Streamer mode
Behavioral safety mode for when the user is live streaming or screen sharing — never print secrets, env vars, tokens, IPs, hostnames, or terminal-sensitive data on screen; substitute safe command alternatives; defer security findings to a private file instead of announcing them on stream. Use when the user says "streamer mode", "I'm streaming", "I'm live", "going live", "screen sharing", "recording my screen", "on stream", or "presenting/demo on Zoom/Meet".From its SKILL.md
npx -y skills add LucasSantana-Dev/streamer-modeAssembled from the repository path, not quoted from the project. Check it against their README if it does not work.
2 things to look at
- 21 days oldThe repository was created 21 days ago. New is not bad, but a brand new repository carrying a familiar-sounding name is the shape a typosquat arrives in, and there has been no time for anyone else to find a problem with it.
- 0 stars0 stars. Stars are a popularity signal and not a quality one, but at this level it is likely that nobody has read this closely except its author, and you would be relying on your own review.
SKILL.md
6.6 KB, ~1.4k tokens by cl100k_base, as published. Nobody here has run it
Streamer Mode
Everything the agent prints — tool output, file reads, command results, error messages — is visible to a live audience. Treat the terminal as a public broadcast until the user says the stream is over.
Use When
- User announces they are streaming, screen sharing, recording, presenting, or demoing.
- User asks for "streamer mode", "safe mode for stream", "hide secrets while I share my screen".
Do Not Use When
- Auditing a repo for leaked secrets (use
security-audit/secure). - Redacting data in files or commits (that is content work, not a session mode).
Activation
- Confirm mode is ON in one short line. Stays on until user says "stop streamer mode" / "stream over" / "done streaming".
- Run the pre-flight sweep SILENTLY (output to file, never stdout) and report only pass/fail per item, never values:
.env*or credential-pattern files in cwd? (lscheck only — never open them)- Git remotes with embedded credentials? (
git config --get-regexp 'remote\..*\.url' > /tmp/…then count matches of://[^/@]*:[^/@]*@|https?://[^/@]*@. Two alternatives on purpose: userinfo containing a colon means a password is present under any scheme, and any userinfo over http(s) is a token. Matching a bareuser@under every scheme would flag ordinaryssh://[email protected]/...remotes, and a check that fires on every SSH remote gets ignored. Report the count only: "1 remote has an embedded credential, fix after stream". Never print the URL or the matching line.) - Shell prompt / OS notifications likely exposing hostname or messages? Remind once: enable OS Do-Not-Disturb, Discord streamer mode.
Core Rules (while ON)
- Never run commands that print secrets or network identity. Full table with safe alternatives:
references/dangerous-commands.md. Headline bans:env,printenv,echo $ANY_SECRET,cat .env*,git remote -v,curl -v,docker inspect(unfiltered),kubectl get/describe secret,aws configure list,aws sts get-caller-identity,gcloud auth list,history,ps aux,ifconfig/ipconfig/netstat(IPs). One documented exception:aws sts get-caller-identityis allowed only with its output discarded (> /dev/null 2>&1) so just the exit code is used. Unredirected, or piped anywhere that renders, it prints the account ID and ARN and stays banned. - Never open sensitive files on screen. Read/cat output is visible. Patterns:
.env*,*.pem,*.key,id_rsa*,.pgpass,.netrc,.npmrc,.aws/credentials,kubeconfig, anything namedsecret*/credential*. Existence checks (test -f) and counts (grep -c) are fine. - Check existence, not value:
test -n "$VAR" && echo setinstead ofecho $VAR. - Redirect verbose output to file, grep narrowly:
cmd > /tmp/out 2>&1then extract only the non-sensitive line needed. - Mask anything sensitive you must mention:
sk-ab***,<server-ip>,<internal-host>,<client>. Applies to IPs (public AND private), hostnames, MAC addresses, email addresses, cloud account IDs, DB connection strings, JWT contents, client names in file paths. - Error output is a leak vector. If a command fails, summarize the error in your own words; do not paste raw traces that contain hosts, paths with client names, or tokens.
- Prefer SSH-style references and placeholders in examples — never real remotes, real accounts, real endpoints.
Security Findings Protocol
If you notice a vulnerability, misconfiguration, or exposed secret while working:
- Default — silent defer. Append the finding to
~/.claude/streamer-findings/<YYYY-MM-DD>.mdvia redirected shell write (never Write-tool preview, never echo the content). On screen say only: "Noted one item for your post-stream review — saved privately."- Create the directory and file restrictively, since this file is a magnet for exactly what must not leak:
mkdir -p -m 700 ~/.claude/streamer-findingsandumask 077before the first write (orchmod 600the file after). A world-readable findings file defeats the point. - Write only the category and location, both masked: "AWS key, line 12 of
config/<redacted>.ts". Never the secret value, never a raw stack trace, never an unmasked absolute path. The file survives the stream, so treat it as the durable artifact it is.
- Create the directory and file restrictively, since this file is a magnet for exactly what must not leak:
- Exception — active exposure. If a credential or secret is visible on screen RIGHT NOW (already printed, in an open file, in a pasted log), interrupt immediately: name the category and location ("an API key is visible in the output above — rotate it after the stream, viewers may have captured it"), but NEVER repeat or quote the value itself.
- Never enumerate vulnerabilities, attack vectors, or "here's how someone could exploit this" on stream.
Deactivation
On "stream over" / "stop streamer mode": confirm mode OFF, then surface the private findings file contents and walk through deferred items (rotation steps first).
Outputs / Evidence
- One-line ON confirmation + pre-flight pass/fail summary (no values).
- Private findings file when anything was deferred.
- OFF confirmation + deferred-findings debrief.
Failure / Stop Conditions
- If a task genuinely requires viewing a secret (e.g., debugging an auth header), stop and tell the user to do that step off-stream — do not proceed with masking tricks that still flash the value.
- Mode is session-scoped; if a new session starts and the user is still streaming, they must re-activate.
Load These Resources
references/dangerous-commands.md— full banned-command table with safe alternatives + sensitive-file patterns.
What ships with it: 4 files
19.1 KB alongside SKILL.md
references/
- dangerous-commands.md5.2 KB
- .gitignore24 B
- LICENSE11.1 KB
- README.md2.8 KB