Laravel security
PHP and Laravel Cursor rules — coding standards, testing, and conventions for the Cursor editor. Install via Composer.
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Use when building, configuring, or hardening security-sensitive Laravel features — authentication, authorization, Eloquent safety, CSRF/XSS, API security, file uploads, secrets, and production configuration. Provides condensed, copy-ready secure defaults for Laravel 11 / PHP 8.3.
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SKILL.md
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Laravel Security Best Practices
Constraints
- Apply
@rules/security/backend.mdand@rules/security/frontend.md - Apply
@rules/php/core-standards.mdc—finalclasses,declare(strict_types=1), typed signatures - If the project uses Laravel, also apply
@rules/laravel/laravel.mdc,@rules/laravel/architecture.mdc,@rules/laravel/filament.mdc,@rules/laravel/livewire.mdc - Stack: Laravel 11 / PHP 8.3, Filament, Livewire, Alpine.js, Blade, Tailwind, Pest, Vite, MySQL, Redis
- Never hardcode secrets; never reveal them in output
- Hard limits: this file stays <= 500 lines and <= 5000 tokens
Purpose
Secure-by-default building blocks for security-sensitive Laravel work. Use the matching section, copy the minimal snippet, and verify against the checklist. For an audit of existing code use @skills/security-review/SKILL.md.
Use when
- Setting up authentication / authorization (Sanctum, gates, policies, middleware)
- Configuring production settings and environment variables
- Writing secure Eloquent queries and models
- Hardening CSRF / XSS / input validation / file uploads / API endpoints
- Managing secrets, queue payloads, and security event logging
Production Configuration
// config/app.php
'debug' => (bool) env('APP_DEBUG', false), // CRITICAL: never true in production
'key' => env('APP_KEY'), // php artisan key:generate
// config/session.php
'secure' => env('SESSION_SECURE_COOKIE', true),
'http_only' => true,
'same_site' => 'lax',
Validate required config at boot and fail fast:
// AppServiceProvider::boot()
foreach (['app.key', 'database.connections.mysql.database'] as $key) {
if (empty(config($key))) {
throw new RuntimeException("Missing required config key: {$key}");
}
}
HTTPS and trusted proxies:
if (app()->environment('production')) {
URL::forceScheme('https');
}
// Use specific CIDR ranges, never '*' (X-Forwarded-* spoofing)
'trusted_proxies' => ['10.0.0.0/8', '172.16.0.0/12'],
Keep .env out of version control (.gitignore ships with .env); ship .env.example with empty placeholders.
Authentication
Sanctum (API tokens)
// config/sanctum.php
'expiration' => 60 * 24, // minutes; null = never
'token_prefix' => env('SANCTUM_TOKEN_PREFIX', ''),
$token = $user->createToken('api', ['posts:read', 'posts:write'])->plainTextToken;
Route::middleware('auth:sanctum')->group(function () {
Route::get('/posts', [PostController::class, 'index'])->middleware('abilities:posts:read');
Route::post('/posts', [PostController::class, 'store'])->middleware('abilities:posts:write');
});
Passwords
// config/hashing.php — bcrypt rounds >= 12, or Argon2id
'bcrypt' => ['rounds' => env('BCRYPT_ROUNDS', 12)],
// FormRequest rules
'password' => [
'required', 'confirmed',
Password::min(12)->letters()->mixedCase()->numbers()->symbols()->uncompromised(),
],
Sessions
// config/session.php — 'driver' => 'database' or 'redis' (avoid 'file' in prod)
public function store(LoginRequest $request): RedirectResponse
{
$request->authenticate();
$request->session()->regenerate(); // CRITICAL: prevents session fixation
return redirect()->intended('/dashboard');
}
public function destroy(Request $request): RedirectResponse
{
Auth::guard('web')->logout();
$request->session()->invalidate();
$request->session()->regenerateToken();
return redirect('/');
}
Authorization
Gates
// AppServiceProvider::boot()
Gate::define('update-post', fn (User $user, Post $post): bool => $user->id === $post->user_id);
Gate::before(function (User $user, string $ability): ?bool {
return $user->role === 'super-admin' ? true : null; // null = fall through
});
// Controller
Gate::authorize('update-post', $post);
Policies
final class PostPolicy
{
public function view(?User $user, Post $post): bool
{
return $post->is_published || ($user && $user->id === $post->user_id);
}
public function update(User $user, Post $post): bool
{
return $user->id === $post->user_id;
}
}
// Controller: $this->authorize('update', $post);
// Blade: @can('update', $post) ... @endcan
Laravel 11 auto-discovers policies by naming convention; register explicitly only when names differ.
Middleware
Route::put('/posts/{post}', [PostController::class, 'update'])->middleware('can:update,post');
Route::middleware(['auth', 'role:admin'])->group(function () {
Route::get('/admin', [AdminController::class, 'index']);
});
For Filament, enforce access via policies and canAccessPanel(); for Livewire, re-check authorization inside actions — a mounted component is not an authorization boundary (@rules/laravel/filament.mdc, @rules/laravel/livewire.mdc).
Eloquent Security
Mass assignment
final class User extends Authenticatable
{
protected $fillable = ['name', 'email', 'phone', 'avatar'];
// NEVER list 'role', 'is_admin'; NEVER use $guarded = []
}
User::create($request->validated()); // GOOD: validated fields only
// User::create($request->all()); // VULNERABLE
SQL injection
User::where('email', $userInput)->first(); // parameterized
User::whereRaw('email = ?', [$userInput])->first(); // parameterized
DB::select('SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = ?', [$input]); // parameterized
// VULNERABLE — never interpolate user input:
// User::whereRaw("email = '{$userInput}'")->first();
// User::orderByRaw($userInput); DB::statement("... '{$userInput}'");
Casting and hidden attributes
final class User extends Authenticatable
{
protected $casts = [
'is_admin' => 'boolean',
'settings' => 'array',
'metadata' => 'encrypted:array', // Laravel 11 encrypted cast
'password' => 'hashed', // auto-hash on set
];
protected $hidden = ['password', 'remember_token', 'two_factor_secret'];
}
CSRF Protection
CSRF is on by default for the web group. State-changing forms need @csrf:
<form method="POST" action="/posts">@csrf ...</form>
Exclude only specific signature-verified webhooks — never blanket api/* (stateful Sanctum needs CSRF):
// bootstrap/app.php — $middleware->validateCsrfTokens(except: ['stripe/*'])
For JS, send the token header (Axios ships preconfigured in Laravel):
<meta name="csrf-token" content="{{ csrf_token() }}">
XSS Prevention
{{ $userInput }} {{-- SAFE: auto-escaped --}}
{!! $userInput !!} {{-- DANGEROUS: raw, never with user input --}}
{!! $trustedHtml !!} {{-- only for content you fully control --}}
<script>
const user = @js($user); {{-- escaped for JS context --}}
const cfg = @json($config);
</script>
When user HTML must survive, purify with an allowlist before storing/output:
// composer require ezyang/htmlpurifier
$config = \HTMLPurifier_Config::createDefault();
$config->set('HTML.Allowed', 'p,b,i,a[href],ul,ol,li,br');
$config->set('URI.AllowedSchemes', ['http', 'https', 'mailto']);
$clean = (new \HTMLPurifier($config))->purify($dirty);
In Alpine, prefer x-text over x-html; only use x-html on sanitized content. Add security headers via middleware:
$response->headers->set('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff');
$response->headers->set('X-Frame-Options', 'DENY');
$response->headers->set('Referrer-Policy', 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin');
$response->headers->set('Content-Security-Policy',
"default-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'");
Input Validation
Always validate through a FormRequest; never persist $request->all():
final class StorePostRequest extends FormRequest
{
public function authorize(): bool
{
return $this->user()?->can('create', Post::class) ?? false;
}
public function rules(): array
{
return [
'title' => ['required', 'string', 'max:255'],
'content' => ['required', 'string', 'max:10000'],
'tags' => ['array'],
'tags.*' => ['integer', 'exists:tags,id'],
];
}
}
Keep validation messages generic — never leak which auth factor failed, whether a record exists, or framework internals (@rules/security/backend.md).
API Security
Rate limiting
// AppServiceProvider::boot()
RateLimiter::for('api', fn (Request $r) =>
Limit::perMinute(60)->by($r->user()?->id ?: $r->ip()));
RateLimiter::for('auth', fn (Request $r) =>
Limit::perMinute(5)->by($r->ip()));
Route::post('/login', [AuthController::class, 'login'])->middleware('throttle:auth');
CORS
// config/cors.php
'paths' => ['api/*', 'sanctum/csrf-cookie'],
'allowed_origins' => explode(',', env('CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS', '')), // explicit allowlist
'supports_credentials' => true, // required for Sanctum SPA auth
// NEVER ['*'] when credentials are supported
File Upload Security
public function rules(): array
{
return [
'document' => ['required', 'file', 'mimes:pdf,doc,docx', 'max:10240',
'extensions:pdf,doc,docx'],
'avatar' => ['nullable', 'image', 'mimes:jpg,jpeg,png,webp', 'max:2048',
'dimensions:max_width=2000,max_height=2000'],
];
}
Store sensitive files off the public disk and serve through an authorized, time-limited URL:
$path = $request->file('document')->store('documents', 'local'); // not 'public'
public function download(Request $request, string $path): RedirectResponse
{
$this->authorize('download', $path);
return redirect(Storage::temporaryUrl($path, now()->addMinutes(15)));
}
Secrets and Dependencies
composer audit # run in CI; fail the build on advisories
# keep composer.lock committed; run composer update deliberately, never in CI
Read every secret from env()/config(); validate presence at boot. For production use a secret manager rather than a deployed .env.
Queue Security
// Encrypt sensitive payloads on the wire
final class ProcessPaymentJob implements ShouldQueue, ShouldBeEncrypted
{
use Dispatchable, InteractsWithQueue, Queueable, SerializesModels;
public function __construct(
private readonly string $paymentIntentId,
private readonly string $cardFingerprint,
) {}
public function handle(): void { /* ... */ }
public function retryUntil(): \Carbon\CarbonInterface
{
return now()->addMinutes(5);
}
}
Logging Security Events
// config/logging.php — dedicated 'security' channel
final class SecurityLogger
{
public static function log(string $event, array $context = []): void
{
Log::channel('security')->warning($event, array_merge([
'user_id' => Auth::id(),
'ip' => request()->ip(),
'url' => request()->fullUrl(),
], $context));
}
}
SecurityLogger::log('failed_login_attempt', ['email' => $email]);
SecurityLogger::log('role_change', ['target_user' => $targetId, 'new_role' => 'admin']);
Quick Security Checklist
| Check | Description |
|---|---|
APP_DEBUG=false | Never run with debug enabled in production |
APP_KEY set | Always run php artisan key:generate |
| HTTPS enforced | Force HTTPS in production via middleware or proxy |
$fillable whitelisted | Never use $guarded = [] |
| CSRF active | @csrf on all state-changing forms |
| Sanctum scopes | Token abilities enforced per route |
| Rate limiting | Throttle API and auth endpoints |
| Input validation | FormRequest with specific rules, never $request->all() |
| File upload restrictions | Validate MIME, extension, size, dimensions |
composer audit in CI | Check dependencies for known vulnerabilities |
| Password hashing | Laravel bcrypt/Argon2, 'password' => 'hashed' cast |
| Session regeneration | Call $request->session()->regenerate() on login |
| Security headers | CSP, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options |
| Security event logging | Audit auth failures, role changes, suspicious activity |
.env not committed | Verify .gitignore includes .env |
Laravel Security Audit
When auditing an existing Laravel application (instead of building new features), use @skills/laravel-security/references/audit-workflow.md. It covers the 7 audit areas — Authorization/IDOR/BOLA, Authentication, Validation, XSS, File upload, Secrets/configuration, Dependencies — with severity mapping (Critical/High/Medium/Low/Info → CR scale Critical/Moderate/Minor), Grep patterns, and a required regression-test sketch per confirmed finding. The building blocks in this file (Production Configuration, Authentication, Authorization, Eloquent Security, CSRF, XSS Prevention, Input Validation, File Upload Security, Secrets and Dependencies) are the reference fixes the audit workflow links back to.
Done when
- The relevant secure default is applied and matches the project's existing style
- No secret is hardcoded; required config/secrets are validated at boot
- Every applicable row of the checklist is satisfied or consciously waived
- Tests (Pest) cover the new auth/authorization/validation behavior
Related Skills
@skills/security-review/SKILL.md— review workflow for existing code@skills/security-threat-analysis/SKILL.md— remediate a referenced advisory/CVE@skills/test-driven-development/SKILL.md— drive the implementation test-first
Gives 2 of the 12 instructions most security skills give
Counted across 648 of the 828 authors here whose files we hold, read 2026-08-06
- parameterize all database querieshere, and in 67 of 648, across 49 files
- hash passwords using bcrypt scrypt or argon2in 48 of 648, across 35 files
- apply rate limiting to authentication endpointsin 48 of 648, across 24 files
- Configure security headersin 35 of 648, across 18 files
- validate all inputshere, and in 32 of 648, across 24 files
- validate all external input at the system boundaryin 29 of 648, across 18 files
- run containers as a non-root userin 28 of 648, across 15 files
- use httponly secure samesite cookies for sessionsin 26 of 648, across 15 files
- run dependency audits before every releasein 21 of 648, across 10 files
- encode output to prevent cross-site scriptingin 21 of 648, across 10 files
- copy dependencies before source codein 20 of 648, across 9 files
- store secrets in environment variablesin 20 of 648, across 17 files
Said here and by no other author read
- use strict types and final classes
- validate required configuration at boot
- use specific CIDR ranges for trusted proxies
- enforce access via policies and middleware
- define fillable attributes explicitly
- purify user HTML with an allowlist
Grouped from the skills themselves: near-identical wordings counted once, and counted by distinct author, so one author publishing three of these counts once.