Wp rest api

WordPress REST API: scaffold, review, secure

Use this skill for inbound REST endpoints. Prefer REST for new, versioned plugin APIs and external clients. Keep outbound HTTP integrations in wp-http-api-client and use admin-ajax only for a concrete legacy or WP-admin-specific reason.

Read reference.md for dispatch/auth debugging, controllers, collections, register_rest_field(), and edge-case verification.

Core execution model

Apply this order when reviewing behavior:

1. Core authentication handlers establish the current user or return an auth error.
2. WP_REST_Server matches (namespace, route, method).
3. Core checks required args, validates registered args, then sanitizes them.
4. Core calls the endpoint's permission_callback.
5. Core calls the main callback only when permission succeeds.
6. Core converts WP_Error and other supported return values into a REST response.

Validation and sanitization therefore run before endpoint authorization. Keep their callbacks cheap, deterministic, read-only, and safe for anonymous traffic.

Review workflow

1. Inventory all inbound REST surfaces:

   rg -n "register_rest_route|register_rest_field|rest_api_init|WP_REST_Controller" .
   

2. Build a route matrix with namespace, path, method, callback, public/private intent, permission_callback, accepted args, and response fields.

3. Trace every security-sensitive identifier from its exact request source into the permission check and the write/read operation. Confirm both use the same value.

4. Trace declared and undeclared input into SQL, metadata, options, filesystem, HTTP, email, and object update calls. Reject mass assignment.

5. Verify output field allowlists, context, pagination bounds, and stable filters.

6. Test anonymous, low-privilege, authorized, invalid-input, not-found, and cross-object access cases. Confirm GET/HEAD are side-effect free; for writes, test method semantics and replay/retry behavior where relevant.

7. Report each finding with severity, route/method, file and line, exploit or failure path, evidence, and the smallest correct remediation. Separate confirmed exposure from defense-in-depth advice.

Treat unauthenticated privileged writes or sensitive reads as high/critical. Treat missing object-level authorization, unbounded collections, mass assignment, and cross-source identifier confusion as security findings, not style issues.

Minimal endpoint scaffold

add_action( 'rest_api_init', static function (): void {
    register_rest_route(
        'myplugin/v1',
        '/items/(?P<id>\d+)',
        array(
            'methods'             => WP_REST_Server::READABLE,
            'callback'            => 'myplugin_get_item',
            'permission_callback' => static function ( WP_REST_Request $request ) {
                $url_params = $request->get_url_params();
                $post_id    = (int) ( $url_params['id'] ?? 0 );

                return current_user_can( 'read_post', $post_id );
            },
            'args'                => array(
                'id' => array(
                    'required' => true,
                    'type'     => 'integer',
                    'minimum'  => 1,
                ),
            ),
        )
    );
} );

/**
 * @return WP_REST_Response|WP_Error
 */
function myplugin_get_item( WP_REST_Request $request ) {
    $url_params = $request->get_url_params();
    $post_id    = (int) ( $url_params['id'] ?? 0 );
    $post       = get_post( $post_id );

    if ( ! $post ) {
        return new WP_Error(
            'myplugin_not_found',
            __( 'Item not found.', 'myplugin' ),
            array( 'status' => 404 )
        );
    }

    return rest_ensure_response(
        array(
            'id'    => $post->ID,
            'title' => get_the_title( $post ),
        )
    );
}

The exact-source lookup is intentional. Do not replace it with $request['id'] or get_param( 'id' ) for an object identifier; merged body/query values have higher priority than the URL value.

Security and correctness rules

Require explicit permission intent

Specify permission_callback for every endpoint. Since WordPress 5.5, omitting it emits _doing_it_wrong(), but registration and dispatch continue. Missing or empty permission callbacks are skipped, so the route is open at the endpoint permission layer unless another layer or the main callback denies it.

• Use __return_true for a deliberately public route. It is not a vulnerability by itself.

• Never use unconditional public permission for a privileged write or sensitive read.

• Check object-level meta capabilities with the target ID:

  current_user_can( 'edit_post', $post_id );
  current_user_can( 'edit_user', $user_id );
  

• Return true, false, null, or WP_Error. Core denies only exact false, null, or WP_Error; falsey values such as 0, '', or array() can grant access. Prefer explicit true or a namespaced WP_Error.

• Keep permission callbacks read-only and idempotent. Core may call them again while generating the Allow header.

• Treat authentication and authorization separately. A valid REST nonce proves the cookie-authenticated request; it does not grant a capability.

For a public form, login, webhook, or callback route, verify the complete abuse policy: bounded input, rate/resource limits, signature or token rules where applicable, replay handling, and non-enumerating responses.

Audit public telemetry and ingestion routes as resource APIs

An analytics beacon can be intentionally public and still expose an IDOR or denial-of-service primitive. Review the complete per-request work budget, not only permission_callback.

• Bound raw body bytes before expensive decoding where the application can do so; also enforce infrastructure/WAF limits because PHP receives the request after the web server.
• Give every nested string/number/array a schema. Use maxLength, numeric bounds, maxItems, accepted keys, and a custom depth/node budget when core's schema cannot express it. A 1–2 MiB JSON cap is usually far too generous for a beacon that should contain a few metrics.
• Count fan-out through hooks: dimension get-or-create queries, inserts per array element, goal evaluation, email, and outbound HTTP all belong to the anonymous request's cost. Queue slow or retriable remote delivery.
• Do not accept a sequential record ID as proof that an anonymous client owns the record. Return an opaque random/signed token or bind the record to a server-resolved session, then update with both resource and owner predicates such as WHERE id = ? AND session_id = ?.
• Rate-limit and quota by a proxy-safe identity, but keep storage and fan-out bounded even when attackers rotate IPs/cookies. Rate limiting is not a substitute for ownership or idempotency.
• Return deterministic 400, 413, 422, and 429 errors. Malformed JSON or a scalar root must not fall through into PHP warnings/5xx responses.

Test cross-session record updates, replayed tokens, maximum and maximum+1 array sizes, oversized/deep bodies, concurrent first beacons, and repeated requests with outbound integrations enabled. Assert a documented upper bound on local queries/writes and zero synchronous third-party calls on the public hot path.

Declare and enforce the input contract

Declare every accepted URL, query, and body parameter in args. Undeclared parameters are not stripped and remain readable from the request, so never pass get_params() or an arbitrary JSON object directly into a model/update API.

'args' => array(
    'email' => array(
        'required'          => true,
        'type'              => 'string',
        'format'            => 'email',
        'validate_callback' => 'rest_validate_request_arg',
        'sanitize_callback' => 'sanitize_email',
    ),
    'role' => array(
        'type'    => 'string',
        'enum'    => array( 'subscriber', 'contributor', 'author' ),
        'default' => 'subscriber',
    ),
    'count' => array(
        'type'    => 'integer',
        'minimum' => 1,
        'maximum' => 100,
    ),
),

When type exists and no custom sanitize_callback is set, core defaults to rest_parse_request_arg(), which validates the registered schema and sanitizes the value. A custom sanitizer replaces that fallback. Pair it with validate_callback => rest_validate_request_arg or a custom validator, or constraints such as minimum, maximum, enum, and format may not run.

Validation proves shape; sanitization normalizes data. Neither replaces $wpdb->prepare(), capability checks, output policy, or business validation.

Read from the intended parameter source

Use source-specific accessors for identifiers and security decisions:

• route capture: $request->get_url_params()
• query string: $request->get_query_params()
• JSON body: $request->get_json_params()
• form body: $request->get_body_params()
• uploaded files: $request->get_file_params()

get_param() and array access merge sources in this priority: JSON, form body, query string, URL, defaults. Never authorize one source and mutate another.

Return REST-native responses and errors

Return supported data or WP_REST_Response on success and WP_Error on expected failure. Prefer explicit response objects when setting status, headers, or links.

return rest_ensure_response( $data );
return new WP_REST_Response( $data, 201, array( 'Location' => $location ) );
return new WP_Error( 'myplugin_invalid', '...', array( 'status' => 422 ) );

Do not call wp_send_json_*() in REST callbacks; it terminates execution and bypasses normal REST response handling. Do not expose exception messages, stack traces, SQL, paths, secrets, or internal class names in 5xx responses.

Shape output explicitly

Do not expose unreviewed database rows, model objects, or metadata blobs. Allowlist response fields and evaluate personal/sensitive data per route and context. An email address is not safe merely because it was intentionally selected. Escape values when a client renders them into HTML; do not HTML-escape ordinary JSON data indiscriminately on the server.

Use cookie authentication correctly

Cookie-authenticated browser requests need _wpnonce or X-WP-Nonce generated for wp_rest. Without a nonce, core treats cookie auth as anonymous; an invalid nonce returns rest_cookie_invalid_nonce with 403.

When WordPress enqueues its registered wp-api-fetch script, core installs the REST nonce middleware automatically, including on the front end. A decoupled bundle importing @wordpress/api-fetch from npm must configure nonce middleware itself or use another authentication scheme. Application Passwords authenticate external HTTPS requests but still require endpoint authorization; never ship application credentials in public browser code.

Use controllers for resource APIs

For several related collection/item routes, extend WP_REST_Controller instead of duplicating registration, permission, schema, and response methods. Core provides parameter helpers, not the actual query/filter/pagination behavior. See reference.md.

Use a unique versioned namespace such as myplugin/v1; add v2 instead of breaking an existing public contract in place.

False-positive guards

• Do not report __return_true as a vulnerability without proving the route should be private or the public operation lacks necessary abuse controls.
• Do not treat a nonce as a substitute for capability/object authorization.
• Do not call a missing permission_callback exploitable until tracing global filters and callback-internal checks; still report the fail-open registration pattern because tooling cannot enforce the intended policy.
• Do not report validation errors returned before permission as an auth bypass; assess separately whether they leak sensitive schema/state or enable expensive anonymous work.
• Do not assume 401 versus 403 inconsistency: core normally returns 401 for unauthenticated denial and 403 for an authenticated but unauthorized user.
• Do not label an explicitly mapped database row unsafe without identifying a sensitive or unintended field. Report unreviewed broad exposure and its data.

Cross-references

• Run wp-security-audit for the surrounding nonce, capability, input, SQL, filesystem, redirect, and output checks.
• Run wp-security-secrets for credentials, token issuance, or custom authentication.
• Run wp-database-performance-audit for large collections, count queries, OFFSET scaling, N+1 queries, caching, or direct database access.

Out of scope

Do not design custom JWT/OAuth/signature protocols, complete CORS/WAF/proxy policy, distributed rate limiting, or OpenAPI generation here. Do not audit core-owned wp/v2 contracts unless plugin code changes them.

References

• Official documentation: https://developer.wordpress.org/rest-api/extending-the-rest-api/adding-custom-endpoints/
• Official documentation: https://developer.wordpress.org/reference/functions/register_rest_route/
• Official documentation: https://developer.wordpress.org/rest-api/extending-the-rest-api/controller-classes/
• Official documentation: https://developer.wordpress.org/rest-api/extending-the-rest-api/schema/
• Official documentation: https://developer.wordpress.org/rest-api/using-the-rest-api/authentication/
• Verified source paths:
  • wp-includes/rest-api.php
  • wp-includes/rest-api/class-wp-rest-server.php
  • wp-includes/rest-api/class-wp-rest-request.php
  • wp-includes/rest-api/endpoints/class-wp-rest-controller.php
  • wp-includes/script-loader.php
  • wp-includes/capabilities.php