Cert manager issuer trust review
Skill Raishin/vanguard-frontier-agentic/skills/cert-manager/cert-manager-issuer-trust-review
Use this skill when reviewing cert-manager PKI configuration for Kubernetes clusters. Trigger when the user asks about Issuer or ClusterIssuer scope, CertificateRequestPolicy coverage, certificate SAN or duration risks, trust-manager bundle distribution, SPIFFE mesh CA integration, cert-manager webhook health, or cloud CA authentication method.From its SKILL.md
npx -y skills add Raishin/vanguard-frontier-agentic --skill cert-manager-issuer-trust-reviewAssembled from the repository path, not quoted from the project. Check it against their README if it does not work.
SKILL.md
3.2 KB, 530 tokens by cl100k_base, as published. Nobody here has run it
cert-manager Issuer Trust Review
Purpose
Review cert-manager Issuer and ClusterIssuer scope, CertificateRequestPolicy (approver-policy) authorization coverage, certificate SAN wildcard and duration risks, trust-manager CA bundle distribution blast radius, SPIFFE/service-mesh CA integration, and cloud-backed CA authentication method. cert-manager's security posture depends on whether namespace-scoped request authorization exists — without CertificateRequestPolicy, any namespace can issue a certificate for any DNS name from a shared ClusterIssuer.
Lean operating rules
- Prefer live evidence (
kubectl get clusterissuer,issuer -A -o yaml,kubectl get certificaterequestpolicy -o yaml,kubectl get certificate -A -o yaml) when the active client exposes it; otherwise fall back to official cert-manager documentation and sanitized YAML from the user. - Separate confirmed facts from inference. If CertificateRequestPolicy deployment, certificate health, or trust-manager bundle scope was not directly queried, say so.
- Treat no CertificateRequestPolicy deployed cluster-wide as a critical finding — any cert request in any namespace is auto-approved against any ClusterIssuer.
- Treat a ClusterIssuer backed by a corporate private CA with no namespace restriction via CertificateRequestPolicy as a high finding — any namespace can request corp-trusted certs.
- Treat Certificate
spec.dnsNamescontaining wildcards like*.internal.company.comfor a single microservice as a high finding — overly broad trust grants. - Treat
spec.durationexceeding 90 days for workload certs as a high finding; certs withduration: 87600h(10 years) are critical. - Treat cert-manager-webhook in a degraded or failing state as a high finding — no new cert renewals can complete.
- Treat a trust-manager Bundle with no namespace selector distributing CA bundles to all namespaces as a medium finding unless intentionally cluster-wide.
- Keep the answer scoped, evidence-labeled, and explicit about what was not queried.
References
Load these only when needed:
Response minimum
Return, at minimum:
- the scoped target (ClusterIssuer, Issuer, Certificate, CertificateRequestPolicy, or trust-manager Bundle) and evidence level,
- the issuer type and backing CA (self-signed, ACME, AWS PCA, Azure Key Vault, Vault, etc.) and whether it is namespace-scoped or cluster-scoped,
- CertificateRequestPolicy presence and subject/issuer constraint coverage,
- certificate SAN scope and duration for any reviewed Certificate resources,
- trust-manager Bundle distribution scope,
- the safest next actions and any assumptions or blockers.
What ships with it: 2 files
11.1 KB alongside SKILL.md
references/
- workflow-and-output.md9.9 KB
- metadata.json1.2 KB