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Security and hardening

Skill oscarqjh/super-agent-skills/plugins/super-agent-skills/skills/security-and-hardening

Full-lifecycle engineering plugin for Claude Code — brainstorm → plan → build → review → ship, with production-grade standards at every step.

Install
npx -y skills add oscarqjh/super-agent-skills --skill security-and-hardening

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What its author says it does

Copied from the file, not written here

Hardens code against vulnerabilities. Use when handling user input, authentication, data storage, or external integrations. Use when building any feature that accepts untrusted data, manages user sessions, or interacts with third-party services.

SKILL.md

11.2 KB, ~2.6k tokens by cl100k_base, as published. Nobody here has run it

Security and Hardening

Overview

Security-first development practices for web applications. Treat every external input as hostile, every secret as sacred, and every authorization check as mandatory. Security isn't a phase — it's a constraint on every line of code that touches user data, authentication, or external systems.

Related: super-agent-skills:threat-modeling identifies WHAT to protect against (design time). This skill ensures the protection is correctly IMPLEMENTED (build time).

When to Use

  • Building anything that accepts user input
  • Implementing authentication or authorization
  • Storing or transmitting sensitive data
  • Integrating with external APIs or services
  • Adding file uploads, webhooks, or callbacks
  • Handling payment or PII data
  • Adding or updating third-party dependencies
  • Auditing packages for security or license compliance
  • Building applications that use LLMs or AI models

The Three-Tier Boundary System

Always Do (No Exceptions)

  • Validate all external input at the system boundary (API routes, form handlers)
  • Parameterize all database queries — never concatenate user input into SQL
  • Encode output to prevent XSS (use framework auto-escaping, don't bypass it)
  • Use HTTPS for all external communication
  • Hash passwords with bcrypt/scrypt/argon2 (never store plaintext)
  • Set security headers (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options)
  • Use httpOnly, secure, sameSite cookies for sessions
  • Run npm audit (or equivalent) before every release

Ask First (Requires Human Approval)

  • Adding new authentication flows or changing auth logic
  • Storing new categories of sensitive data (PII, payment info)
  • Adding new external service integrations
  • Changing CORS configuration
  • Adding file upload handlers
  • Modifying rate limiting or throttling
  • Granting elevated permissions or roles

Never Do

  • Never commit secrets to version control (API keys, passwords, tokens)
  • Never log sensitive data (passwords, tokens, full credit card numbers)
  • Never trust client-side validation as a security boundary
  • Never disable security headers for convenience
  • Never use eval() or innerHTML with user-provided data
  • Never store sessions in client-accessible storage (localStorage for auth tokens)
  • Never expose stack traces or internal error details to users

OWASP Top 10 Prevention

1. Injection (SQL, NoSQL, OS Command)

// BAD: SQL injection via string concatenation
const query = `SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = '${userId}'`;

// GOOD: Parameterized query
const user = await db.query('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = $1', [userId]);

// GOOD: ORM with parameterized input
const user = await prisma.user.findUnique({ where: { id: userId } });

2. Broken Authentication

// Password hashing
import { hash, compare } from 'bcrypt';

const SALT_ROUNDS = 12;
const hashedPassword = await hash(plaintext, SALT_ROUNDS);
const isValid = await compare(plaintext, hashedPassword);

// Session management
app.use(session({
  secret: process.env.SESSION_SECRET,  // From environment, not code
  resave: false,
  saveUninitialized: false,
  cookie: {
    httpOnly: true,     // Not accessible via JavaScript
    secure: true,       // HTTPS only
    sameSite: 'lax',    // CSRF protection
    maxAge: 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000,  // 24 hours
  },
}));

3. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

// BAD: Rendering user input as HTML
element.innerHTML = userInput;

// GOOD: Use framework auto-escaping (React does this by default)
return <div>{userInput}</div>;

// If you MUST render HTML, sanitize first
import DOMPurify from 'dompurify';
const clean = DOMPurify.sanitize(userInput);

4. Broken Access Control

// Always check authorization, not just authentication
app.patch('/api/tasks/:id', authenticate, async (req, res) => {
  const task = await taskService.findById(req.params.id);

  // Check that the authenticated user owns this resource
  if (task.ownerId !== req.user.id) {
    return res.status(403).json({
      error: { code: 'FORBIDDEN', message: 'Not authorized to modify this task' }
    });
  }

  // Proceed with update
  const updated = await taskService.update(req.params.id, req.body);
  return res.json(updated);
});

5. Security Misconfiguration

// Security headers (use helmet for Express)
import helmet from 'helmet';
app.use(helmet());

// Content Security Policy
app.use(helmet.contentSecurityPolicy({
  directives: {
    defaultSrc: ["'self'"],
    scriptSrc: ["'self'"],
    styleSrc: ["'self'", "'unsafe-inline'"],  // Tighten if possible
    imgSrc: ["'self'", 'data:', 'https:'],
    connectSrc: ["'self'"],
  },
}));

// CORS — restrict to known origins
app.use(cors({
  origin: process.env.ALLOWED_ORIGINS?.split(',') || 'http://localhost:3000',
  credentials: true,
}));

6. Sensitive Data Exposure

// Never return sensitive fields in API responses
function sanitizeUser(user: UserRecord): PublicUser {
  const { passwordHash, resetToken, ...publicFields } = user;
  return publicFields;
}

// Use environment variables for secrets
const API_KEY = process.env.STRIPE_API_KEY;
if (!API_KEY) throw new Error('STRIPE_API_KEY not configured');

Input Validation Patterns

Schema Validation at Boundaries

import { z } from 'zod';

const CreateTaskSchema = z.object({
  title: z.string().min(1).max(200).trim(),
  description: z.string().max(2000).optional(),
  priority: z.enum(['low', 'medium', 'high']).default('medium'),
  dueDate: z.string().datetime().optional(),
});

// Validate at the route handler
app.post('/api/tasks', async (req, res) => {
  const result = CreateTaskSchema.safeParse(req.body);
  if (!result.success) {
    return res.status(422).json({
      error: {
        code: 'VALIDATION_ERROR',
        message: 'Invalid input',
        details: result.error.flatten(),
      },
    });
  }
  // result.data is now typed and validated
  const task = await taskService.create(result.data);
  return res.status(201).json(task);
});

File Upload Safety

// Restrict file types and sizes
const ALLOWED_TYPES = ['image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/webp'];
const MAX_SIZE = 5 * 1024 * 1024; // 5MB

function validateUpload(file: UploadedFile) {
  if (!ALLOWED_TYPES.includes(file.mimetype)) {
    throw new ValidationError('File type not allowed');
  }
  if (file.size > MAX_SIZE) {
    throw new ValidationError('File too large (max 5MB)');
  }
  // Don't trust the file extension — check magic bytes if critical
}

Triaging npm audit Results

SeverityReachable in prod?Action
Critical/HighYesFix immediately
Critical/HighNo (dev-only, unused path)Fix soon, not a blocker
ModerateYesFix next release cycle
LowFix during regular dependency updates

Key question: Is the vulnerable function actually called in your code path? When deferring a fix, document the reason and set a review date.

Rate Limiting

import rateLimit from 'express-rate-limit';

// General API rate limit
app.use('/api/', rateLimit({
  windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000, // 15 minutes
  max: 100,                   // 100 requests per window
  standardHeaders: true,
  legacyHeaders: false,
}));

// Stricter limit for auth endpoints
app.use('/api/auth/', rateLimit({
  windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000,
  max: 10,  // 10 attempts per 15 minutes
}));

Secrets Management

.env files:
  ├── .env.example  → Committed (template with placeholder values)
  ├── .env          → NOT committed (contains real secrets)
  └── .env.local    → NOT committed (local overrides)

.gitignore must include:
  .env
  .env.local
  .env.*.local
  *.pem
  *.key

Before committing: Run git diff --cached | grep -i "password\|secret\|api_key\|token" to catch accidentally staged secrets.

For detailed security checklists and pre-commit verification steps, see references/security-checklist.md.

Supply Chain Security

Dependencies are attack surface. Every package you install runs with your application's privileges.

Before Adding a Dependency

Ask five questions before npm install:

  1. Do we need it? Can the standard library or existing deps solve this?
  2. Is it maintained? Last commit within 6 months? Active issue responses?
  3. Is it trusted? Check download count, maintainer count, GitHub stars. Low numbers on a critical package = risk.
  4. Is it safe? Run npm audit / pip audit / cargo audit before and after adding.
  5. Is the license compatible? GPL in a proprietary project = legal problem. Check with license-checker or equivalent.

Typosquatting Detection

Before installing, verify the exact package name on npm/PyPI — don't trust autocomplete (lodash not 1odash, @babel/core not @bable/core).

AI-Specific Vulnerabilities

When building applications that use LLMs:

  • Prompt injection: Treat all user input that reaches an LLM as untrusted. Never concatenate user input directly into system prompts.
  • Output validation: LLM output is untrusted data. Validate and sanitize before using in SQL, HTML, or system commands.
  • Model supply chain: Verify model checksums. Don't load models from untrusted sources.

For detailed checklists, see references/supply-chain-security.md.

For thorough audits: Dispatch the super-agent-skills:dependency-auditor agent for a full dependency tree audit covering security, licensing, maintenance health, and impact assessment.

Common Rationalizations

RationalizationReality
"We'll add security later"Security retrofitting is 10x harder than building it in. Add it now.
"The framework handles security"Frameworks provide tools, not guarantees. You still need to use them correctly.
"It's only a dev dependency"Dev dependencies execute during build. A compromised build tool owns your CI pipeline.

Red Flags

  • User input passed directly to database queries, shell commands, or HTML rendering
  • Secrets in source code or commit history
  • API endpoints without authentication or authorization checks
  • Missing CORS configuration or wildcard (*) origins
  • No rate limiting on authentication endpoints
  • Stack traces or internal errors exposed to users
  • Dependencies with known critical vulnerabilities

Verification

After implementing security-relevant code:

  • npm audit shows no critical or high vulnerabilities
  • No secrets in source code or git history
  • All user input validated at system boundaries
  • Authentication and authorization checked on every protected endpoint
  • Security headers present in response (check with browser DevTools)
  • Error responses don't expose internal details
  • Rate limiting active on auth endpoints

What ships with it

Read from the repository

Just SKILL.md. No reference files, no scripts.

Gives 6 of the 12 instructions most security skills give in ~2.6k tokens

Counted across 648 of the 828 authors here whose files we hold, read 2026-08-07

  • Parameterize all database querieshere, and in 68 of 648, across 51 files
  • Hash passwords using bcrypt, scrypt, or argon2here, and in 49 of 648, across 36 files
  • Apply rate limiting to authentication endpointsin 48 of 648, across 24 files
  • Configure security headersin 35 of 648, across 19 files
  • Validate all inputsin 32 of 648, across 24 files
  • Validate all external input at the system boundaryhere, and in 29 of 648, across 19 files
  • Run containers as a non-root userin 28 of 648, across 15 files
  • Use httponly secure samesite cookies for sessionshere, and in 26 of 648, across 15 files
  • Run dependency audits before every releasehere, and in 21 of 648, across 10 files
  • Encode output to prevent cross-site scriptinghere, and in 21 of 648, across 11 files
  • Copy dependencies before source codein 20 of 648, across 9 files
  • Store secrets in environment variablesin 20 of 648, across 18 files

Said here and by no other author read

  • Sanitize untrusted output before using in system commands
  • Verify exact package names before installing dependencies

Grouped from the skills themselves: near-identical wordings counted once, and counted by distinct author, so one author publishing three of these counts once. Length counted with cl100k_base; the agent that loads this file may tokenize it differently.

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Skills are one crate of 326,970. Ordering is by how many stacks a row turns up in, so the top of any crate is what has actually been picked rather than what has the most stars.