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Node supply chain

Skill Paldom/node-skills/skills/node-supply-chain

Agent Skills for maintaining high-quality open-source Node.js, TypeScript, Next.js, and React apps and packages - linting, type safety, testing, packaging and releases, and CI quality gates.

Install
npx -y skills add Paldom/node-skills --skill node-supply-chain

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One thing to look at

  • 1 stars1 stars. Stars are a popularity signal and not a quality one, but at this level it is likely that nobody has read this closely except its author, and you would be relying on your own review.

What its author says it does

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Hardens the npm supply chain - lockfile discipline, Dependabot cooldown and groups, per-package-manager install-script policy, provenance verification, npm token hygiene, SHA-pinned Actions. Use when the user asks to secure dependencies, audit npm packages, respond to a compromised dependency, or pin actions. Not for repo settings like rulesets/secret scanning, or publishing.

The file declares its own license as MIT. That is the author’s claim about this one file, and it is not the same thing as the license GitHub reports for the repository, which is listed with the other numbers below.

SKILL.md

4.0 KB, as published. Nobody here has run it

node-supply-chain

Layers the defenses that made the difference in real npm attacks — and names what each layer does not cover. The failures this skill fixes: models recommend npm install in CI, blanket auto-merge for bot PRs (a documented malware path), treat cooldowns as full protection, and apply npm-specific script policies to pnpm/yarn repos where they do nothing.

When NOT to use

  • GitHub repo settings (rulesets, secret scanning, PVR) → repo-settings tooling outside this collection (e.g. the github-skills repo-protections skill).
  • Publishing your own package with provenance → node-release.
  • Fixing a CVE in your own code → ordinary dev work.

Workflow

  1. Baseline audit: 
    python3 "${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/scripts/audit_supply_chain.py"
    Reports: lockfile state, CI install command, Dependabot config (cooldown/groups), unpinned third-party actions, install-script policy for the repo's actual package manager.
  2. Lockfile discipline: committed lockfile; CI installs with npm ci / pnpm install --frozen-lockfile / yarn immutable — never bare install.
  3. Dependabot (.github/dependabot.yml): npm + github-actions ecosystems, weekly, grouped, cooldown — with its three real limits stated every time: security PRs bypass cooldown by design, transitive npm deps aren't covered, SHA-pinned actions don't alert. Never blanket auto-merge bot PRs — bot authorship has delivered malware on green CI; same review gate as humans.
  4. Install-script policy per package manager (playbook table — npm's current-major behavior, pnpm onlyBuiltDependencies, yarn enableScripts): apply the mechanism the repo's PM actually honors; allowlist the few packages that genuinely need build scripts.
  5. Provenance verification (npm audit signatures — command version-gated in the playbook): treat as origin proof, never safety proof.
  6. Token hygiene: no classic tokens; granular tokens with short lifetimes for what OIDC can't cover; account-level trusted-publishing-only enforcement (setup itself → node-release).
  7. Actions pinning: third-party actions SHA-pinned with version comments; lint workflows with the checker from node-ci or zizmor.
  8. Incident response (compromised upstream): the playbook checklist — determine exposure from the lockfile (exact resolved versions + install window), override/pin to known-good, document the window, then re-harden.

Output spec

Audit script clean (or every finding dispositioned); Dependabot config with cooldown+groups and no blanket auto-merge; per-PM script policy actually in force; pinning applied; the three cooldown limits stated in the report — never implied protection the config doesn't deliver.

Gotchas

  • npm/pnpm/yarn script policies are different mechanisms — an npm-only answer in a pnpm repo protects nothing.
  • A cooldown is a bet someone else finds the malware inside the window — layer it, don't rely on it.
  • overrides/resolutions fix exposure fast but rot silently — date-stamp them and remove after upstream ships clean.
  • Version-gate npm CLI behaviors (script defaults, audit signatures) against npm's own docs at use time.

Files

  • references/supply-chain-playbook.md — layered model, per-PM script policy table, Dependabot config, provenance limits, token policy, incident checklist.
  • scripts/audit_supply_chain.py — deterministic repo audit; non-zero exit on hard violations (no lockfile, bare install in CI, blanket bot auto-merge).

Keep looking

Skills are one crate of 328,083. Ordering is by how many stacks a row turns up in, so the top of any crate is what has actually been picked rather than what has the most stars.