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Container security

Skill sairam0424/MindForge/.mindforge/skills/container-security

MindForge: The Enterprise Agentic Framework for Claude Code & Antigravity. High-performance autonomous execution, wave-parallelism, and multi-tier governance for production-grade AI engineering.From the repository description

Install
npx -y skills add sairam0424/MindForge --skill container-security

Assembled from the repository path, not quoted from the project. Check it against their README if it does not work.

One thing to look at

  • 0 stars0 stars. Stars are a popularity signal and not a quality one, but at this level it is likely that nobody has read this closely except its author, and you would be relying on your own review.

SKILL.md

4.9 KB, ~1.1k tokens by cl100k_base, as published. Nobody here has run it

Skill — Container Security

When this skill activates

Any task involving container image security, runtime hardening, Kubernetes security policies, container secret management, or supply chain integrity for containerized workloads.

Mandatory actions when this skill is active

Before writing any code

  1. Select base image strategy (distroless preferred, Alpine acceptable, Ubuntu last resort).
  2. Identify secrets required and injection mechanism (never env vars in manifests).
  3. Define network policy requirements (default-deny baseline).
  4. Determine Pod Security Standard level (restricted > baseline > privileged).

During implementation

  • Pin base images by digest (not just tag) for reproducibility.
  • Run as non-root user (UID > 10000).
  • Set filesystem to read-only where possible.
  • Drop all Linux capabilities, add back only what's needed.
  • Never store secrets in image layers or environment variables in manifests.
  • Use multi-stage builds to exclude build tools from runtime image.

After implementation

  • Run Trivy/Grype scan — block on CRITICAL or HIGH CVEs.
  • Sign image with cosign and generate SBOM.
  • Verify Pod Security Standard compliance.
  • Test NetworkPolicy blocks unauthorized traffic.
  • Confirm secrets are injected at runtime (not baked in).

Image Scanning

CI Pipeline Integration

# Block deployment if critical CVEs found
- trivy image --severity CRITICAL,HIGH --exit-code 1 $IMAGE

Scan Frequency

  • On every build (CI gate).
  • Weekly scheduled scan of running images (new CVEs discovered post-deploy).
  • Before promotion between environments.

Vulnerability Management

  • CRITICAL: Block deployment, fix immediately.
  • HIGH: Block deployment, fix within 48 hours.
  • MEDIUM: Track, fix within sprint.
  • LOW: Backlog, fix opportunistically.

Base Image Strategy

PriorityImage TypeUse Case
1gcr.io/distroless/staticGo binaries, no shell needed
2gcr.io/distroless/baseC/C++ apps needing libc
3alpine:3.xWhen shell/package manager needed
4ubuntu:22.04-minimalComplex runtime dependencies

Rules

  • Pin by digest: FROM alpine@sha256:abc123...
  • Rebuild weekly to pick up base image security patches.
  • Never use latest tag in production.

Runtime Hardening

Pod Security Standards (Kubernetes)

Restricted (target for all workloads):

securityContext:
  runAsNonRoot: true
  runAsUser: 10001
  readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
  allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
  capabilities:
    drop: ["ALL"]
  seccompProfile:
    type: RuntimeDefault

Container Isolation

  • Use gVisor or Kata Containers for untrusted workloads.
  • Separate namespaces for different trust levels.
  • Resource limits (CPU, memory) to prevent DoS.

Secrets Management

Injection Methods (Ranked)

  1. External Secrets Operator → syncs from Vault/AWS SM to K8s Secret → volume mount.
  2. Vault Agent Sidecar → injects secrets into shared volume at runtime.
  3. CSI Secret Store Driver → mounts secrets as files.
  4. Sealed Secrets → encrypted in Git, decrypted in cluster.

Anti-patterns (NEVER do)

  • Secrets as environment variables in Pod spec/Deployment manifest.
  • Secrets baked into container image.
  • Secrets in ConfigMaps.
  • Secrets committed to Git (even "encrypted" without proper tooling).

Network Policies

Default Deny Baseline

apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
  name: default-deny-all
spec:
  podSelector: {}
  policyTypes:
    - Ingress
    - Egress

Then explicitly allow required flows:

  • Ingress: only from specific services/namespaces.
  • Egress: only to required databases, APIs, DNS.

Supply Chain Integrity

Image Provenance

  1. Sign all images with cosign in CI.
  2. Generate SBOM (Software Bill of Materials) with syft.
  3. Enforce signature verification in admission controller (Kyverno/OPA).
  4. Use deterministic builds for reproducibility.

Admission Control

  • Reject unsigned images.
  • Reject images from untrusted registries.
  • Reject images with known critical CVEs.
  • Reject pods violating security context requirements.

Self-check

  • Base image pinned by digest.
  • Non-root user configured.
  • Read-only filesystem enabled.
  • All capabilities dropped (add back minimally).
  • Image scanned with zero CRITICAL/HIGH CVEs.
  • Secrets injected at runtime (not in manifest or image).
  • NetworkPolicy default-deny applied.
  • Image signed and SBOM generated.
  • Pod Security Standard: restricted level.

What ships with it

Read from the repository

Just SKILL.md. No reference files, no scripts.

Gives 1 of the 12 instructions most security skills give in ~1.1k tokens

Counted across 648 of the 828 authors here whose files we hold, read 2026-08-07

  • Parameterize all database queriesin 68 of 648, across 51 files
  • Hash passwords using bcrypt, scrypt, or argon2in 49 of 648, across 36 files
  • Apply rate limiting to authentication endpointsin 48 of 648, across 24 files
  • Configure security headersin 35 of 648, across 19 files
  • Validate all inputsin 32 of 648, across 24 files
  • Validate all external input at the system boundaryin 29 of 648, across 19 files
  • Run containers as a non-root userhere, and in 28 of 648, across 15 files
  • Use httponly secure samesite cookies for sessionsin 26 of 648, across 15 files
  • Run dependency audits before every releasein 21 of 648, across 10 files
  • Encode output to prevent cross-site scriptingin 21 of 648, across 11 files
  • Copy dependencies before source codein 20 of 648, across 9 files
  • Store secrets in environment variablesin 20 of 648, across 18 files

Said here and by no other author read

  • block deployment on critical or high CVEs
  • rebuild images weekly

Grouped from the skills themselves: near-identical wordings counted once, and counted by distinct author, so one author publishing three of these counts once. Length counted with cl100k_base; the agent that loads this file may tokenize it differently.

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