Web security review

Web and Electron Security Review (JavaScript / TypeScript)

Leaf-mode guard

If the task identifies your role as leaf-reviewer or sets delegation-budget: 0, read and follow references/validation-pass.md, validate only the supplied candidates, return the verdicts to the caller, and stop before the full workflow below.

Identify exploitable security vulnerabilities in JavaScript/TypeScript web and Electron desktop applications. Reason about the code the way a security researcher would — trace data flow, understand framework and runtime protections, and report only findings you can justify with concrete proof. Signal over noise.

This skill is a best-of-three composite. See ATTRIBUTION.md.

Scope

In scope: Node.js/TypeScript backends (Express, NestJS, Fastify, Next.js API routes), browser/SSR frontends (React, Vue, Angular, Next.js), and Electron main, preload, renderer, worker, and utility-process code. Server-side, client-side, and desktop JS/TS, plus the config, packaging, CI/CD, and IaC files that ship with them.

Out of scope: other languages (defer to a language-specific reviewer) and the exclusions in references/false-positives.md.

Report vs. research — the prime directive

• Report on: only the file, diff, or path the user asked about.
• Research: the entire codebase to establish the facts before reporting.

Before flagging anything, trace where the input actually comes from, whether it is validated/sanitized upstream, how it is configured, and what framework protection applies. Never report on pattern-match alone. Investigate first, report second.

Reporting gate: proof, not probability

Report a finding only when you can construct concrete proof appropriate to the class. If you can't describe how the bug actually manifests, it isn't a finding. Use one of these proof shapes:

• Data-flow flaw: the exact attacker-controlled input, its route through the code, and the security-sensitive sink it reaches.
• Exposure flaw: the sensitive value or resource, where an attacker can observe or retrieve it, and why the value is real and security-relevant. Never validate a suspected credential against a live service.
• Configuration flaw: the effective unsafe setting, the attacker capability or reachable operation it affects, the security boundary it removes, and the concrete resulting impact.

Every shape must establish attacker capability, affected boundary, and impact. Signal over noise: better to miss a theoretical issue than to flood the report.

Do not assign confidence percentages or 1–10 scores — reviewer confidence is not evidence, and neither is a second tool agreeing with you. The complete proof is the evidence. Every candidate is in exactly one state:

State	You have…	Action
Proven	one complete proof shape above with a concrete exploit or exposure you can describe	Report, with that proof in the finding
Lead	a suspicious path, exposure, or setting with a missing proof element after investigation	List under "Needs verification" as a question — not a finding
Theoretical	only a pattern match, best-practice gap, or defense-in-depth nit	Drop

For a data-flow candidate, first ask whether the input is attacker-controlled or server-controlled. For exposure and configuration candidates, identify the attacker- reachable boundary and concrete impact instead. See the taxonomy, proof gate, and hard exclusion / precedent lists in references/false-positives.md — read it before reporting anything.

Review workflow

Run these steps in order. Load reference files as each step needs them — don't front-load everything into context.

1. Scope resolution

• If a path/diff was given, review only that. Otherwise review the working changes, including untracked files. Establish the default scope with:

  if git rev-parse --verify --quiet origin/HEAD >/dev/null; then
    git diff --merge-base origin/HEAD
  else
    git diff HEAD
  fi
  git ls-files --others --exclude-standard
  

  Treat the diff output plus every listed untracked path as the review scope.
• Detect frameworks and versions from package.json / lockfile (React, Vue, Angular, Express, Nest, Next, ORM/driver/ODM, Redis clients, LevelDB adapters, and validation libraries like zod/joi). When Electron is present, resolve its exact installed version, target platforms, packaging toolchain, and main/preload/renderer entry points.
• Verify version-sensitive framework, dependency, and vulnerability behavior against primary sources: official project documentation, release notes/advisories, standards, or NVD/CISA records. Do not rely on search snippets or third-party summaries.

2. Map the attack surface

For each file, decide which vulnerability classes are even reachable, then load the matching sections of references/vuln-classes.md:

Code under review	Primary classes to check
API routes / controllers	authorization (IDOR/BOLA), authentication/JWT, injection
DB/storage access / ORM/ODM/client	SQL/NoSQL injection; Redis/LevelDB authz, path, atomicity
Templates / DOM / components	XSS
Outbound fetch/http/webhooks	SSRF
State-changing endpoints	CSRF
Uploads / file paths	path traversal, file handling
Cookies / tokens / hashing	crypto, session, secrets
Login / password reset / signup	auth — hashing, enumeration, reset tokens, brute-force
OAuth / OIDC callback routes	OIDC/SSO — see oidc-sso-review.md
Object merge / JSON.parse spread	prototype pollution, mass assignment
Money / counters / multi-step flows	business logic, race conditions
Dockerfile / compose / .env / IaC	deployment hardening — see self-hosting-hardening.md
DB service / connection config / migrations	DB deployment — see database-deployment-security.md
Electron main/preload/renderer / webPreferences	renderer-to-native escalation, isolation — see electron-threats.md
Electron IPC / bridge / windows / navigation	capability authorization, cross-frame/window trust — see electron-threats.md
Electron protocols / deep links / shell / updater	path/header/command flow, permissions, package integrity — see electron-threats.md

Load references/javascript-web-patterns.md for the framework-specific safe-vs-dangerous catalog (what auto-escapes, which sinks are exploitable, which APIs bypass protection).

Conditional passes. If the scope includes deployment files (Dockerfile, docker-compose*.yml, .env*, IaC) or the user asks for a deployment/Docker/self- hosting review, additionally run references/self-hosting-hardening.md, and when a DB service / connection config / migration runner is in scope also run references/database-deployment-security.md. Report proven findings in a Deployment Hardening section with a Deployment-Risk rating (not the app-vuln severity table). Deployment checklist matches remain subject to the proof gate: reachability and concrete impact are required, and a missing hardening control alone is not a finding. If an OAuth/OIDC login flow is in scope, also run references/oidc-sso-review.md. If Electron is detected or the requested artifact is an Electron package/ASAR, additionally run references/electron-threats.md and map every renderer-to-native trust boundary before classifying candidates.

3. Dependency & secrets quick pass

Fast, high-value wins before the deep scan:

• Dependencies: scan package.json + lockfile for known-vulnerable packages. When available and permitted, corroborate with npm audit --omit=dev — but only report a dependency finding with a concrete, reachable exploit path; otherwise omit it from findings or put the missing reachability fact under Needs verification.
• Electron runtime: when present, compare the exact resolved version and target platform with the official support policy, Electron advisories, release notes, and applicable bundled Chromium/Node advisories. Match the affected API/content path and attacker prerequisites before reporting; an outdated line alone is a hardening gap.
• Secrets: scan all files — including .env, config, CI/CD, Dockerfiles, IaC — for hardcoded API keys, tokens, private keys, and DB connection strings with embedded credentials. Real high-value secrets in source/logs are findings; see the precedents in references/false-positives.md.

4. Deep vulnerability scan

The core pass. Reason about the code; do not grep-and-report. For each reachable class in step 2, apply the detection signals, safe patterns, and escalation checkers in references/vuln-classes.md. For every candidate, confirm the framework does not already neutralize it (auto-escaping, parameterized queries, SameSite cookies, middleware) using references/javascript-web-patterns.md.

5. Cross-file data-flow analysis

Step back and look holistically. Trace attacker-controlled input from entry points (HTTP params/body/headers/cookies, route segments, uploads, WebSocket messages, renderer/IPC payloads, deep links, protocol requests, navigation, clipboard/downloads) across files to dangerous sinks (DB queries, exec, HTML output, file writes, outbound requests, Electron/OS capabilities). Catch second-order issues (value stored safely, used unsafely later) and broken trust boundaries between modules, processes, frames, windows, or services that no single-file view reveals.

6. Adversarial self-verification

For each surviving candidate, try to refute it before it makes the report. When independent reviewers are available and the candidate set is non-trivial, use at most two leaf validation tasks total. Partition or batch the candidates between them; never launch one task per candidate or a second validation round.

Prefer the tool-restricted security:reviewer agent when the host exposes it; otherwise use a general task-local subagent. Start every prompt with role: leaf-reviewer and delegation-budget: 0, omit workflow skill names, and point it at the resolved path of <plugin-root>/skills/web-security-review/references/validation-pass.md. When context inheritance is configurable, do not pass the surrounding conversation. Ask each reviewer to disprove its assigned candidates using references/false-positives.md:

• Re-read the code with fresh eyes. Is it actually reachable with attacker input?
• Is there validation, sanitization, or an allowlist upstream that was missed?
• Does a framework/middleware handle it already?
• Is the source truly attacker-controlled, or server-controlled config?
• For an exposure, is the value/resource genuinely sensitive and attacker-observable?
• For configuration, is the setting effective on a reachable path, and does it cause the claimed impact rather than merely omit defense-in-depth?

Drop anything that lacks a complete applicable proof shape after refutation. This find → refute-in-parallel → keep-only-what-survives loop is what keeps the report actionable.

7. Report

Emit the report in the structure defined by references/report-format.md: a severity summary table first, then findings grouped by class, each with location, proof (the traced data flow, exposure, or effective configuration), evidence, impact, and fix. If nothing survives, say so explicitly and state what was scanned — "No proven vulnerabilities identified in <scope>."

8. Propose fixes (do not auto-apply)

For each Critical/High finding, propose a concrete, minimal patch: show vulnerable → fixed, preserve surrounding style and names, and explain what changed and why. State plainly: "Review each patch before applying — nothing has been changed." Never edit files as part of the review unless the user explicitly asks.

Severity

Assign severity from the proven impact, attacker prerequisites, affected data or privilege, and scope — never from a sink name alone. Use these anchors:

Severity	Anchor
Critical	Pre-auth compromise of the application/host or similarly systemic loss
High	Major confidentiality/integrity loss or account takeover
Medium	Meaningful but constrained security-boundary violation
Low	Limited, demonstrable impact with narrow scope

For example, raw-HTML rendering may be Low through High depending on who controls and views the content; SSRF may be Low through Critical depending on reachable targets and credentials; and a hardcoded value is not a finding until it is real, sensitive, and exposed. State the assumptions that drive severity.

Output rules

• Lead with a findings summary table (counts by severity).
• Group by vulnerability class, not by file.
• Every finding: file:line, an evidence snippet, its proof (using the applicable shape above), a plain-English attacker scenario, and a fix. For secrets, redact the value; never reproduce a complete credential, private key, password, or connection string in the report.
• Never auto-apply patches — present them for human review.
• A clean result is a valid result: say what was scanned and that nothing was found.

Reference files

Load on demand — keep SKILL.md context lean.

File	Load during	Covers
references/javascript-web-patterns.md	steps 2, 4, 6	Framework catalog: React/Vue/Angular/Express/Next/Nest safe-vs-dangerous sinks, DOM XSS, prototype pollution, zod runtime validation, search starters
references/vuln-classes.md	steps 2, 4	Per-class detection signals, safe patterns, escalation checkers (SQL/Mongo injection, Redis/LevelDB storage boundaries, per-ORM/ODM raw + SQLite, XSS, authz/mass-assignment, authn/session/JWT, SSRF, CSRF, deserialization, path traversal, crypto, secrets, info disclosure, business logic)
references/false-positives.md	steps 3, 4, 6	Attacker- vs server-controlled taxonomy, hard exclusions, precedents
references/self-hosting-hardening.md	conditional (deployment scope)	Network exposure, reverse-proxy/trust proxy/host-header trust, container/root, secrets in images, CORS, backups, brute-force posture
references/database-deployment-security.md	conditional (DB deployment scope)	Least-privilege DB/Redis roles, default creds, TLS, Redis ACLs, LevelDB filesystem boundary, migration privilege, dump exposure
references/oidc-sso-review.md	conditional (OAuth/OIDC scope)	redirect_uri + post-login open redirect, state/nonce + unsolicited-response rejection, ID-token validation (sig/iss/aud/exp/JWKS), account-linking takeover, PKCE, token leakage, access-token-vs-ID-token misuse
references/electron-threats.md	conditional (Electron scope)	Electron trust topology and proof patterns for renderers/preloads/main, contextBridge/IPC, navigation/windows/webviews, protocols/deep links/shell, permissions/sessions, version advisories, updater/ASAR/fuses/storage
references/report-format.md	step 7	Output template and finding card

Adapting for your project

Point this skill at AGENTS.md and optional CLAUDE.md for the app's threat model, trusted inputs, and auth boundaries. Add project-specific safe patterns (your validation layer, your ORM conventions) to references/false-positives.md so the review stops re-flagging them, and add any bespoke sinks to references/vuln-classes.md. For Electron, also document trusted content origins, allowed IPC capabilities, packaged platforms, update/signing ownership, and intentional window/session privilege tiers.