Threat model
Produce a threat model for a system or feature using STRIDE and data-flow analysis. Use when the user asks to threat-model, assess attack surface, or plan security for a design.From its SKILL.md
npx -y skills add minagayid/Agents --skill threat-modelAssembled from the repository path, not quoted from the project. Check it against their README if it does not work.
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SKILL.md
1.5 KB, as published. Nobody here has run it
Threat Model
Systematically enumerate how a system could be attacked and what to do about it.
Steps
- Scope & assets. What are we protecting (data, funds, availability, trust)? Who are the actors?
- Draw the data flow. External entities, processes, data stores, and the flows between them. Mark trust boundaries (where data crosses privilege levels).
- Enumerate threats with STRIDE per element/flow:
- Spoofing · Tampering · Repudiation · Information disclosure · Denial of service · Elevation of privilege
- Rate each threat by likelihood × impact; focus on what crosses trust boundaries.
- Mitigate. For each significant threat, name a control (authN, input validation, encryption, rate limiting, least privilege, logging) and who owns it.
- Track residual risk you're accepting and why.
Deliverable
A table: element/flow · STRIDE category · threat · likelihood/impact · mitigation · status. Plus a short list of the top risks and recommended next actions.
Guidelines
- Concentrate on trust boundaries — that's where most real vulnerabilities live.
- Prefer eliminating a threat (design change) over detecting it.
- Keep it living: revisit when the design or data flows change.