Analyzing wiper malware
Skill meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/skills/analyzing-wiper-malware
Analyzes destructive wiper malware by identifying raw-disk and MBR/VBR overwrite primitives, boot-record tampering, mass-deletion and backup-destruction behavior, and distinguishing wipers from ransomware. Activates for requests to analyze a wiper, identify destructive disk-overwrite behavior, or tell a wiper apart from ransomware.From its SKILL.md
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SKILL.md
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Analyzing Wiper Malware
When to Use
- You have a sample suspected of destructive intent and need to identify disk-overwrite, MBR/VBR tampering, and mass-deletion primitives.
- You must distinguish a wiper (irreversible destruction) from ransomware (encryption for ransom).
Do not use this on a live host or by running the sample — destructive behavior is the threat. Analyze statically in isolation.
Prerequisites
- The sample, read inertly.
Safety & Handling
- Read bytes statically; never execute. A wiper run is unrecoverable — isolation is mandatory.
Workflow
Step 1: Detect destructive primitives
python scripts/analyst.py scan sample.bin
Flags raw-disk handles (\\.\PhysicalDrive, \\.\C:), DeviceIoControl, MBR/VBR write patterns,
CreateFileMapping over the boot sector, and bulk DeleteFile/overwrite loops.
Step 2: Detect backup/recovery destruction
Surface vssadmin delete shadows, wbadmin delete, bcdedit /set recoveryenabled no, and
wevtutil cl (log clearing) — common wiper recovery-denial steps.
Step 3: Distinguish wiper vs ransomware
Weigh destruction-without-crypto and absence of a ransom note / key exchange against encryption-and-extortion indicators to classify intent.
Step 4: Document
Record the destruction method (overwrite pattern, MBR vs file-level) and recovery-denial steps.
Validation
- Destructive primitives reference real raw-disk/boot-record APIs, not generic file IO.
- Recovery-denial commands are detected where present.
- The wiper-vs-ransomware classification cites concrete evidence.
Pitfalls
- Disk utilities and secure-erase tools share these primitives — context is essential.
- Pseudo-ransomware wipers that display a note but cannot decrypt (intent is destruction).
- Bootloader-only wipers needing boot-sector analysis (pair with the rootkit/bootkit skill).
References
- See
references/api-reference.mdfor the scanner. - ATT&CK T1561 and T1485 (linked in frontmatter).
What ships with it: 3 files
4.7 KB alongside SKILL.md, 1 of them executable
references/
- api-reference.md1.4 KB
scripts/
- analyst.pyruns3.0 KB
- LICENSE340 B