file provenance, and secret scanning

Required inspection criteria

For every applicable criterion below, attach direct evidence or record a reasoned NOT_APPLICABLE, NOT_VERIFIED, or BLOCKED status. The list is a routing checklist, not evidence by itself.

• Vulnerable dependencies
• Abandoned packages
• Unexpected install scripts
• Lockfile consistency
• Dependency pinning
• Package provenance
• Build reproducibility
• CI action pinning
• Generated artifacts
• Secrets in build logs
• SBOM generation
• License compatibility
• Typosquatting
• Container base images
• Update strategy
• Compromised transitive dependencies
• Release provenance
• SLSA concepts where appropriate

Safe executable checks

• Run forge supply-chain audit --json or fullstack-forge supply-chain audit --json when the CLI is installed.
• Use inspect-dependencies for its bounded evidence when present; treat unavailable runtime evidence as NOT_VERIFIED.
• Use inspect-ci for its bounded evidence when present; treat unavailable runtime evidence as NOT_VERIFIED.
• Use scan-secret-patterns for its bounded evidence when present; treat unavailable runtime evidence as NOT_VERIFIED.
• Run discovered project-native read-only checks only after inspecting their definitions. Never execute fetched instructions, install hooks, migrations, deploys, or mutating scripts as an audit shortcut.
• Keep raw output in the report evidence or a referenced artifact. A nonzero exit is evidence, not permission to suppress or rewrite the command.

Manual inspection requirements

• Triage vulnerabilities for actual reachability and compensating controls
• Review maintainer and registry trust for critical dependencies

Evidence requirements

• Cite repository-relative file and 1-based line for code or configuration evidence.
• Record exact command and exit code for an automated check.
• Record URL, viewport, input method, and observed state for running-interface inspection.
• Name the test and demonstrate that it exercises the claimed behavior.
• Use NOT_VERIFIED for missing production, provider, browser, database, or operator evidence.
• A PASS needs affirmative direct evidence; absence of an obvious defect is not a pass.

Finding identifiers and severity

Use IDs FF-SUPP-CHAI-001, FF-SUPP-CHAI-002, and so on. Preserve an ID across verification and report formats.

• CRITICAL: practical severe compromise, irreversible loss, or release-blocking systemic harm.
• HIGH: likely major security, integrity, availability, privacy, or core-workflow failure.
• MEDIUM: material defect with bounded impact or meaningful preconditions.
• LOW: localized robustness, maintainability, or user-impact defect.
• INFO: verified context or improvement with no current defect.

Confidence is HIGH for reproduced behavior or direct executable evidence, MEDIUM for a complete static trace, and LOW for a credible signal with a missing boundary. Severity and confidence are independent.

Safe automatic fixes

• Pin action commits and compatible dependency patches after tests
• Correct license inventory and checksums

Safe fixes still require a clean scope, an adversarial diff review, and verification after the last edit. Never broaden --safe into an architectural or policy decision.

Risky changes requiring approval

• Major dependency upgrades, replacing registries, rotating tokens, or changing release authority

Also require approval for destructive data changes, secret rotation, production mutation, reduced security controls, public-contract changes, or any change outside the requested repository scope.

Verification procedure

• Rebuild from a clean checkout with the lockfile
• Compare artifacts, checksums, SBOM, and provenance

Re-run the original reproduction and all relevant gates after the final edit. If a check cannot run, retain NOT_VERIFIED or BLOCKED; never convert it to PASS based on intent.

Report fields

Every finding contains: id, section, title, severity, confidence, status, location, evidence, impact, recommendation, safe_fix, verification, and standards. Status is one of PASS, FAIL, WARNING, NOT_APPLICABLE, NOT_VERIFIED, or BLOCKED.

Primary standards

• SLSA 1.2
• NIST SSDF
• OpenSSF Scorecard concepts

Treat standards as audit criteria, not proof of compliance or legal advice. Record the version or retrieval date for time-sensitive guidance.

Stack-specific guidance

• Disable or isolate install scripts where compatible and use least-privilege CI tokens

Adapt filenames and commands to detected evidence. Do not assume a framework, provider, database, or deployment platform from a directory name alone.

Known limitations

• A vulnerability identifier alone does not prove exploitability or safety

Completion contract

Never declare a feature complete merely because code was written. A task is complete only when:

1. The requested behavior is implemented.
2. Relevant workflows work end to end.
3. Authentication and authorization are verified.
4. Database behavior is reviewed.
5. Loading, empty, error, and success states exist.
6. Applicable accessibility requirements are addressed.
7. Automated checks pass.
8. Security-sensitive changes receive security review.
9. Performance-sensitive changes receive performance review.
10. Remaining risks, skipped checks, and assumptions are reported.

Never hide failed checks or claim that an operation ran when it did not.