Openrig operator

OpenRig Operator

Overview

This skill covers host/runtime/operator triage around OpenRig itself. Use it when the problem may be the daemon, the shell/runtime surface, or stale helper processes rather than the product workflow you are trying to run.

CANONICAL SURFACE NOTE (2026-05-11) — for durable queue routing while doing operator triage, use rig queue (daemon-backed SQLite). rigx queue is recovery-only fallback; qitems written there are invisible to daemon-backed reads and should not be used for new substantive work.

When to Use

Use this skill when you see:

• rig whoami --json returning partial identity
• rig ps --nodes --json failing while some other rig commands still work
• Sent to ... plus Verified: no
• repeated unified-exec-process warnings
• suspicion that stale helper processes are accumulating
• Codex seats hit Operation not permitted, command approval friction, or stale writable roots
• Codex seats report usage-limit/rate-limit or need a ChatGPT account switch

Do not use this skill for normal product workflow routing, queue handling, or ordinary peer communication. Use openrig-user for that.

Do not use this skill to decide how to change OpenRig behavior. Changes to the OpenRig product (CLI, daemon, UI, specs) happen in the openrig product repo — operate that as a normal software project, not via this troubleshooting skill.

First Checks

Start with the minimum truthful operator read:

rig whoami --json
rig daemon status
rig ps --nodes --json

Interpret them together, not in isolation:

• partial whoami can mean identity is inferable while daemon-backed surfaces are degraded
• daemon status tells you whether the host daemon is up, not whether every seat can reach it cleanly
• ps --nodes --json is the best machine-readable topology check when it works

Verification Drift Vs Send Failure

For rig send:

• Sent to ... + Verified: yes = strong positive delivery evidence
• Sent to ... + Verified: no = ambiguous delivery, not automatic failure
• no Sent to ... line or a hard error = send failure

When verification is ambiguous, check:

• direct reply
• rig capture <session>
• transcript evidence
• queue/outbox state if the message asked for a durable handoff

Do not blindly retry until you have checked one of those.

Unified Exec Warning

If you see:

• Warning: The maximum number of unified exec processes you can keep open is 60 ...

treat it first as a host/tooling-layer warning, not as automatic proof that the OpenRig topology is unhealthy.

This warning can coexist with a healthy live topology.

Safe Process Triage

Inspect the process surface first:

ps -axo pid,ppid,command | rg 'tmux send-keys|rig queue create|tmux attach|codex|claude'

Think in layers:

• host/tooling layer: stale one-shot wrappers, session bookkeeping, helper shells
• topology layer: live tmux attach seats, live codex / claude runtimes, daemon health

Do not diagnose topology failure from tooling-layer warnings alone.

Safe Cleanup Boundary

Usually safe to reap when clearly orphaned / one-shot:

• tmux send-keys ...
• short-lived shell wrappers created only to enqueue or send one message

Do not mass-kill:

• tmux attach ...
• codex ...
• claude ...
• other long-lived daemon/runtime processes

The point is to remove garbage, not workers.

Terminal Node Escalation

Use a terminal node when evidence shows a seat-level sandbox/profile cannot perform required host work, but another approved operator surface can. This is an explicit operator lane, not a silent permission bypass.

Good fits:

• Codex/Claude seat cannot access Tart, SSH, tmux, queue directories, or host files needed for a proof
• a VM/test-proof or current-host-operator task needs real host capability
• another seat or terminal/sysadmin node has approved access and can return command evidence

Do not use this lane to bypass repo safety, dirty-worktree boundaries, review gates, or destructive-action approval. If the command would stop live rigs, delete data, reset git state, or mutate VM state beyond the accepted plan, require explicit authorization and record it.

Protocol:

1. Classify the original failure as seat/profile-specific if possible, not product failure.
2. Write or cite a packet with objective, lane, exact commands, cwd, expected outputs, stop conditions, and artifact path.
3. Route to an existing sysadmin/infrastructure/terminal node when available; otherwise provision a named terminal node through the topology/config layer instead of using a hidden ad hoc shell.
4. Terminal node runs only the packeted commands and returns command log, exit codes, cwd/env notes, and artifacts.
5. Original agent keeps task ownership and proof classification; terminal node supplies host capability.

Field lesson: if tester sees Operation not permitted for Tart/SSH while driver or another approved seat can reach the VM, treat it as permission/profile variance and route a terminal-node/operator remediation before changing product code.

Codex Permission Policy

Use the security-and-consequence-boundary-policy skill for the security model. OpenRig gates consequence boundaries, not ordinary work inside the intended boundary.

Treat Codex permissions as two independent layers:

• command approval rules decide which shell commands can run outside the sandbox
• filesystem writable roots decide which paths a workspace-write seat can mutate

Codex auto_review, --full-auto, and approval-bypass modes are not normal fleet defaults. They can burn quota catastrophically and do not widen filesystem roots for an already-running seat. Full access scope with approvals_reviewer = "user" is the intended Codex default here.

Claude Code auto permissions are different and are the preferred Claude default on this host when the consequence-boundary rules still apply.

Current host policy:

• default profile is fleet
• fleet uses sandbox_mode = "danger-full-access", approval_policy = "on-request", approvals_reviewer = "user"
• top-level [sandbox_workspace_write].writable_roots intentionally includes ~/code and tool dotdirs: .codex, .claude, .openrig, .agents, .config, .cache, .local, .docker, .npm, .nvm, .pnpm-store
• permissions.fleet.filesystem mirrors those writes and denies .ssh, .gnupg, and project env files
• default.rules broadly allows rig and rigx; rigx is fully permitted for now because it is the fast-moving config-layer overlay
• default.rules still prompts for destructive/publishing surfaces such as rm, mv, chmod, git push, PR mutation, sudo, process kills, daemon lifecycle, and destructive Docker/Brew/rig commands

Codex Account / Usage-Limit Refresh

When Codex seats hit usage limits or need a ChatGPT/OpenAI account rotation, use the focused codex-seat-auth-refresh skill instead of improvising.

Key reminder: host auth can switch while already-running Codex TUIs keep the old account. Refresh only the scoped seats, preserve stable seat names, and record auth-seat registry rows sequentially.

Known failure modes this policy prevents:

• Codex seats assuming a task is impossible when the real issue is stale launch roots
• agents creating workaround slices/features for what is actually a sandbox/config problem
• writing load-bearing canon into state/, /tmp, or a nearby writable folder because the intended durable path was blocked
• trusting labels like full access; verify actual roots and command policy instead
• changing config.toml and expecting already-running seats to pick it up without restart

When Operation not permitted appears:

1. Identify whether it is command approval, filesystem root, macOS privacy, or stale session.
2. Check effective roots with codex -p fleet debug prompt-input <probe-name>.
3. Verify with a tiny direct write probe in an allowed target and a negative probe in a protected target such as .ssh.
4. If config.toml changed, restart one seat and re-run the probes before fleet rollout.
5. If the target should be durable and is not writable, stop and escalate; do not invent fallback storage.

Field note: as of Codex CLI 0.125.0, top-level [sandbox_workspace_write] was the shape reflected by debug prompt-input; profile-scoped writable roots did not show in the effective prompt. Re-test this if Codex changes.

Durable Write Escalation

If the task requires writing load-bearing knowledge or behavior and the intended target is not writable, stop and escalate. Do not silently write to state/, /tmp, or a nearby writable folder.

Use the intended durable home for the kind of content:

• skills/ (e.g. ~/.claude/skills/, ~/.agents/skills/, or your team's shared skill folder) for operating rules and refocus behavior
• Your team's workstream notebook (field notes, lab experiments, mission packets, etc.) for durable observations and PM canon
• The product repo for shipped OpenRig daemon/CLI/config/spec/test behavior

A runtime mirror under a rig state/ path may be used only as a temporary live patch, must be labeled as non-canonical, and must have a canonical sync follow-up.

Common Mistakes

• treating Verified: no as if it proves the message did not land
• treating the unified-exec warning as if it proves the rig is overloaded
• killing live seats when only stale helper wrappers needed cleanup
• concluding "daemon down" from one seat's failure without checking host-level daemon status
• assuming Codex config changes apply to already-running seats without a restart/probe
• confusing command approval with filesystem write permission
• calling a VM or product path broken before comparing another approved seat or terminal-node probe
• assuming a label like full access proves effective write/network capability; verify command approval and filesystem writable-root coverage separately

Practical Rule

Clean the smallest safe surface that matches the evidence.

If the warning or failure remains after stale-wrapper cleanup, re-check:

rig daemon status
rig ps --nodes --json

If those remain healthy, the residual issue may still be in the host/tool/session layer rather than in OpenRig topology state.