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Hunting credential dumping activity

Skill meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/skills/hunting-credential-dumping-activity

An open agent-skills library for malware analysis, reverse engineering, and threat hunting - 118 curated, runnable skills mapped to MITRE ATT&CK, D3FEND, and CAR.

Install
npx -y skills add meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack --skill hunting-credential-dumping-activity

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What its author says it does

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Hunts for credential dumping by detecting LSASS process access with suspicious access masks, known dumping tool signatures, and comsvcs.exe MiniDump abuse in Sysmon Event ID 10 and process-creation telemetry. Activates for requests to hunt credential dumping, detect LSASS access, or find Mimikatz/comsvcs MiniDump activity.

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SKILL.md

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Hunting Credential Dumping Activity

When to Use

  • You have Sysmon ProcessAccess (Event ID 10) and/or process-creation telemetry and want to detect attempts to read LSASS memory or dump credentials.
  • You are investigating post-exploitation credential theft.

Do not use this to dump credentials yourself — it analyzes telemetry of such activity. Legit security tools also touch LSASS; corroborate before alerting.

Prerequisites

  • Sysmon EID 10 events (with TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceImage) and/or EID 1 process events.

Workflow

Step 1: Hunt LSASS access and dumping patterns

python scripts/analyst.py hunt events.csv

Flags EID 10 events where TargetImage is lsass.exe with high-risk GrantedAccess masks (0x1010, 0x1410, 0x143a, 0x1438), and process events showing comsvcs.dll,MiniDump, procdump ... lsass, rundll32 ... MiniDump, or known tool names.

Step 2: Reduce false positives

De-prioritize known security agents (EDR, AV) as the SourceImage; weight unsigned or unusual source processes.

Step 3: Confirm

Correlate with file writes of .dmp files and subsequent off-host transfer.

Step 4: Operationalize

Write a Sigma rule for LSASS access masks and comsvcs MiniDump.

Validation

  • LSASS access flags are based on access mask, not mere access by trusted tools.
  • comsvcs/procdump/rundll32 MiniDump patterns are detected from command lines.
  • Findings map to ATT&CK T1003.001/.002.

Pitfalls

  • Many legitimate tools open LSASS — access mask + source-image context is essential.
  • Attackers renaming tools; rely on behavior (mask, MiniDump export) not just names.
  • Direct-syscall dumpers that avoid the usual API and reduce telemetry.

References

Keep looking

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