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Prd securability enhancement

Skill Securability-Engineering/securable-claude-plugin/skills/prd-securability-enhancement

Enhance PRDs, feature specs, user stories, or product briefs with explicit OWASP ASVS coverage and FIASSE v1.1 SSEM implementation guidance — before code is written. Trigger on "harden the PRD/spec", "choose ASVS level", "map features to ASVS", "find missing security requirements", "add NFRs for security", "make these requirements securable", "security-review my product brief". For code review use securability-engineering-review; for code generation use securability-engineering.From its SKILL.md

Install
npx -y skills add Securability-Engineering/securable-claude-plugin --skill prd-securability-enhancement

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SKILL.md

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PRD Securability Enhancement (FIASSE/SSEM + ASVS)

Enhance PRD content so each feature has explicit, testable securability requirements aligned to OWASP ASVS and shaped by FIASSE v1.1 / SSEM. The goal is to upgrade the requirements artifact before implementation, so delivery teams build securable capabilities by design rather than retrofitting controls later.

Path resolution: every data/, plays/, and templates/ path in this skill lives at the plugin root — the directory two levels above this SKILL.md file. In a Claude Code plugin install that root is ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}; in a repo checkout or a copied skills tree, resolve relative to this file (e.g., ../../data/asvs/README.md). These paths never refer to the user's project.

This skill is requirements-centric. It does not review or write code. If the user wants code review, redirect to securability-engineering-review. If they want code generation, redirect to securability-engineering.

When to Invoke

Trigger this skill when the user asks to:

  • Strengthen or harden a PRD, spec, user-story set, or product brief with security requirements
  • Choose an ASVS assurance level (Level 1, 2, or 3) for a product or feature
  • Map features to ASVS controls or check ASVS coverage of a requirements doc
  • Find missing security requirements before development starts
  • Annotate features with SSEM attributes or FIASSE tenets
  • Add testable security acceptance criteria to existing functional requirements

Adjacent phrasings: "security-review this spec", "what's missing security-wise from this feature list", "add NFRs for security to my PRD", "make these requirements securable".

Inputs

Ask the user for whatever is missing before starting:

  • The PRD, spec, or feature list (markdown, prose, ticket export, etc.)
  • System context: user types, deployment model, data sensitivity, integration surfaces
  • Compliance or risk context, if any (HIPAA, PCI, SOC 2, regulated industry)
  • Whether they have an ASVS level preference, or want this skill to recommend one

If the artifact is large, parse the features inline; do not require the user to pre-extract them.

Procedure

Step 1 — Parse features

Extract each feature into a normalized record. Capture for each:

  • Feature ID and title (assign IDs like F-01 if absent)
  • Actor (user role, system, external service)
  • Data touched and sensitivity class
  • Trust boundaries crossed (browser↔server, service↔service, server↔storage, internal↔external)
  • Existing acceptance criteria (verbatim, even if weak)

If the source PRD lumps several capabilities into one bullet, split them so each feature is independently testable.

Step 2 — Choose the ASVS level first

Selecting the level before mapping requirements prevents both under-scoping and over-scoping. Use this rubric:

LevelUse when
1Internal tooling, prototypes, low-sensitivity data, no regulatory pressure, limited blast radius if compromised
2Typical production web/API systems with authenticated users, business-critical behavior, customer data, or moderate regulatory exposure (most products land here)
3High-assurance contexts: payments, health records, government, identity providers, anything where compromise causes severe material impact or where attackers are well-resourced

Default to Level 2 unless evidence pushes lower or higher. Document:

  • Chosen level
  • Why lower levels are insufficient (when level > 1)
  • Any specific features that should escalate above the baseline (e.g., a payments endpoint inside a Level-2 product gets Level-3 treatment)

Step 3 — Map each feature to ASVS

For every feature, use data/asvs/README.md (chapter index) and the when_to_use frontmatter in data/asvs/V*.md to identify applicable chapters.

Numbering discipline: all references use ASVS 5.0 chapter numbering, which differs sharply from 4.x (in 5.0, Authentication is V6, not V2; Authorization is V8, not V4; Input Validation lives in V2, not V12). When in doubt, open the chapter file and confirm its title frontmatter before citing it. Never emit a requirement ID you have not confirmed against data/asvs/.

Common mappings (ASVS 5.0):

  • Any user/external input, business-logic rules, rate limiting / anti-automation → V2 (Validation and Business Logic)
  • Output encoding, injection defense, sanitization → V1 (Encoding and Sanitization)
  • Browser-delivered UI (cookies, security headers, CSP, origin separation) → V3 (Web Frontend Security)
  • Public APIs, webhooks, GraphQL, WebSocket → V4 (API and Web Service)
  • File upload/download/storage → V5 (File Handling)
  • Auth flows (login, passwords, MFA, account recovery) → V6 (Authentication)
  • Sessions → V7 (Session Management)
  • Authorization, ownership, multi-tenant scoping → V8 (Authorization)
  • JWTs and other self-contained tokens → V9 (Self-contained Tokens)
  • OAuth/OIDC integration → V10 (OAuth and OIDC)
  • Crypto, key management, hashing, randomness → V11 (Cryptography)
  • TLS / transport security → V12 (Secure Communication)
  • Config, secrets, environment/deployment → V13 (Configuration)
  • PII, data at rest, retention, minimization → V14 (Data Protection)
  • Dependencies, defensive coding, concurrency → V15 (Secure Coding and Architecture)
  • Logging, audit trails, error handling → V16 (Security Logging and Error Handling)

Filter requirements by the chosen ASVS level. For each requirement, classify coverage:

  • Covered — the PRD already satisfies the intent
  • Partial — partly covered; clarify or strengthen acceptance criteria
  • Missing — requirement absent and must be added
  • N/A — justified with a one-line rationale

Use the ASVS Coverage Gap Pattern Table below to spot the gaps that PRDs reliably miss.

Step 4 — Add Securability Notes per feature

Write a short paragraph per feature surfacing only the SSEM and FIASSE points that materially shape implementation. Do not enumerate all ten SSEM attributes or all FIASSE tenets — that produces noise.

Useful lenses (mention only when relevant):

  • Trust-boundary handling and input canonicalization (FIASSE v1.1 S4.3, S4.4.1)
  • Isolated Integrity — never trust client-supplied values for server-owned state (FIASSE v1.1 S4.4.1.2)
  • Canonical Parsing — process only the named values you expect (FIASSE v1.1 S4.4.1.1)
  • Observability: what must be logged or auditable (FIASSE v1.1 S3.2.1.4 + Accountability; Transparency S2.6)
  • Least Astonishment — predictable behavior at trust boundaries and error paths (FIASSE v1.1 S2.7)
  • Resilience or availability drivers (rate limits, timeouts, graceful and secure failure)
  • Testability or modifiability mandates (e.g., centralizing crypto/auth in a dedicated module)
  • Dependency stewardship — ongoing relationship with third-party code (FIASSE v1.1 S4.6)

Step 5 — Convert into testable acceptance criteria

For each added or strengthened requirement, write at least one acceptance criterion that is:

  • Behaviorally observable (a test or audit can confirm pass/fail)
  • Specific about boundary conditions (failure modes, unauthorized actors, malformed input)
  • Tied to a verifiable artifact (log line, response code, denied action)

Ambiguous "secure" or "robust" language is not acceptable here.

Step 6 — Emit the enhanced PRD artifact

Produce these sections in order, using the exact templates below.

Step 7 — Emit the machine-readable contract

Alongside the prose PRD, write the same requirements as a securable contract: .securable/requirements.yaml (and .securable/boundaries.yaml for the trust-boundary map discovered in Step 1). This is the artifact that outlives the session — any code-generation harness reads it, the generation skill implements against it and flips status: planned → implemented, and merge review flips implemented → verified with evidence. Never emit a requirement here that lacks a testable acceptance criterion (that would be a control citation, not a requirement — FIASSE v1.1 S6.1.1).

  • Shape: schema/securable/requirements.schema.json and schema/securable/boundaries.schema.json (paths relative to the plugin root); worked example in examples/securable/.
  • Every ASVS reference must exist in data/asvs/; run scripts/validate_securable.py --dir .securable after writing and fix anything it rejects before finishing.
  • Requirements above the chosen baseline level carry level and escalation: true.
  • Write the contract into the user's project at .securable/ (ask before creating the directory if the project layout is unclear).

ASVS Coverage Gap Pattern Table

These are the gaps PRDs reliably miss. When you see one of the trigger phrasings on the left, add the named requirements on the right — they are almost always missing in the source artifact.

PRD trigger phrasing (what the feature says)Almost-always-missing requirementsASVS 5.0 sectionsTag
"User logs in with email and password"Account-enumeration parity (same response/timing for valid vs invalid email); password-screen against breached-password list; auth-event audit log; per-account brute-force rate limitV6.2, V6.3.1, V6.3.8, V2.4, V16.3"Auth surface gaps"
"User resets/forgets password"Account-enumeration parity on the request endpoint; single-use token; short expiry (≤15 min); token-hash-at-rest; rate-limit per email and per IP; audit log of issuance/redemptionV6.3.8, V6.4.1, V6.2, V2.4, V16.3"Reset flow gaps"
"User uploads a file"Type allow-list (not deny-list); content-sniffing vs declared type; max size; antivirus/safe-storage path; filename canonicalization; storage outside web root; URL non-guessabilityV5.1, V5.2, V5.3, V2.2"Upload gaps"
"User can edit their profile" / "update settings"Allow-listed mutable fields (no email/role/is_admin from request body); ownership check on the resource; audit log of changes; old-vs-new value captureV8.2.2, V8.2.3, V2.2, V16.3"Mass-assignment gaps"
"Admin can do X" / "role-based access"Authorization decision logged with grant/deny; centralized authz module (not scattered checks); deny-by-default at boundary; ownership scoping on every record fetchV8.1, V8.2, V8.3, V16.3.2"Authz gap"
"Public API endpoint" / "third-party integration"Per-key/per-client rate limits; auth for every call (not first-call only); request-id propagation; response field allow-list (no leaking internal fields); contract validationV4.1, V2.4, V14.2.6, V16.2"API gaps"
"Send email/SMS to user"Templated payload with no user-controlled subject/body injection; rate-limit per recipient and per actor; bounce/abuse-loop handling; opt-out and audit logV1.2, V2.2, V2.4, V16.3"Outbound-message gaps"
"Search / filter / list with user-supplied parameters"Parameter allow-list; ordering/pagination caps; query timeout; result count cap; tenant/owner scoping enforced server-sideV2.2, V2.4, V8.2"Query-surface gaps"
"Webhook receiver" / "callback URL"Source verification (signature, mTLS, IP allow-list); replay protection (timestamp + nonce); idempotency key; rate-limit; audit log of received eventsV4.1.5, V12.3.5, V2.4, V16.3"Webhook gaps"
"Save user file/document/note"Owner identifier never client-supplied; size and content caps; rich-text/HTML sanitization on read or write; audit log of writesV8.2.2, V2.2, V1.3, V16.3"Server-owned state gaps (Isolated Integrity)"
"Export data" / "download report"Authorization re-checked on export (not just on UI route); rate-limit; audit log including row count; PII-scrub policy if applicableV8.3, V2.4, V14.2, V16.3"Export gaps"
"Background job processes user-submitted data"Same boundary discipline as the synchronous path (validation, surface minimization, owner scoping); job-level audit log; poison-message handling and DLQV2.2, V2.3, V16.3"Async-path boundary gaps"
"Configuration / feature flag / admin setting"Change requires authenticated actor and audit record; cannot be set via product API without admin role; secret values never echoed back; defaults are safeV13.1, V13.3, V8.2, V16.3"Config-surface gaps"
"PII/PHI/financial data" mentioned anywhereField-level classification; encryption at rest and in transit; retention/disposal policy; access-log requirement; export/erasure (right-to-be-forgotten) flowsV14.1, V14.2.6, V14.2.7, V11.3, V12.1, V16.3.2"Sensitive-data lifecycle gaps"
"Real-time" / "websocket" / "streaming" featurePer-connection auth (not just first message); per-connection resource caps; back-pressure / max-queue; idle timeout; audit of connection lifecycleV4.4, V7.2, V2.4, V16.3"Streaming gaps"
"AI/LLM-backed feature"Prompt-injection handling at trust boundary; output validation before downstream side effects; per-actor rate limit and cost cap; audit log of prompts and tool calls; PII redaction policyV2.2, V2.4, V14.2, V16.3"LLM boundary gaps"

When a feature triggers one of these patterns, prefill the corresponding requirements as Missing in the coverage matrix unless the PRD explicitly addresses them — most of the time it doesn't.

Two notes on using this table honestly:

  • Level accuracy — some of these requirements sit above Level 2 (e.g., account-enumeration parity 6.3.8 is Level 3). When a gap-table item is above the chosen baseline level, add it as a recommended escalation with its level stated, not as a silent baseline requirement. The table earns trust by being right about levels, not by inflating scope.
  • AI/LLM row — ASVS 5.0 has no LLM-specific chapter; the sections cited are the closest anchors (input validation, anti-automation/cost caps, data protection, security events). Name the concern precisely in the requirement text and treat the ASVS reference as the nearest verifiable hook.

Output Templates

A. ASVS Level Decision

## ASVS Level Decision

**Chosen Level**: [1 | 2 | 3]

**Rationale**: [2–4 sentences. Cover data sensitivity, user population, regulatory context, and material-impact reasoning. Note why lower levels are insufficient if Level > 1.]

**Feature-Level Escalations**: [List any features that need a higher level than baseline, with one-line justification, or "None".]

B. Coverage Matrix

## Feature ↔ ASVS Coverage Matrix

| Feature | ASVS Section | Requirement ID | Level | Coverage | PRD Change Needed |
|---------|--------------|----------------|-------|----------|-------------------|
| F-01    | V2.2         | 2.2.1          | 2     | Missing  | Add MFA requirement for high-risk actions |
| F-01    | V7.1         | 7.1.1          | 2     | Partial  | Specify which auth events are logged |
| F-02    | V12.1        | 12.1.1         | 2     | Covered  | — |

Aim for completeness over brevity here — every feature × every applicable requirement gets a row. Where the gap pattern table applies, include the named requirements it surfaces.

C. Enhanced Feature Specifications

For each feature, emit exactly this shape:

### Feature F-01: [Title]

**Actor**: [user role / system]
**Data**: [data classes touched]
**Trust Boundaries**: [boundaries crossed]

**ASVS Mapping**: V2.2.1, V7.1.1, ...

**Updated Requirements**:
- [Original requirement, kept or rewritten]
- [Newly added requirement from ASVS mapping]
- [Newly added requirement from ASVS mapping]

**Acceptance Criteria**:
- [Testable criterion tied to a requirement above]
- [Testable criterion tied to a requirement above]

**Securability Notes**: [Short paragraph — only material SSEM/FIASSE points for this feature. Do not enumerate all attributes.]

D. Cross-Cutting Securability Requirements

Controls that span multiple features (centralized logging, secrets management, dependency policy, baseline TLS, error-handling standards). One bullet each, with the ASVS reference.

E. Open Gaps and Assumptions

Anything you could not resolve from the input: missing system context, unclear data sensitivity, unstated user populations, deferred decisions. Be explicit so the team can close these before implementation.

F. Securable Contract (machine-readable)

The .securable/requirements.yaml / .securable/boundaries.yaml pair from Step 7, validated. In the prose artifact, reference it with one line and the validator command; do not duplicate its contents inline.

Worked Example (Mini)

Input feature (from a PRD):

F-03: Users can reset their password by clicking "Forgot Password" and entering their email. The system emails a reset link.

This trips the "Reset flow gaps" pattern in the gap table — so the missing requirements are predictable.

Enhanced output:

### Feature F-03: Password Reset via Email

**Actor**: Unauthenticated user (claiming an account)
**Data**: Email address (PII), password (credential), reset token
**Trust Boundaries**: browser → public API; API → email provider; API → credential store

**ASVS Mapping**: V2.2.1, V2.4.1, V6.2.1, V6.2.4, V6.3.8 (L3 escalation), V6.4.1, V16.3.1

**Updated Requirements**:
- User can request a password reset by entering an account email at `/reset`.
- The system always returns the same success response whether or not the email matches an account (prevents account enumeration, V6.3.8 — a Level 3 requirement, added here as a recommended escalation because recovery flows are a favorite enumeration surface).
- Reset tokens are single-use, expire within 15 minutes, and are stored only as a salted hash (V6.4.1 — recovery secrets must expire quickly and must not become long-term credentials).
- New passwords are validated against the password policy and screened against a known-breached-password list (V6.2.1, V6.2.4).
- All reset requests, token issuances, token redemptions, and password changes are logged with user ID, source IP, user agent, and outcome (V16.3.1).
- Reset requests are rate-limited per email and per source IP (V2.4.1).
- The email input is canonicalized and validated against a strict format (V2.2.1).

**Acceptance Criteria**:
- Submitting a non-existent email returns the same response body, status code, and timing characteristics as a valid email (within tolerance).
- A reset token cannot be redeemed after 15 minutes or after first successful use; both cases produce a generic failure response and a logged `reset_token_invalid` event.
- More than 5 reset requests for the same email within 10 minutes are rejected with HTTP 429 and logged.
- Audit log lines for reset events are queryable by user ID and contain the fields above.

**Securability Notes**: This feature crosses an unauthenticated trust boundary (FIASSE v1.1 S4.3), so input handling and rate limiting are the load-bearing concerns. The reset token is server-owned state; never accept client-supplied token attributes beyond the opaque token itself (Isolated Integrity, FIASSE v1.1 S4.4.1.2). Centralize token generation, hashing, and verification in a single module so the policy can evolve without touching call sites (Modifiability). All reset events must be observable in the audit pipeline so abuse patterns can be detected (Accountability + Observability, FIASSE v1.1 S3.2.1.4; Transparency S2.6).

This is the level of specificity the output should hit — concrete, testable, and traceable back to ASVS.

Quality Checklist (run before emitting)

Coverage

  • Every feature has an ID, actor, data classification, and trust-boundary list
  • ASVS level is chosen and justified before per-feature mapping
  • Every feature mapped against all applicable ASVS chapters at the chosen level
  • Gap patterns from the table above were applied to every relevant feature
  • Every Missing/Partial item produced a concrete PRD change

Output discipline

  • Coverage matrix is present and includes change-needed column
  • Each feature follows the exact output shape (Actor / Data / Trust Boundaries / ASVS Mapping / Updated Requirements / Acceptance Criteria / Securability Notes)
  • Acceptance criteria are behaviorally testable, not aspirational
  • Securability Notes are surgical — only material SSEM/FIASSE points, not exhaustive enumeration

Traceability

  • Every added requirement cites its ASVS reference
  • Cross-cutting requirements section captures shared controls
  • Open gaps and assumptions are listed explicitly

When in doubt

  • Prefer adding a missing requirement over assuming coverage; mark it explicitly so reviewers see it.
  • Prefer fewer, sharper ASVS references per feature over a long list that nobody will action.
  • Prefer plain language in Securability Notes — these are read by product managers, not just security engineers.

Reference Material

  • Step-by-step runbook: plays/requirements-analysis/prd-fiasse-asvs-enhancement.md
  • ASVS chapter index: data/asvs/README.md
  • ASVS requirements (per chapter): data/asvs/V*.md
  • FIASSE v1.1 foundational principles: data/fiasse/S2.1.md–S2.7.md (Transparency S2.6, Least Astonishment S2.7)
  • FIASSE v1.1 SSEM attribute umbrellas: data/fiasse/S3.2.1.md–S3.2.3.md; leaf files (e.g. S3.2.1.4.md Observability) for attribute-specific guidance
  • FIASSE v1.1 Boundary Control and Resilient Coding: data/fiasse/S4.3.md, S4.4.md, and the canonical-input-handling leaves S4.4.1.md, S4.4.1.1.md, S4.4.1.2.md
  • FIASSE v1.1 Dependency Management and Stewardship: data/fiasse/S4.5.md, S4.6.md

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