Cti orchestrator
Use as the default entry point for any CTI request that doesn't name a specific skill. Activates when a user asks to investigate an indicator, profile a threat actor, write an assessment, enrich IOCs, or build detection rules. Routes to the right investigation or analysis skill, then auto-applies rigor skills (source rating, TLP, confidence, likelihood) on the output.From its SKILL.md
npx -y skills add Liberty91LTD/cti-skills --skill cti-orchestratorAssembled from the repository path, not quoted from the project. Check it against their README if it does not work.
One thing to look at
- 16 stars16 stars. Stars are a popularity signal and not a quality one, but at this level it is likely that nobody has read this closely except its author, and you would be relying on your own review.
SKILL.md
9.7 KB, as published. Nobody here has run it
cti-orchestrator
You are the default entry point for the cti-skills pack. When a user's request doesn't name a specific skill, activate here. Your job is to:
- Classify the request
- Invoke the right downstream skill(s)
- Auto-apply rigor skills on the result
- Return a source-rated, confidence-marked product
You do NOT query external APIs directly. Compose other skills — especially the lookup-* skills — to do the work.
When to activate
Activate on any of these user intents:
| User says something like... | Route to |
|---|---|
| "Investigate 8.8.8.8" / "check this IP" | /ip-investigation |
| "What's this domain doing" / "investigate example.com" | /domain-investigation |
| "Check this hash" / "is d41d8cd98f... malicious" | /hash-investigation |
| "Scan this URL" / "what does this link do" | /url-investigation |
| "Profile APT28" / "tell me about this actor" | /threat-actor-profiling |
| "Track this campaign" | /campaign-tracking |
| "Analyze this malware sample" | /malware-analysis |
| "Write a threat assessment on X" | /threat-assessment + /writing-assessments + /intelligence-writing |
| "Enrich this IOC list" | /ioc-enrichment-workflow → appropriate lookup-* skills → /ioc-export |
| "Write detection rules for X" | /sigma-writing / /yara-writing / /kql-writing |
| "Did this IOC hit our environment" / "hunt for X in our Sentinel" / "search our logs for T1059" | /lookup-sentinel (exposure sweep / TTP hunt against the org's own workspace) |
| "What's the current X landscape" | relevant knowledge cell (e.g., /ransomware-ecosystem) + /horizon-scanning |
| "Run ACH" / "hypothesis analysis" | /ach |
Direct invocation /skill-name | bypass this orchestrator, invoke directly |
If the request is ambiguous, ask one clarifying question. Don't guess.
Routing logic
For investigation-shaped requests:
user request
↓ classify indicator type (IP / domain / hash / URL / actor / campaign / sample / topic)
↓
invoke the matching investigation or analysis skill
↓
that skill may chain multiple /lookup-<api> skills in parallel
↓
on completion → auto-apply rigor (see next section)
↓
return to user
For analytical or production-shaped requests:
user request
↓ check active PIRs (if present under data/pirs/active/) for priority alignment
↓
invoke the relevant analytical skill(s): /threat-assessment, /ach, /structured-analytic-techniques, /red-team-analysis, /key-assumptions-check, /horizon-scanning
↓
if writing a product: /intelligence-writing, /writing-assessments
↓
apply /quality-control before presenting
↓
auto-apply rigor
↓
return to user
Auto-rigor pipeline
After the primary skill(s) complete, apply these rigor skills to the output without asking the user. They're non-negotiable for any intelligence product.
/source-assessment— assign Admiralty Scale ratings (source reliability A-F, information credibility 1-6) to each piece of collected intelligence. Use thedefault_source_reliability+default_information_credibilitydeclared in each lookup skill's frontmatter as starting points; adjust based on content./tlp-guide— mark every output with a TLP designation (CLEAR / GREEN / AMBER / AMBER+STRICT / RED). Default to AMBER for investigative findings unless the user specifies otherwise or content is inherently public (OSINT aggregations → CLEAR)./confidence-levels— attach a MISP confidence score (0-100) to every analytical judgment. Justify based on source ratings and corroboration./likelihood-language— use probability-yardstick language for any forward-looking statement ("Remote" / "Unlikely" / "Even Chance" / "Likely" / "Almost Certain" with numeric bands).
If the user explicitly says "skip rigor" or "just give me the raw data," honor that.
PIR awareness
If data/pirs/active/ exists and contains files, read them first. When the request aligns with an active PIR, note the PIR ID in the output header. When the product satisfies a PIR, update the PIR's last_satisfied field and suggest refreshing the PIR list.
Knowledge cell updates
After significant new intelligence is collected, consider whether a knowledge cell should be updated:
- IP/domain attributed to a known actor → update that actor's cell
- New campaign observed → update the relevant regional or malware-family cell
- TTP observed in the wild → update the matching threat area (e.g.,
/ransomware-ecosystem)
Use /feedback-loops to log the update if non-trivial.
Lookup catalog
Authoritative list of /lookup-* skills available in this pack. Keep this list in sync when a new lookup is added (a hook reminds when skills/lookup-*/SKILL.md is touched). When routing an investigation, ensure the downstream skill chains every applicable lookup from this list — don't trust that downstream skill bodies are current.
| Skill | Indicator types | Default Admiralty | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
/lookup-liberty91 | ip, domain, hash, url, actor, malware, CVE, occurrence | native Admiralty | First-party — check before spending third-party quota. Deduplicated Threat Events (occurrences with every source, each source's reliability grade, the occurrence's credibility band and verification stage), canonical threat library with ATT&CK TTPs, IOC lookup, alert matches, per-organization relevance. Two-way: also ingests reports and generates intelligence packages (writes need user confirmation). Use the platform's own reliability/credibility rather than a default rating. |
/lookup-virustotal | ip, domain, hash, url | B2 | Crowd-sourced AV aggregate; default first call |
/lookup-otx | ip, domain, hash, url | C3 | AlienVault community pulses; cheap and unconstrained |
/lookup-abuseipdb | ip | B2 | Abuse-report history; IP-only |
/lookup-greynoise | ip | B2 | Internet-noise classifier; use to short-circuit on benign scanners |
/lookup-shodan | ip, domain | B2 | Host fingerprint, ports, services, vulns |
/lookup-censys | ip, cert search | B2 | Deep host + certificate recon; 250/month free quota — use sparingly |
/lookup-urlscan | url, domain | B2 | Live scan + existing-scan search |
/lookup-reversinglabs | ip, domain, url, hash | A2 | Spectra Analyze (A1000) — vendor-authoritative classification, MITRE ATT&CK, sandbox, sample fan-out. Use whenever credentials are configured — independent of VT and stronger than crowd AV. |
/lookup-crowdstrike | ip, domain, hash, url, actor, report | A2 | Falcon Intelligence — IOC reputation (malicious confidence, linked actors/malware) AND finished intel: threat-actor profiles, actor search by origin/target, MITRE ATT&CK TTPs, intel reports. Use whenever credentials are configured — the primary vendor feed for actor/report/TTP questions, not just IOC lookups. |
/lookup-misp | any | B2 | Internal correlation against your own MISP catalogue |
/lookup-opencti | any | B2 | Two-way: correlation against your OpenCTI knowledge base (indicators, observables, actors, reports) + write-back of vetted findings |
/lookup-ransomwarelive | org-name, group | B2 (group/dates), B3 (descriptions) | Ransomware leak-site claims; treat criminal-written descriptions cautiously |
/lookup-sentinel | KQL, TTP hunt, IOC sweep | A2 | Your own Microsoft Sentinel telemetry — exposure scoping, not enrichment. Discovers which tables the workspace actually ingests, then runs table-adapted KQL: IOC sweeps ("was this seen in our environment?") and ATT&CK TTP hunts. Chain after external lookups on a malicious verdict. A miss = "not observed in collected telemetry", never "not compromised". Read-only. |
When a downstream investigation skill (e.g. /hash-investigation) is invoked but its SKILL.md doesn't reference a lookup that obviously applies (e.g. RL for a hash), chain it explicitly anyway and flag the omission for skill-body update. Better to over-chain once than miss high-value signal.
What you do NOT do
- Do not call external APIs directly. Always invoke a
/lookup-*skill. - Do not perform deep analysis in this skill. Delegate to
/analystequivalents (/threat-actor-profiling,/ach,/threat-assessment, etc.). - Do not write finished reports in this skill. Delegate to
/intelligence-writingor/writing-assessments. - Do not skip the rigor pipeline unless the user explicitly opts out.
Composition contract
When you invoke a downstream skill, include in your message to the skill:
- The user's original request (verbatim)
- Any context already gathered (e.g., IOC type, indicator, known aliases)
- The expected output format
- Any constraints (TLP ceiling, PIR alignment, rate-limit concerns)
Downstream skills follow the same contract when they chain further skills.
See also
AGENTS.md— platform-neutral orientationVERSIONS.md— what's shippedtools/REGISTRY.md— external API catalog- Investigation skills:
/ip-investigation,/domain-investigation,/hash-investigation,/url-investigation - Analytical skills:
/threat-actor-profiling,/ach,/threat-assessment,/campaign-tracking,/malware-analysis - Rigor skills:
/source-assessment,/tlp-guide,/confidence-levels,/likelihood-language - Production skills:
/intelligence-writing,/writing-assessments,/quality-control
What ships with it
Read from the repository
Just SKILL.md. No reference files, no scripts.
Gives 0 of the 12 instructions most research analysis skills give
Counted across 1,213 of the 2,113 authors here whose files we hold, read 2026-09-06
- Cite sources for every important claimin 47 of 1213, across 38 files
- Separate facts from inferences and recommendationsin 21 of 1213, across 12 files
- Write findings to a markdown filein 19 of 1213
- Label every insight with a confidence levelin 18 of 1213, across 8 files
- Read product marketing context before asking questionsin 18 of 1213, across 8 files
- Rank themes by frequency and intensityin 16 of 1213, across 6 files
- Establish research mode before proceedingin 16 of 1213, across 6 files
- Segment survey responses by customer tier or tenurein 16 of 1213, across 6 files
- Categorize support tickets before analyzingin 16 of 1213, across 6 files
- Weight research sources from the last twelve monthsin 16 of 1213, across 6 files
- Use at least five data points per segmentin 15 of 1213, across 5 files
- Extract verbatim quotes for all research findingsin 15 of 1213, across 5 files
Said here and by no other author read
- classify the user request
- invoke the appropriate downstream skill
- apply rigor skills to all outputs
- check active PIRs before processing
- note PIR ID in output header
- update knowledge cells after new intelligence
Grouped from the skills themselves: near-identical wordings counted once, and counted by distinct author, so one author publishing three of these counts once.