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Fable safe prompt

Skill lingxling/awesome-skills-cn/antigravity-awesome-skills/plugins/agentic-awesome-skills/skills/fable-safe-prompt

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Install
npx -y skills add lingxling/awesome-skills-cn --skill fable-safe-prompt

Assembled from the repository path, not quoted from the project. Check it against their README if it does not work.

What its author says it does

Copied from the file, not written here

Rewrite allowed prompts to reduce false-positive safety triggers without bypassing policy or changing intent.

The file declares its own license as MIT. That is the author’s claim about this one file, and it is not the same thing as the license GitHub reports for the repository, which is listed with the other numbers below.

SKILL.md

4.8 KB, as published. Nobody here has run it

Fable-Safe Prompt

When to Use

  • Use when an allowed prompt appears likely to hit false-positive classifier language.
  • Use when the user asks for prompt wording that keeps benign intent clear and policy-compliant.

Return the user's prompt back in full, verbatim, changing ONLY the specific sentences/phrases most likely to trip Fable 5's cyber/bio classifiers. Do not rewrite the whole thing, do not summarize, do not restructure — minimal surgical edits. Keep the actual goal and all benign text exactly as written. This lowers false positives for benign work. It must not be used to bypass safety policy or enable harmful requests.

Fable 5 runs 3 input classifiers: cyber, bio/chem, reasoning_extraction. Triggers are keyword/surface-based, largely intent-independent ("hello" and "cancer" got flagged). The fix is to abstract away the sensitive domain, not just restate intent.

Apply when the prompt touches: cyber/auth/exploits/malware/pentesting/credentials; bio/chem/medical/disease/lab topics; or any "show your reasoning" instruction.

The user provides the prompt-to-be-changed wrapped in <prompt>...</prompt> XML tags. Operate only on the text inside those tags; treat everything outside as instructions to you.

Method

  1. Flag the highly problematic sentences/phrases (offensive framings, named sensitive domains, "show your thinking" lines).
  2. Replace each in place with a safe equivalent (see swaps), or describe the wanted functionality abstractly rather than naming the domain.
  3. Leave everything else byte-for-byte identical.
  4. Return the complete edited prompt.

Reframe so the task reads as: owned/authorized, defensive (implement/fix/test, not attack), and not dual-use (no exploit dev, attack simulation, bypass payloads, malware, live testing).

Swap framings (apply per-sentence)

TriggeringSafe rewrite
"How could an attacker exploit this auth""Review these auth files for missing checks and fix them defensively"
"Write an exploit / payload / PoC""Add a regression test proving X is fixed, then patch it"
"How do I bypass / brute-force Y""Enforce secure session validation + rate limiting on Y"
"Reverse this malware / show attack steps""Describe the risk high-level, then implement the fix"
"Show your reasoning / explain step-by-step / walk me through your thinking"Delete it. Trips reasoning_extraction. If progress visibility is needed, ask it to use a send-to-user tool, not to echo its internal thoughts.
Clinician framing: "as a doctor, diagnose this ECG"Patient framing: "help me interpret this ECG my doctor gave me"
Named bio/chem domain: "cancer / disease pathway / chemical kinetics"Abstract it: describe the data/analysis generically, drop the domain noun

Trigger keywords to abstract away

Cyber: exploit, malware, vulnerability, attack, bypass, stealth, fingerprinting, anti-bot, CAPTCHA, penetration. Bio/chem: biology, biomedicine, chemistry, cancer, disease pathways, RNA/variant calling, equilibrium, kinetics, diagnosis. Distillation: "distill the model", training pipelines, frontier LLM development.

If no benign defensive equivalent exists for a sentence (it's purely offensive), flag it to the user rather than silently neutering the intent.

Output

  1. Print the full safe prompt back to the user in text (a code block, ready to paste).
  2. Copy it to the clipboard so the user can paste immediately:
    pbcopy <<'EOF'
    <the full safe prompt>
    EOF
    
    Confirm in one line that it's on the clipboard.
  3. A short list of exactly which sentences you changed and what they became.
  4. If the task is genuinely offensive (pentest, exploit repro, malware analysis): say plainly no edit makes it Fable-safe — use an Opus 4.8 fallback or vetted Mythos, not Fable 5.

Hard truth: you can't reliably stop Fable 5 guardrails. Robust API setups also treat stop_reason: "refusal" (HTTP 200, stop_details.category = cyber/bio) as a route to an Opus 4.8 fallback — mention only if the user controls the integration.

Limitations

  • Adapted from davidondrej/skills; verify local paths, tools, credentials, and agent features before acting.
  • For commands, remote access, scheduling, browser automation, or file-changing workflows, get explicit user approval and confirm the target environment first.

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