agentsclimarketplace

Security review

Skill Lukk17/agent-standards/.agents/skills/security-review

One git checkout drops a shared AI coding setup (skills, subagents, MCP servers, OpenSpec scaffolding) into any project, across Claude Code, Kilo, OpenCode, Codex, and Copilot.

Install
npx -y skills add Lukk17/agent-standards --skill security-review

Assembled from the repository path, not quoted from the project. Check it against their README if it does not work.

One thing to look at

  • 0 stars0 stars. Stars are a popularity signal and not a quality one, but at this level it is likely that nobody has read this closely except its author, and you would be relying on your own review.

What its author says it does

Copied from the file, not written here

Use this skill when adding authentication, handling user input, working with secrets, creating API endpoints, or implementing payment/sensitive features. Provides comprehensive security checklist and patterns.

SKILL.md

17.5 KB, as published. Nobody here has run it

Security Review Skill

This skill ensures all code follows security best practices and identifies potential vulnerabilities.


When to Activate

  • Implementing authentication or authorization
  • Handling user input or file uploads
  • Creating new API endpoints
  • Working with secrets or credentials
  • Implementing payment features
  • Storing or transmitting sensitive data
  • Integrating third-party APIs

Security Checklist

1. Secrets Management

FAIL: NEVER Do This
const apiKey = "sk-proj-xxxxx"  // Hardcoded secret
const dbPassword = "password123" // In source code
PASS: ALWAYS Do This
const apiKey = process.env.OPENAI_API_KEY
const dbUrl = process.env.DATABASE_URL

// Verify secrets exist
if (!apiKey) {
  throw new Error('OPENAI_API_KEY not configured')
}
Verification Steps
  • No hardcoded API keys, tokens, or passwords
  • All secrets in environment variables
  • .env.local in .gitignore
  • No secrets in git history
  • Production secrets in hosting platform (Vercel, Railway)

2. Input Validation

Always Validate User Input
import { z } from 'zod'

// Define validation schema
const CreateUserSchema = z.object({
  email: z.string().email(),
  name: z.string().min(1).max(100),
  age: z.number().int().min(0).max(150)
})

// Validate before processing
export async function createUser(input: unknown) {
  try {
    const validated = CreateUserSchema.parse(input)
    return await db.users.create(validated)
  } catch (error) {
    if (error instanceof z.ZodError) {
      return { success: false, errors: error.errors }
    }
    throw error
  }
}
File Upload Validation
function validateFileUpload(file: File) {
  // Size check (5MB max)
  const maxSize = 5 * 1024 * 1024
  if (file.size > maxSize) {
    throw new Error('File too large (max 5MB)')
  }

  // Type check
  const allowedTypes = ['image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/gif']
  if (!allowedTypes.includes(file.type)) {
    throw new Error('Invalid file type')
  }

  // Extension check
  const allowedExtensions = ['.jpg', '.jpeg', '.png', '.gif']
  const extension = file.name.toLowerCase().match(/\.[^.]+$/)?.[0]
  if (!extension || !allowedExtensions.includes(extension)) {
    throw new Error('Invalid file extension')
  }

  return true
}

Always validate magic bytes (binary signature), not just extension or MIME header:

import magic

def validate_upload(file_bytes: bytes, allowed_types: list[str]) -> bool:
    # Check binary signature (magic bytes) — not just extension or MIME header
    detected = magic.from_buffer(file_bytes, mime=True)
    return detected in allowed_types
Verification Steps
  • All user inputs validated with schemas
  • File uploads restricted (size, type, extension)
  • No direct use of user input in queries
  • Whitelist validation (not blacklist)
  • Error messages don't leak sensitive info

3. SQL Injection Prevention

FAIL: NEVER Concatenate SQL
// DANGEROUS - SQL Injection vulnerability
const query = `SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = '${userEmail}'`
await db.query(query)
PASS: ALWAYS Use Parameterized Queries
// Safe - parameterized query
const { data } = await supabase
  .from('users')
  .select('*')
  .eq('email', userEmail)

// Or with raw SQL
await db.query(
  'SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = $1',
  [userEmail]
)
Verification Steps
  • All database queries use parameterized queries
  • No string concatenation in SQL
  • ORM/query builder used correctly
  • Supabase queries properly sanitized

4. Authentication & Authorization

JWT Token Handling
// FAIL: WRONG: localStorage (vulnerable to XSS)
localStorage.setItem('token', token)

// PASS: CORRECT: httpOnly cookies
res.setHeader('Set-Cookie',
  `token=${token}; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Strict; Max-Age=3600`)
Authorization Checks
export async function deleteUser(userId: string, requesterId: string) {
  // ALWAYS verify authorization first
  const requester = await db.users.findUnique({
    where: { id: requesterId }
  })

  if (requester.role !== 'admin') {
    return NextResponse.json(
      { error: 'Unauthorized' },
      { status: 403 }
    )
  }

  // Proceed with deletion
  await db.users.delete({ where: { id: userId } })
}
Password Hashing
  • Primary (recommended): Argon2id: argon2-cffi (Python) / Argon2PasswordEncoder (Spring)
  • Acceptable fallback: BCrypt with cost factor >= 12
  • Prohibited: MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256 (unsalted), PBKDF2 with < 100,000 iterations
# Python — argon2-cffi
from argon2 import PasswordHasher

ph = PasswordHasher()
hash = ph.hash(password)         # hash and store
ph.verify(hash, password)        # verify on login
// Spring Security
PasswordEncoder encoder = new Argon2PasswordEncoder(16, 32, 1, 65536, 3);
String hash = encoder.encode(rawPassword);
encoder.matches(rawPassword, hash);
Row Level Security (Supabase)
-- Enable RLS on all tables
ALTER TABLE users ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;

-- Users can only view their own data
CREATE POLICY "Users view own data"
  ON users FOR SELECT
  USING (auth.uid() = id);

-- Users can only update their own data
CREATE POLICY "Users update own data"
  ON users FOR UPDATE
  USING (auth.uid() = id);
Verification Steps
  • Tokens stored in httpOnly cookies (not localStorage)
  • Authorization checks before sensitive operations
  • Row Level Security enabled in Supabase
  • Role-based access control implemented
  • Session management secure

5. XSS Prevention

Sanitize HTML
import DOMPurify from 'isomorphic-dompurify'

// ALWAYS sanitize user-provided HTML
function renderUserContent(html: string) {
  const clean = DOMPurify.sanitize(html, {
    ALLOWED_TAGS: ['b', 'i', 'em', 'strong', 'p'],
    ALLOWED_ATTR: []
  })
  return <div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: clean }} />
}
Content Security Policy

Rule: No unsafe-inline or unsafe-eval in Content Security Policy. Use nonces for inline scripts/styles if necessary.

// next.config.js
const nonce = generateSecureNonce() // cryptographically random per request

const securityHeaders = [
  {
    key: 'Content-Security-Policy',
    value: [
      "default-src 'self'",
      `script-src 'self' 'nonce-${nonce}'`,
      `style-src 'self' 'nonce-${nonce}'`,
      "img-src 'self' data:",
      "font-src 'self'",
      "frame-ancestors 'none'",
      "base-uri 'self'",
    ].join('; ')
  }
]

Full recommended CSP header:

Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'nonce-{random}'; style-src 'self' 'nonce-{random}'; img-src 'self' data:; font-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'self'
Verification Steps
  • User-provided HTML sanitized
  • CSP headers configured with nonces: no unsafe-inline or unsafe-eval
  • No unvalidated dynamic content rendering
  • React's built-in XSS protection used

6. CSRF Protection

CSRF Tokens
import { csrf } from '@/lib/csrf'

export async function POST(request: Request) {
  const token = request.headers.get('X-CSRF-Token')

  if (!csrf.verify(token)) {
    return NextResponse.json(
      { error: 'Invalid CSRF token' },
      { status: 403 }
    )
  }

  // Process request
}
SameSite Cookies
res.setHeader('Set-Cookie',
  `session=${sessionId}; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Strict`)
Verification Steps
  • CSRF tokens on state-changing operations
  • SameSite=Strict on all cookies
  • Double-submit cookie pattern implemented

7. Rate Limiting

API Rate Limiting
import rateLimit from 'express-rate-limit'

const limiter = rateLimit({
  windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000, // 15 minutes
  max: 100, // 100 requests per window
  message: 'Too many requests'
})

// Apply to routes
app.use('/api/', limiter)
Expensive Operations
// Aggressive rate limiting for searches
const searchLimiter = rateLimit({
  windowMs: 60 * 1000, // 1 minute
  max: 10, // 10 requests per minute
  message: 'Too many search requests'
})

app.use('/api/search', searchLimiter)
Verification Steps
  • Rate limiting on all API endpoints
  • Stricter limits on expensive operations
  • IP-based rate limiting
  • User-based rate limiting (authenticated)

8. Sensitive Data Exposure

Logging
// FAIL: WRONG: Logging sensitive data
console.log('User login:', { email, password })
console.log('Payment:', { cardNumber, cvv })

// PASS: CORRECT: Redact sensitive data
console.log('User login:', { email, userId })
console.log('Payment:', { last4: card.last4, userId })
Error Messages
// FAIL: WRONG: Exposing internal details
catch (error) {
  return NextResponse.json(
    { error: error.message, stack: error.stack },
    { status: 500 }
  )
}

// PASS: CORRECT: Generic error messages
catch (error) {
  console.error('Internal error:', error)
  return NextResponse.json(
    { error: 'An error occurred. Please try again.' },
    { status: 500 }
  )
}
Verification Steps
  • No passwords, tokens, or secrets in logs
  • Error messages generic for users
  • Detailed errors only in server logs
  • No stack traces exposed to users

9. Blockchain Security (Solana)

Wallet Verification
import { verify } from '@solana/web3.js'

async function verifyWalletOwnership(
  publicKey: string,
  signature: string,
  message: string
) {
  try {
    const isValid = verify(
      Buffer.from(message),
      Buffer.from(signature, 'base64'),
      Buffer.from(publicKey, 'base64')
    )
    return isValid
  } catch (error) {
    return false
  }
}
Transaction Verification
async function verifyTransaction(transaction: Transaction) {
  // Verify recipient
  if (transaction.to !== expectedRecipient) {
    throw new Error('Invalid recipient')
  }

  // Verify amount
  if (transaction.amount > maxAmount) {
    throw new Error('Amount exceeds limit')
  }

  // Verify user has sufficient balance
  const balance = await getBalance(transaction.from)
  if (balance < transaction.amount) {
    throw new Error('Insufficient balance')
  }

  return true
}
Verification Steps
  • Wallet signatures verified
  • Transaction details validated
  • Balance checks before transactions
  • No blind transaction signing

10. Dependency Security

Regular Updates
# Check for vulnerabilities
npm audit

# Fix automatically fixable issues (mutates the lockfile — review the diff before committing)
npm audit fix

# Update dependencies
npm update

# Check for outdated packages
npm outdated
Lock Files
# ALWAYS commit lock files
git add package-lock.json

# Use in CI/CD for reproducible builds
npm ci  # Instead of npm install
Verification Steps
  • Dependencies up to date
  • No known vulnerabilities (npm audit clean)
  • Lock files committed
  • Scheduled dependency review with a vulnerability scan (npm audit / pip-audit in CI); enabling Dependabot is an approval-gated decision, not an automatic default
  • Regular security updates

Security Testing

Automated Security Tests

// Test authentication
test('requires authentication', async () => {
  const response = await fetch('/api/protected')
  expect(response.status).toBe(401)
})

// Test authorization
test('requires admin role', async () => {
  const response = await fetch('/api/admin', {
    headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${userToken}` }
  })
  expect(response.status).toBe(403)
})

// Test input validation
test('rejects invalid input', async () => {
  const response = await fetch('/api/users', {
    method: 'POST',
    body: JSON.stringify({ email: 'not-an-email' })
  })
  expect(response.status).toBe(400)
})

// Test rate limiting
test('enforces rate limits', async () => {
  const requests = Array(101).fill(null).map(() =>
    fetch('/api/endpoint')
  )

  const responses = await Promise.all(requests)
  const tooManyRequests = responses.filter(r => r.status === 429)

  expect(tooManyRequests.length).toBeGreaterThan(0)
})

Pre-Deployment Security Checklist

Before ANY production deployment:

  • Secrets: No hardcoded secrets, all in env vars
  • Input Validation: All user inputs validated
  • SQL Injection: All queries parameterized
  • XSS: User content sanitized
  • CSRF: Protection enabled
  • Authentication: Proper token handling
  • Authorization: Role checks in place
  • Rate Limiting: Enabled on all endpoints
  • HTTPS: Enforced in production
  • Security Headers: CSP, X-Frame-Options configured
  • Error Handling: No sensitive data in errors
  • Logging: No sensitive data logged
  • Dependencies: Up to date, no vulnerabilities
  • Row Level Security: Enabled in Supabase
  • CORS: Properly configured
  • File Uploads: Validated (size, type)
  • Wallet Signatures: Verified (if blockchain)

Resources


Remember: Security is not optional. One vulnerability can compromise the entire platform. When in doubt, err on the side of caution.


OAuth 2.1 / PKCE

  • Mandate PKCE for all authorization code flows (S256 code challenge)
  • Prohibit Implicit Grant: removed in OAuth 2.1; use authorization code + PKCE instead
  • Prohibit ROPC (Resource Owner Password Credentials): no exceptions
  • Refresh Token Rotation: issue a new refresh token on every use; invalidate the old one immediately
  • Access token lifetime: maximum 15 minutes

JWT Validation Checklist

Always validate:

  • alg claim: explicitly reject none algorithm: configure allowed algorithms allowlist
  • exp: token must not be expired
  • iss: must match expected issuer exactly
  • aud: must match expected audience
import jwt

def decode_token(token: str) -> dict:
    return jwt.decode(
        token,
        public_key,
        algorithms=["RS256"],  # Explicit allowlist — never use algorithms=["*"]
        options={"require": ["exp", "iss", "aud"]},
        audience="my-api",
        issuer="https://auth.example.com",
    )

mTLS, Service-to-Service

For internal microservice communication, enforce mutual TLS:

  • Both client and server present certificates
  • Use a private CA for internal service certificates
  • Short certificate lifetimes (< 24h) via cert-manager or Vault PKI

Required Security Headers

Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'nonce-{random}'; frame-ancestors 'none'
Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()
Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: DENY

Zero Trust Architecture

Principles:

  • Never trust, always verify: no implicit trust based on network location
  • Every request must be authenticated and authorized, even between internal services
  • Network policies: default-deny; explicit allow rules for required communication paths
  • Short-lived credentials: rotate tokens, certificates, and secrets automatically
  • Least privilege: service accounts have only the permissions they need

Supply Chain Security

  • Generate SBOM (Software Bill of Materials) for every release (CycloneDX or SPDX format)
  • Sign container images with cosign (Sigstore) on every production push
  • Pin all dependencies to exact versions in lock files; prohibit unpinned ranges in production
  • Block CI on CRITICAL/HIGH CVEs with available fixes (Trivy, Grype, npm audit)

Audit Logging Requirements

Every security-relevant event must produce an immutable audit log entry with:

  • timestamp (UTC ISO 8601)
  • actor (user ID or service account)
  • action (what was done)
  • resource (what was acted upon)
  • outcome (success/failure)
  • ip_address and user_agent for user-initiated actions

Rules:

  • Write to a write-only log sink (append-only storage, separate account)
  • Retain for minimum 12 months
  • Never expose raw audit logs to end users

Privacy by Design

  • Data minimization: collect only what is strictly necessary
  • Legal basis: document the legal basis (consent, legitimate interest, etc.) for each data category
  • Right to erasure: implement within 30 days of request
  • DPIA (Data Protection Impact Assessment): required before introducing a feature that processes sensitive personal data at scale
  • Pseudonymization in non-production: never use real PII in dev/staging environments

Encryption at Rest

  • Symmetric encryption: AES-256-GCM for field-level encryption
  • Asymmetric: RSA-4096 or ECDSA P-384 for key wrapping
  • KMS/HSM for cryptographic key management: never store master keys in application config
  • Rotate encryption keys annually or after suspected compromise

SAST / DAST Pipeline

  • SAST: run on every PR (Semgrep, SonarQube, or Bandit for Python)
  • DAST: run weekly or before every major release using OWASP ZAP against a staging environment
  • Dependency scanning: npm audit, pip-audit, trivy fs on every PR

Keep looking

Skills are one crate of 328,083. Ordering is by how many stacks a row turns up in, so the top of any crate is what has actually been picked rather than what has the most stars.