Securing applications

Skill nhattrung0911/shipwright/skills/securing-applications

Production-grade engineering discipline for AI coding agents — 5 composable skills (plan, build, secure, operate) for Claude Code, Codex & Gemini. Never skips a step, never fakes done.

Install

npx -y skills add nhattrung0911/shipwright --skill securing-applications

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Use when building or reviewing anything that handles untrusted input, authentication, authorization, secrets, user data, PII/privacy, payments, file uploads, CORS/headers, external dependencies, LLM/AI features, or deployment config — and as a mandatory gate before shipping or claiming a feature done. Covers OWASP Top 10:2025 + LLM risks + data privacy. Stack- and agent-agnostic.

SKILL.md

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Securing Applications

Overview

Security is a gate, not a feature — it blocks "done", it isn't an optional add-on. Built on OWASP Top 10:2025 (current edition). Most breaches are boring: missing access checks, misconfig, leaked secrets, unpatched dependencies. Cover the basics relentlessly.

Core principle: Never trust input, never trust the caller, never trust defaults. Verify at every boundary.

Announce when securing/reviewing: "Using securing-applications: checking against OWASP Top 10:2025."

When to Use

Building: auth, input handling, file upload, payments, admin features, anything touching user data.
Configuring: deploy, server, cloud, CORS, headers, env.
Reviewing: before shipping any feature; pre-launch; dependency updates.

OWASP Top 10:2025 — risk → defense → how to check

#	Risk	Defense	Check
A01	Broken Access Control (#1)	Authorize EVERY request server-side per resource & action; deny by default; never trust client role/ID; check ownership per object (BOLA); reject unexpected fields (mass assignment); validate outbound URLs (SSRF — allowlist, block link-local & cloud metadata `169.254.169.254`)	Access another user's object by ID across ≥2 users → 403; unauthenticated request → deny; POST an extra `isAdmin` field → ignored; SSRF to metadata IP → blocked
A02	Security Misconfiguration	Harden defaults; full security headers (CSP, HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options/frame-ancestors, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy, COOP/COEP); disable debug/dir-listing; least-privilege cloud IAM; *CORS: never reflect arbitrary Origin, never `` + credentials**	Scan headers (securityheaders.com-class); review prod config diff; no `0.0.0.0` open ports, no default creds; CORS not wildcard-with-creds
A03	Software Supply Chain Failures (rising)	Pin deps (lockfile, frozen install in CI); scan for known CVEs; verify package integrity; pin CI actions by SHA; generate SBOM; beware typosquats/compromised maintainers	Run dependency audit (e.g. `npm audit --audit-level=high`, `pip-audit`); CI fails on critical CVE; review new deps before adding
A04	Cryptographic Failures	TLS everywhere; hash passwords with argon2id (tuned params) or bcrypt; encrypt sensitive data at rest; no homemade crypto; rotate keys; monitor cert expiry	Grep for weak algos (md5/sha1 for passwords); confirm HTTPS-only + HSTS; secrets encrypted at rest
A05	Injection (SQL/NoSQL/cmd/XSS)	Parameterized queries/ORM; validate+sanitize input; escape/encode output (XSS); never string-concat queries/commands; CSRF: SameSite=Lax/Strict cookies + per-request token on state-changing routes; file uploads: validate magic bytes, AV-scan, store non-executable off-origin	Injection payloads blocked; no string-built SQL; output encoded; CSRF token required on writes; malicious upload rejected
A06	Insecure Design	Threat-model before building; security requirements as acceptance criteria; rate-limit as anti-abuse (credential stuffing, scraping); abuse-case thinking	Documented abuse cases for auth + payments exist; limits/quotas designed in
A07	Authentication Failures	Strong auth (MFA option); secure session mgmt; lockout/throttle on login; no creds in URL; rotate/expire tokens; JWT: validate alg/aud/iss/exp server-side, reject `alg=none`, plan revocation	Brute-force login → blocked; sessions expire; tokens not in logs; tampered/`alg=none` JWT → rejected
A08	Software/Data Integrity Failures	Verify update/deploy signatures; protect CI/CD pipeline; no unsigned/auto-updates from untrusted source; validate deserialized data	Pipeline access controlled; artifacts signed; no untrusted deserialization
A09	Security Logging & Alerting Failures	Log auth events, access-control failures, server errors (structured); alert on anomalies; protect & retain logs; NEVER log secrets/PII	Are failed logins logged + alerted? Secrets absent from logs?
A10	Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions (new)	Fail closed (deny on error, never grant); handle all error paths; no stack traces/internal detail to users; consistent error responses	Force errors → app denies access, shows generic message, doesn't crash open

Secrets — non-negotiable

Secrets in environment/secret-manager, never in source or commits. Scan history before pushing.
Separate dev/staging/prod credentials. Rotate on exposure and on a schedule.
No secrets in client-side code, logs, error messages, or URLs.

LLM / AI-app risks (if the app calls an LLM)

OWASP LLM Top 10 territory — the build checklist's "tested" is not "safe" here:

Prompt injection: treat ALL model input (user text, retrieved docs, tool output) as untrusted; never let it override system instructions.
Treat model OUTPUT as untrusted: never exec/eval it, never render unsanitized, never trust it for authz decisions.
Tool/function calls: least-privilege, allowlist actions, confirm destructive ops; a compromised prompt must not reach dangerous tools.
Data exfiltration: guard against the model leaking secrets/PII via tool calls or output.

Data privacy & consent (owner: this skill)

PII inventory: know what personal data you store and why.
Data-subject rights (DSAR): deletion + export paths exist (GDPR/CCPA).
Consent: cookie/tracking consent gate before non-essential tracking; honor opt-out.
Retention: delete data past its retention window (cleanup jobs — see operating-production-services).

Pre-Ship Security Gate

Do NOT mark a feature/site done until (tick = tested with evidence, not assumed):

Verify (neutral — map to your stack)

"Dependency audit" = your ecosystem's CVE scanner.
"Header/config scan" = a security-header checker + manual prod-config review.
"Injection/access test" = attempt the attack yourself (or via a helper agent) and confirm it's blocked — evidence, not assumption.
For a structured review on Claude Code, the /security-review command if available.

Companion skills

Overall delivery gate → disciplined-delivery (security gate references this skill)
Web build → shipping-production-websites (pillar 5 = this skill's depth)

Source

OWASP Top 10:2025 — owasp.org/Top10/2025 (current edition; A03 Supply Chain rising, A10 Mishandling Exceptional Conditions new).