agentsclimarketplace

Guard

Skill Sagargupta16/craftsmanship/skills/guard

Skills that encode engineering discipline -- plan, guard, verify, review, audit, ship. Compatible with 45+ AI agents via skills.sh.

Install
npx -y skills add Sagargupta16/craftsmanship --skill guard

Assembled from the repository path, not quoted from the project. Check it against their README if it does not work.

One thing to look at

  • 0 stars0 stars. Stars are a popularity signal and not a quality one, but at this level it is likely that nobody has read this closely except its author, and you would be relying on your own review.

What its author says it does

Copied from the file, not written here

Use when making git operations, handling secrets, committing code, or dealing with credentials. Enforces git safety rules (no force-push to main, no amend of published commits), secret-handling discipline (never commit .env, use .env.example), and destructive-command caution.

SKILL.md

4.6 KB, ~1.0k tokens by cl100k_base, as published. Nobody here has run it

Safety Guardrails

Git Safety

RuleWhy
Never force push to main/masterDestroys team history, breaks CI
Never git reset --hard without explicit confirmationIrreversible data loss
Never amend published commitsCreates divergent history for collaborators
Never skip pre-commit hooks (--no-verify)Hooks catch real issues
Stage specific files by namegit add . risks committing secrets or binaries
Never commit .env, credentials, API keysSecrets in git history are permanent
Verify current branch before pushingAvoid pushing to wrong branch
Never force-push to someone else's branchOnly to your own fork branches

Destructive Commands

These commands need explicit user confirmation before running:

CommandRisk
rm -rfPermanent file deletion
git reset --hardDiscards uncommitted changes
git push --forceOverwrites remote history
git clean -fdxDeletes untracked files including gitignored
DROP TABLE / TRUNCATEIrreversible data loss
kill -9 on shared processesMay corrupt state
Modifying CI/CD pipelinesVisible to whole team

Secrets and Credentials

Never Commit

  • .env files, .env.* (except .env.example)
  • API keys, access tokens, bearer tokens
  • Passwords, connection strings with credentials
  • Private keys (.pem, .key, id_rsa)
  • OAuth client secrets
  • Cloud provider credentials (AWS, GCP, Azure)

Use Placeholders

.env.example with placeholder values is safe to commit:

DATABASE_URL=postgresql://user:password@localhost:5432/dbname
API_KEY=your-api-key-here
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE

If Real Credentials Are in Git History

  1. Rotate the credential immediately -- git history is permanent and public
  2. Use git filter-repo or BFG to remove from history
  3. Force-push cleaned history (coordinate with team)
  4. Audit access logs for suspicious use

Scan Before Committing

# Check staged changes for common secret patterns
git diff --cached | grep -iE 'api[_-]?key|secret|password|token|bearer' | grep -v example

# Tools
gitleaks detect --source=. --verbose
trufflehog git file://. --only-verified

Code Security Basics

RuleWhy
Validate user input at system boundariesPrevents injection attacks
Use parameterized queries, never string concatSQL injection
Sanitize data before rendering in templatesXSS
Use bcrypt/argon2 for password hashingMD5/SHA are broken for passwords
Set CORS origins from env, never wildcard in prodCross-origin attacks
HTTPS only, no mixed contentMITM attacks
Rate-limit authentication endpointsCredential stuffing / brute force

Dependency Safety

  • Check vulnerabilities before adding new packages (npm audit, pip-audit, cargo audit)
  • Prefer well-maintained packages with active security response
  • Pin dependency versions in lock files
  • Review package permissions (scripts, post-install hooks)
  • Watch for typosquatting: reqeusts vs requests, expresss vs express

Working with Shared Systems

Actions that affect others need confirmation:

  • Pushing code (affects CI, teammates)
  • Creating/closing/commenting on PRs or issues
  • Sending messages (Slack, email, GitHub)
  • Modifying shared infrastructure
  • Deploying to staging/production

Third-Party Uploads

Uploading content to external tools publishes it:

  • Pastebins, gists, diagram renderers
  • Cloud storage with sharable links
  • AI chatbots (data may be retained/trained on)

Before uploading: is this content sensitive? PII, internal architecture, credentials?

Anti-Patterns

Anti-PatternProblemDo Instead
git add .Accidentally stages secrets, binariesStage specific files by name
--no-verify to skip hooksBypasses real safety checksFix the hook failure, or ask why it's failing
Force push to shared branchDestroys teammates' workRebase locally, only force-push your own branches
Committing secrets "just temporarily"Git history is permanentNever, always use .env.example
"It's just a test credential"Real bad actors scan GitHubRotate and remove from history
rm -rf based on LLM suggestionLLMs hallucinate pathsVerify path manually, dry-run with ls first

What ships with it

Read from the repository

Just SKILL.md. No reference files, no scripts.

Keep looking

Skills are one crate of 328,083. Ordering is by how many stacks a row turns up in, so the top of any crate is what has actually been picked rather than what has the most stars.