Sota code security

SOTA Code Security

Purpose

One skill, two modes. The rules/ files define the 2026 secure-coding baseline (OWASP Top 10 2025/API 2023/LLM + Agentic Top 10, CWE-mapped). In BUILD mode you write code that conforms to the rules by default. In AUDIT mode you hunt for violations of the same rules and report them as severity-rated findings. The rules are the single source of truth for both — anything a rules file forbids is a finding; anything it mandates is the implementation default.

Threat-model framing for both modes: every input is hostile until validated at a trust boundary; every output channel (response, error, log, model context) is adversary-readable; every privileged operation needs an explicit, code-enforced (never prompt-, comment-, or convention-enforced) authorization decision.

BUILD mode — secure-by-default while writing code

1. Identify trust boundaries first. Before writing a handler/parser/job, name what crosses in (user input, third-party content, model output, file bytes) and what authority the code wields. Pick the relevant rules files from the index below and follow them as you write — not as a review pass.
2. Defaults, not options. Use the rules' default choices without being asked: parameterized queries, argv-exec, argon2id, AEAD via libsodium-class libraries, __Host- cookies, allowlist DTOs (extra=forbid), deny-by-default route policy, per-principal rate limits, timeouts on every outbound call.
3. Structural over disciplinary. Prefer designs where the insecure variant cannot be written: ownership predicates inside queries, RLS for tenancy, typed Secret wrappers with masked repr, central crypto/authz modules, logger redaction filters. If safety depends on every future dev remembering a rule, redesign.
4. Never hand-roll crypto, session machinery, password hashing, JWT/OAuth protocol steps, HTML sanitizers, or auth token schemes. Compose vetted libraries per rules/02 and rules/04.
5. When requirements force a deviation (e.g. shell-out unavoidable, CORS must reflect origins), implement the rules file's documented mitigation stack and leave a SECURITY: comment stating the residual risk.
6. Every control must be falsifiable. For each control you add, ask: if this were silently a no-op, would anything observable differ? If nothing would — no log, no metric, no failing test — the control is not finished. Assert on real loaded artifacts (not exists()), fail closed and loudly, never truncate before inspecting, and make degradation a distinct, metered state. rules/10 is the full catalog.
7. Finish with the file's audit checklist. Before declaring code complete, run the relevant rules files' end-of-file checklists against your own diff; fix every "no".

AUDIT mode — hunting vulnerabilities against these rules

Process:

1. Map the attack surface: entry points (routes, GraphQL resolvers, queue consumers, cron jobs, WS/gRPC, webhooks, file ingestion, LLM tool loops), secrets locations, authz enforcement points, outbound fetchers.
2. Sweep by rules file, prioritized: 03 (authz) and 01 (injection) find the most criticals; then 02, 05, 08, 04, 07, 06, and 10 (silent no-ops) as a pass over whatever the others confirmed exists. For each file, grep-drive the hunt from its named sinks/APIs (e.g. shell=True, dangerouslySetInnerHTML, verify=False, pickle.loads, merge(, Object.assign(.*req.body, permit!, algorithms= absent near jwt.).
3. Trace, don't pattern-match: confirm untrusted data actually reaches the sink and no upstream boundary neutralizes it. Report the full source→sink path. A reachable sink with attacker data = finding; an unreachable one = note as hardening debt, Low.
4. Check the negatives: missing controls are findings too — absent rate limiting, absent CSRF tokens, absent tenant predicate, absent timeout, absent security headers. Use each rules file's audit checklist as the completeness gate; every "no" answer becomes a finding or an accepted risk.
5. Check the inert: a control that is present but does nothing is invisible to steps 2–4, because the code is not wrong — it is a no-op. Run rules/10 as its own pass over every control the sweep confirmed exists: swallowed exceptions, weak existence checks, truncation before inspection, degradation that never logs, and tests that pass against a no-op'd body.
6. Verify, then report. No speculative findings: state the concrete exploit scenario; if exploitability is uncertain, say what's unverified and rate conservatively. Absence claims ("no instances of X") need a wider search and a second method than presence claims do.

Severity conventions (CVSS-style impact mapping)

Severity	CVSS band	Criteria	Examples
Critical	9.0–10.0	Unauthenticated (or trivially authenticated) remote compromise of confidentiality/integrity at scale: RCE, SQLi dumping the DB, auth bypass, cross-tenant read/write, secrets in public repo/client bundle	pickle.loads(request.body); JWT alg not pinned; reflected-Origin CORS with credentials; tenant_id from request param
High	7.0–8.9	Single-user-scoped compromise or privileged-precondition full compromise: IDOR on sensitive objects, stored XSS, SSRF reaching metadata, authenticated command injection, session fixation, missing object-level authz	Ownership check missing on GET /documents/{id}; dangerouslySetInnerHTML on user bio; upload served executable from app origin
Medium	4.0–6.9	Meaningful weakening requiring chaining or limited impact: CSRF on non-critical state, ReDoS/resource exhaustion, missing rate limit on login, verbose errors leaking internals, weak-parameter argon2/bcrypt, missing security headers on sensitive pages, log injection	No lockout on login; stack traces in prod 500s; SameSite unset with no CSRF token but Origin checked
Low	0.1–3.9	Hardening gaps and defense-in-depth misses with no direct exploit: missing __Host- prefix, Server header exposure, report-only CSP, unmasked PII in internal logs, missing Vary: Origin	Cookie lacks prefix; HSTS missing includeSubDomains; EXIF not stripped

Adjust one band up/down for context: data sensitivity (health/financial ↑), internet-exposed vs internal-only (↓ one max — network position is not identity), existing compensating control (↓), trivially scriptable at scale (↑).

Finding format

[SEVERITY] <title>
File: <path>:<line>            (every claim anchored to file:line)
CWE: CWE-<id> (<name>)         (omit only if genuinely unmapped)
Source → Sink: <where attacker data enters> → <dangerous operation>
Exploit scenario: <concrete attacker story: who, sends what, gets what>
Fix: <specific change, referencing the rules/ section with the pattern>

Order the report Critical→Low; lead with a one-paragraph executive summary (counts by severity, worst finding, systemic themes). Group repeated instances of one weakness into a single finding listing all locations.

Rules index

File	Topics	Read this when...
rules/01-input-injection.md	SQLi/NoSQLi, command & argument injection, path traversal/Zip Slip, SSRF + DNS rebinding, XXE, SSTI, deserialization, prototype pollution, ReDoS, canonicalization, allowlist validation	...any external data reaches a query, shell, path, URL fetcher, parser, template, regex, or object loader; writing input validation; auditing any handler
rules/02-authentication.md	argon2id parameters, credential-stuffing defense, session lifecycle/fixation, JWT (alg pinning, claims, storage, refresh rotation), OAuth2/OIDC + PKCE, MFA/TOTP, account recovery, passkeys/WebAuthn	...building or reviewing login, signup, sessions, tokens, SSO, password reset, MFA enrollment, or anything that proves identity
rules/03-authorization.md	Deny-by-default enforcement, IDOR/BOLA, function-level authz, RBAC/ABAC/ReBAC, multi-tenant isolation (RLS), confused deputy, authz bypass patterns	...any endpoint takes an object ID; multi-tenant features; role/permission systems; service-to-service trust; hunting access-control bugs (start here for audits)
rules/04-cryptography.md	Algorithm table (AEAD, X25519, Ed25519), nonce discipline, CSPRNG use, key management/rotation/KMS, TLS config & cert verification, constant-time comparison, tamper-evident logs/audit ledgers (keyed chains, anchoring, integrity vs completeness), secrets in code/CI	...encrypting, signing, hashing, generating tokens, configuring TLS, storing secrets, building or auditing a "tamper-evident"/audit ledger, or you see any crypto primitive or verify=False in code
rules/05-web-security.md	Context-aware XSS encoding, Trusted Types, nonce-based CSP, CSRF stack, CORS misconfig, clickjacking, header baseline, cookie attributes/prefixes, file upload pipeline	...rendering user content, setting headers/cookies, configuring CORS, handling uploads, or auditing anything browser-facing
rules/06-memory-resource-safety.md	Integer overflow/truncation, bounds & banned C APIs, unsafe/FFI policy, untrusted size fields, decompression bombs, timeouts/rate limits/load shedding, TOCTOU & race-driven bypass	...parsing binary formats, doing arithmetic on input-derived sizes/money, writing C/C++/unsafe Rust/FFI, or auditing DoS and concurrency surfaces
rules/07-data-exposure.md	Leak-free error handling, oracle-free responses, logging redaction & log injection, security event logging, mass assignment, response over-exposure, debug surfaces in prod	...designing errors/logging, binding request bodies to models, shaping API responses, or auditing what an attacker learns from outputs
rules/08-llm-ai-security.md	Prompt injection (direct/indirect), lethal trifecta, dual-LLM/taint gating, tool-call authorization & human-in-the-loop, model output as untrusted data, RAG ACLs, model supply chain	...building or auditing anything with an LLM: agents, tool calling, RAG, chat UIs rendering model output, MCP servers, prompt/completion logging
rules/09-untrusted-data-ingestion.md	Hostile data feeds/content; ingest as a trust boundary, provenance/taint tagging; sandboxed parsers (image/archive/PDF/Office/XML/CSV/JSON, fuzzy-hash); zip-slip/zip-bomb/pixel-bomb/decompression caps; size/rate/timeout DoS controls, quarantine/DLQ; parse-don't-validate, MIME sniffing, polyglots, AV; feed integrity & broker pattern	...ingesting attacker-authored external data — threat-intel/RSS feeds, scraped content, user uploads, third-party webhooks/APIs, RAG corpora, email, file imports — through parsers into storage/UI; auditing collectors, upload endpoints, or feed pipelines
rules/10-silent-control-failure.md	Controls that look enabled and do nothing: the falsification question, weak existence checks, optional-dependency degradation, empty/placeholder rulesets, swallowed enforcement exceptions, overloaded flags, early-return and truncation bypasses, silently-ignored config keys, doc/code default drift, hardcoded report numbers, shipped-artifact gaps, prompt/instruction standing in for an enforced control (attention leakage); mutation-probing a control; the degraded-control helper; absence-claim evidence	...you are about to trust that a control is working — any audit pass over controls that exist, any build where a safeguard's failure would be invisible, any "it's enabled" claim from a banner, config, or green test
rules/11-dead-path-diagnostics.md	Finding the above at codebase scale: duration-not-result, printing every gate's denominator (0 checked, 0 failed, exit 0), cross-scale delta, telemetry silence, proving a fix executed; scale-dependent silence (unbounded traversal, size-gated paths fixtures never cross, budgets that truncate coverage silently); stale-artifact no-ops (a cache/tag key narrower than the behaviour); format assumptions from one sample + lenient parsers returning plausible-but-wrong values; asserts stripped by -O/NDEBUG/missing -ea; ACTIVE/LATENT/REFUTED evidence labels; §7 the instrument that measures a control is itself a control (scorers, gates, benchmarks: two references in CI, a negative control, abort-don't-warn)	...sweeping a whole system for stages that report success while doing nothing, deciding where to apply rules/10, or validating that a pipeline's "0 findings" means it ran

Top-10 non-negotiables

Violations of these are findings regardless of context; in BUILD mode they are never acceptable shortcuts:

1. Every SQL/NoSQL value parameterized — no string-built queries, raw-query escape hatches audited, identifiers allowlist-mapped. (CWE-89)
2. No shell string execution — argv arrays only, -- separators, no shell=True/exec(string). (CWE-78)
3. No native deserialization of untrusted data — no pickle / ObjectInputStream / unserialize / Marshal / yaml.load; data-only formats + schema. (CWE-502)
4. Object-level authz on every ID the client supplies — ownership/tenant predicate inside the query, deny by default, 404 for unauthorized. (CWE-639/862)
5. Passwords only as argon2id (or scrypt/bcrypt) hashes at current parameters; login/reset rate-limited with uniform errors. (CWE-916/307)
6. JWT verification pins algorithms and checks exp/iss/aud; OAuth is Authorization Code + PKCE with exact redirect URIs; tokens never in localStorage or URLs. (CWE-347)
7. No hardcoded or client-shipped secrets, no disabled TLS verification — CSPRNG for all tokens, constant-time comparison for all secret checks. (CWE-798/295/330/208)
8. All user-influenced output encoded/sanitized for its sink — HTML context encoding + allowlist sanitizer for rich text; applies equally to LLM output. (CWE-79)
9. Outbound fetch of user-supplied URLs gets full SSRF defense — scheme allowlist, post-resolution private-IP block, pinned connection, redirect re-validation. (CWE-918)
10. LLM tool calls authorized in code against the human principal — session-bound scoping, schema-validated arguments, human confirmation for irreversible actions; prompts are never the security boundary. (CWE-863)