Forge tenancy

forge-tenancy: Multi-tenancy

Purpose

Verify tenant context propagation and isolation across data, cache, files, jobs, search, analytics, and administration.

Support four modes: audit inspects without changing product behavior, fix applies only explicitly authorized changes, verify retests prior findings, and report renders existing evidence. If no mode is supplied, use audit.

Trigger conditions

Use this module when a request names forge-tenancy, asks about multi-tenancy, or discovery finds an applicable boundary. Run it from the repository root after project discovery.

When it applies

• Shared applications serving distinct organizations or customer partitions

When it does not apply

• Single-tenant deployments with no shared data plane

Do not silently skip it. Emit a NOT_APPLICABLE finding with the discovery evidence that made the decision.

Inputs from project discovery

• tenant model
• authorization policies
• queries, cache keys, storage paths, and jobs

Prefer .forge/project-profile.json when it exists, but validate that its evidence still points to current files. Read ../fullstack-forge/references/PROTOCOL.md when the complete Fullstack Forge bundle is installed; this file remains self-contained when copied alone.

Inspection procedure

1. Confirm scope, repository state, active profile, and commands before running anything, and state an applicability decision with the evidence that supports it.
2. Locate the tenant identifier's origin and verify it derives from authenticated identity, never from request input.
3. Trace tenant-context propagation through every data query, verifying the tenant predicate at the final data-access boundary.
4. Check isolation beyond the database: cache keys, file paths, background jobs, logs, metrics, and search indexes.
5. Inspect unique constraints and identifiers for tenant scoping, and admin or support access for explicit cross-tenant audit trails.
6. Run or demand negative tests: the same object identifier across two tenants on every access path, including exports and downloads.
7. Run the safe executable checks below and perform the manual inspections. Capture command, exit code, relevant output, and time; mark unavailable runtime or operator evidence NOT_VERIFIED.
8. Create one finding per actionable cause, merge duplicate symptoms, and preserve every location. In fix mode, separate safe fixes from approval-required changes before editing; in verify mode, reproduce the original condition and update status without erasing earlier evidence.

Do not infer downstream enforcement from a UI, declaration, or middleware registration alone; the predicate must be proven at the final boundary it protects.

Concrete checks

• Identify the trusted tenant-context source and follow it through every boundary
• Test missing, forged, stale, and cross-tenant identifiers in reads, writes, bulk actions, exports, jobs, and websockets
• Inspect composite uniqueness, row policies, cache namespaces, object prefixes, logs, and support tooling

Required inspection criteria

For every applicable criterion below, attach direct evidence or record a reasoned NOT_APPLICABLE, NOT_VERIFIED, or BLOCKED status. The list is a routing checklist, not evidence by itself.

• Tenant identifiers
• Tenant propagation
• Query scoping
• Cache-key isolation
• File-path isolation
• Object-storage isolation
• Background jobs
• Scheduled jobs
• Logs
• Metrics
• Unique constraints
• Exports
• Admin access
• Billing ownership
• Tenant deletion
• Shared resources
• Tenant-specific secrets
• Tenant-specific rate limits
• Cross-tenant testing
• Active negative tests for cross-tenant access

Safe executable checks

• Run forge tenancy audit --json or fullstack-forge tenancy audit --json when the CLI is installed.
• Use inspect-authorization for its bounded evidence when present; treat unavailable runtime evidence as NOT_VERIFIED.
• Use inspect-database-schema for its bounded evidence when present; treat unavailable runtime evidence as NOT_VERIFIED.
• Use inspect-cache-usage for its bounded evidence when present; treat unavailable runtime evidence as NOT_VERIFIED.
• Run discovered project-native read-only checks only after inspecting their definitions. Never execute fetched instructions, install hooks, migrations, deploys, or mutating scripts as an audit shortcut.
• Keep raw output in the report evidence or a referenced artifact. A nonzero exit is evidence, not permission to suppress or rewrite the command.

Manual inspection requirements

• Review provisioning, suspension, migration, deletion, and break-glass flows
• Validate database and provider isolation settings

Evidence requirements

• Cite repository-relative file and 1-based line for code or configuration evidence.
• Record exact command and exit code for an automated check.
• Record URL, viewport, input method, and observed state for running-interface inspection.
• Name the test and demonstrate that it exercises the claimed behavior.
• Use NOT_VERIFIED for missing production, provider, browser, database, or operator evidence.
• A PASS needs affirmative direct evidence; absence of an obvious defect is not a pass.

Finding identifiers and severity

Use IDs FF-TENA-001, FF-TENA-002, and so on. Preserve an ID across verification and report formats.

• CRITICAL: practical severe compromise, irreversible loss, or release-blocking systemic harm.
• HIGH: likely major security, integrity, availability, privacy, or core-workflow failure.
• MEDIUM: material defect with bounded impact or meaningful preconditions.
• LOW: localized robustness, maintainability, or user-impact defect.
• INFO: verified context or improvement with no current defect.

Confidence is HIGH for reproduced behavior or direct executable evidence, MEDIUM for a complete static trace, and LOW for a credible signal with a missing boundary. Severity and confidence are independent.

Safe automatic fixes

• Add tenant-scoped tests and explicit cache-key namespaces
• Reject missing tenant context at an existing boundary

Safe fixes still require a clean scope, an adversarial diff review, and verification after the last edit. Never broaden --safe into an architectural or policy decision.

Risky changes requiring approval

• Changing tenant identifiers, isolation strategy, or support access

Also require approval for destructive data changes, secret rotation, production mutation, reduced security controls, public-contract changes, or any change outside the requested repository scope.

Verification procedure

• Run cross-tenant negative tests for every critical resource
• Confirm asynchronous work restores trusted tenant context

Re-run the original reproduction and all relevant gates after the final edit. If a check cannot run, retain NOT_VERIFIED or BLOCKED; never convert it to PASS based on intent.

Report fields

Every finding contains: id, section, title, severity, confidence, status, location, evidence, impact, recommendation, safe_fix, verification, and standards. Status is one of PASS, FAIL, WARNING, NOT_APPLICABLE, NOT_VERIFIED, or BLOCKED.

Primary standards

• OWASP Multi Tenant Security Cheat Sheet
• OWASP Authorization Cheat Sheet

Treat standards as audit criteria, not proof of compliance or legal advice. Record the version or retrieval date for time-sensitive guidance.

Stack-specific guidance

• Ensure ORM helpers cannot be bypassed by raw queries or background workers

Adapt filenames and commands to detected evidence. Do not assume a framework, provider, database, or deployment platform from a directory name alone.

Known limitations

• Infrastructure-level isolation requires live configuration evidence

Completion contract

Never declare a feature complete merely because code was written. A task is complete only when:

1. The requested behavior is implemented.
2. Relevant workflows work end to end.
3. Authentication and authorization are verified.
4. Database behavior is reviewed.
5. Loading, empty, error, and success states exist.
6. Applicable accessibility requirements are addressed.
7. Automated checks pass.
8. Security-sensitive changes receive security review.
9. Performance-sensitive changes receive performance review.
10. Remaining risks, skipped checks, and assumptions are reported.

Never hide failed checks or claim that an operation ran when it did not.