Supply chain security scanner

Supply Chain Security Scanner

AI-powered software supply chain security auditing for agentic platforms. Covers dependency vulnerability scanning, SBOM generation, license compliance, and provenance verification across npm, PyPI, Maven, Go modules, Cargo, and container images.

Table of Contents

1. Activation Triggers
2. Prerequisites
3. Audit Methodology
4. Workflow: Step-by-Step
5. Tool Coverage
6. SBOM Generation & Management
7. Provenance Verification
8. License Compliance
9. Remediation & Reporting
10. Quick Reference
11. Common Pitfalls & Anti-Patterns
12. CI/CD Integration Patterns
13. Ecosystem Vulnerability Databases
14. OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10 Context
15. SEO Metadata

---

Activation Triggers

This skill activates when a user requests a supply chain security action.

Primary Triggers (activate)

• "scan my project for vulnerable dependencies"
• "generate an SBOM for this repository"
• "check if our npm packages have known CVEs"
• "audit our software supply chain"
• "verify the provenance of this container image"
• "run a dependency vulnerability scan"
• "check license compliance of our dependencies"
• "generate a CycloneDX SBOM"
• "verify SLSA provenance for this build artifact"
• "scan this Docker image for vulnerabilities"
• "run software composition analysis on this codebase"
• "check for dependency confusion attacks"
• "audit pip packages for security issues"
• "generate SPDX bill of materials"

Near-Miss Negatives (do NOT activate)

• "explain what SBOM means" — informational request, no action needed
• "how do I secure my npm packages?" — general security advice, not a scan
• "what is SLSA provenance?" — definition/education request, not verification

If a user asks an educational question, answer it directly without launching a scan. If a user asks for general security advice, provide guidance without running tooling.

---

Prerequisites

The following CLIs must be available. The scripts in scripts/ perform capability detection automatically and report which tools are missing before any scan runs.

Tool	Purpose	Installation
syft	SBOM generation (SPDX, CycloneDX)	brew install syft / curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anchore/syft/main/install.sh | sh -s -- -b /usr/local/bin
grype	Vulnerability scanning against SBOM	brew install grype / curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anchore/grype/main/install.sh | sh -s -- -b /usr/local/bin
cosign	Container image signing & verification	brew install cosign
slsa-verifier	SLSA provenance verification	go install github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-verifier/v2/cli/slsa-verifier@latest
trivy	Comprehensive scanner (images, fs, repos)	brew install trivy
npm	npm audit (bundled with Node.js)	brew install node
pip-audit	PyPI vulnerability audit	pip install pip-audit
owasp-dependency-check	OWASP Dependency-Check CLI	brew install dependency-check
jq	JSON report processing	brew install jq
curl	API calls to vulnerability databases	Pre-installed on macOS/Linux

The skill checks for each tool at runtime. Missing tools are reported with copy-paste installation commands. Scans proceed with available tools only.

---

Audit Methodology

Every supply chain audit follows a four-phase methodology:

SCAN → ANALYZE → REPORT → REMEDIATE

Phase 1: SCAN

Goal: Collect raw data from all available sources.

1. Ecosystem detection — Auto-detect project type(s) from lockfiles and build files:

   • package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml → npm/JavaScript
   • requirements.txt, Pipfile.lock, pyproject.toml → Python/PyPI
   • pom.xml, build.gradle, build.gradle.kts → Java/Maven/Gradle
   • go.sum → Go modules
   • Cargo.lock → Rust/Cargo
   • Dockerfile, Containerfile → Container images
   • .csproj, packages.config → .NET/NuGet

2. Parallel scanning — Run all applicable scanners concurrently:

   • npm audit --json for Node.js projects
   • pip-audit --format=json for Python projects
   • owasp-dependency-check --format JSON for JVM projects
   • grype dir:. --output json for general-purpose scanning
   • trivy fs . --format json for comprehensive filesystem scan
   • trivy image <image> for container images

3. SBOM generation — Produce an SBOM before scanning so results are anchored to a specific dependency graph snapshot. Default: CycloneDX JSON. Option: SPDX tag-value.

4. Provenance check — For container images and build artifacts with attached attestations, verify SLSA provenance and signature chains.

Phase 2: ANALYZE

Goal: Correlate findings, de-duplicate, and prioritize.

1. De-duplication — Merge findings from multiple scanners by CVE ID. Keep the highest CVSS score and most detailed advisory for each unique vulnerability.

2. CVSS triage — Sort by severity:

   • Critical (CVSS 9.0–10.0): Immediate action required. Exploitable remotely.
   • High (CVSS 7.0–8.9): Patch within 48 hours.
   • Medium (CVSS 4.0–6.9): Schedule in next sprint.
   • Low (CVSS 0.1–3.9): Monitor; patch opportunistically.
   • None (CVSS 0.0): Informational only.

3. Exploitability assessment — Cross-reference with:

   • EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) scores > 0.1
   • KEV (Known Exploited Vulnerabilities) catalog membership
   • Public exploit availability (Exploit-DB, Metasploit)
   • Attack vector: Network (AV:N) vs Local (AV:L)
   • Attack complexity and privileges required

4. License risk analysis — Flag:

   • Copyleft licenses (GPL, AGPL, EUPL) in proprietary codebases
   • Unlicensed or unknown-license packages
   • License incompatibilities between direct dependencies

5. Provenance findings — Report:

   • Unsigned or unattested artifacts
   • SLSA level gaps (no provenance → SLSA 0, signed → SLSA 1+, attested → SLSA 2+)
   • Expired or untrusted signing keys

Phase 3: REPORT

Goal: Output structured, actionable findings.

Output formats (select based on user request or default to Markdown + JSON):

Format	Use Case
Markdown table	Human-readable summaries, PR comments
JSON	Machine consumption, CI/CD integration
SARIF	GitHub Code Scanning, IDE integration
CSV	Spreadsheet import for compliance tracking
HTML	Self-contained report for stakeholders

Every finding includes:

• CVE ID — Canonical identifier
• Package — Name and affected version(s)
• Severity — CVSS score and vector string
• Description — Plain-language impact summary
• Fix — Minimum patched version or workaround
• References — Links to NVD, GHSA, and vendor advisories

Phase 4: REMEDIATE

Goal: Provide actionable fix paths.

1. Automatic fixes (offer to run, never auto-apply):

   • npm audit fix — Auto-update compatible patches
   • npm audit fix --force — Breaking updates (warn user)
   • pip install --upgrade <package> — Pin to patched version
   • Maven <dependency> version bumps with versions:use-latest-releases

2. Manual fixes — For vulnerabilities with no direct patch:

   • Recommend alternative packages
   • Suggest vendor mitigations or configuration changes
   • Flag for architecture review if package is critical

3. SBOM updates — After remediation, regenerate SBOM to reflect the patched dependency graph. Recommend committing SBOM to repository at sbom/ or .sbom/.

4. Verification — Re-scan to confirm fixes resolved vulnerabilities and no regressions were introduced.

---

Workflow: Step-by-Step

Standard Dependency Scan

1. cd <project-root>
2. Run: scripts/scan-dependencies.sh
   → Auto-detects ecosystem, runs appropriate scanners
   → Outputs: scan-report-<timestamp>.json, scan-report-<timestamp>.md
3. Review findings
4. Apply fixes per report recommendations
5. Re-run scan to verify

SBOM Generation Workflow

1. cd <project-root>
2. Run: scripts/generate-sbom.sh --format cyclonedx
   → Generates: sbom-<project>-<version>-<timestamp>.cdx.json
3. Optionally sign: cosign sign-blob --key cosign.key sbom-*.cdx.json
4. Commit SBOM to repository
5. (Optional) Upload to dependency-track or OWASP Dependency-Track instance

Provenance Verification Workflow

1. Identify the artifact (image digest, binary hash, or build ID)
2. Run: scripts/verify-provenance.sh --image <image>@<digest>
   OR:  scripts/verify-provenance.sh --artifact <path> --provenance <attestation-url>
3. Review SLSA level, builder identity, and source repository
4. Validate against expected values (builder, repo, branch, workflow)
5. Block deployment if verification fails

CI/CD Integration

# Example GitHub Actions snippet
- name: Supply Chain Scan
  run: |
    bash scripts/scan-dependencies.sh --ci
- name: Upload SBOM
  uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
  with:
    name: sbom
    path: sbom-*.cdx.json

---

Tool Coverage

npm audit (Node.js / JavaScript)

# Standard audit
npm audit --json

# Fix compatible vulnerabilities
npm audit fix

# Fix all (including breaking changes — review first!)
npm audit fix --force

# Audit specific package
npm audit --json --package-lock-only

Strengths: Fast, built-in, understands npm dependency resolution quirks. Limitations: Only covers the npm registry advisory database. Does not cover transitive dependencies outside the lockfile. No license or provenance checking.

pip-audit (Python / PyPI)

# Audit from requirements.txt
pip-audit --requirement requirements.txt --format json

# Audit from pyproject.toml
pip-audit --format json

# Audit ignoring specific CVEs (with documented reason)
pip-audit --ignore-vuln PYSEC-2023-123 --desc "False positive: internal-only service"

# Fix: pip-audit outputs fix versions; apply manually
pip install --upgrade <package>==<fixed-version>

Strengths: Uses the PyPI Advisory Database (via OSV). Fast, minimal dependencies. Limitations: Python-only. Does not scan compiled extensions or vendored libraries.

OWASP Dependency-Check (Java / JVM / Multi-language)

# Basic scan of current directory
dependency-check --project "MyProject" --scan . --format JSON --out ./reports/

# With NVD API key (required for production use; increases rate limits)
dependency-check --nvdApiKey $NVD_API_KEY --project "MyProject" --scan .

# HTML report for stakeholders
dependency-check --project "MyProject" --scan . --format HTML --out ./reports/

Strengths: Broad language support (Java, .NET, Ruby, Python, Node.js via OSS Index), NVD integration, CPE matching. Mature and OWASP-backed. Limitations: Slow on first run (downloads NVD data feed). Java-centric. Large memory footprint (allocate -Xmx4g for large projects).

Syft + Grype (SBOM-based Scanning)

Syft generates an SBOM. Grype scans the SBOM for vulnerabilities. This separation is powerful: generate once, scan many times with updated vulnerability data.

# Generate CycloneDX SBOM
syft dir:. --output cyclonedx-json > sbom.cdx.json

# Generate SPDX SBOM
syft dir:. --output spdx-json > sbom.spdx.json

# Scan SBOM with Grype
grype sbom:sbom.cdx.json --output json > vulnerabilities.json

# Fail on critical/high (exit code 1)
grype sbom:sbom.cdx.json --fail-on high

# Only show fixable vulnerabilities
grype sbom:sbom.cdx.json --only-fixed

Strengths: Works across all ecosystems. SBOM is reusable across tools. Fast. Limitations: Requires both syft and grype. SBOM must be regenerated when dependencies change.

Trivy (Comprehensive Scanner)

# Filesystem scan
trivy fs . --format json --output trivy-fs.json

# Container image scan
trivy image nginx:1.25 --format json --output trivy-image.json

# Repository scan (remote)
trivy repo https://github.com/owner/repo --format json

# Scan with SBOM output
trivy fs . --format cyclonedx --output sbom.cdx.json

# Filter by severity
trivy fs . --severity CRITICAL,HIGH

Strengths: Single binary, covers filesystem + images + repos + K8s, built-in SBOM generation, fast, actively maintained by Aqua Security. Limitations: Less granular license detection than dedicated tools. Some false positives in go.sum scanning.

cosign + slsa-verifier (Provenance)

# Verify container image signature
cosign verify --key cosign.pub <image>@sha256:<digest>

# Verify SLSA provenance attestation
slsa-verifier verify-image <image>@sha256:<digest> \
  --source-uri github.com/owner/repo \
  --source-branch main

# Verify artifact with provenance file
slsa-verifier verify-artifact <binary> \
  --provenance-path <attestation.intoto.jsonl> \
  --source-uri github.com/owner/repo

Strengths: Cryptographic proof of build integrity. SLSA framework compliance. Limitations: Only works when build system produces attestations (GitHub Actions with SLSA generator, Google Cloud Build, etc.). Most open-source projects lack attestations today.

---

SBOM Generation & Management

SBOM Formats

Aspect	SPDX	CycloneDX
Originating body	Linux Foundation	OWASP
Primary use case	License compliance	Security/vulnerability
Mandatory fields	12 fields (SPDX 2.3)	5 fields (CycloneDX 1.5)
JSON schema	Yes	Yes
Tag-value format	Yes (unique to SPDX)	No
NTIA minimum elements	✅	✅
Vulnerability data	Via external ref	Native VEX support
Tool ecosystem	FOSSology, ORT	Syft, Trivy, Grype, Dependency-Track

Recommendation: Generate both. CycloneDX for security tooling (Grype, Dependency-Track); SPDX for license compliance (FOSSology, ORT). Use Syft with --output to produce either format.

NTIA Minimum Elements for SBOM

Per U.S. Executive Order 14028 and NTIA guidance, every SBOM must include:

1. Supplier name — Entity creating the component
2. Component name — Human-readable identifier
3. Version — Version string of the component
4. Unique identifier — PURL, CPE, or SWID tag
5. Dependency relationships — Which components depend on which
6. Author — SBOM creator
7. Timestamp — When SBOM was generated

SBOM Lifecycle

Build → Generate SBOM → Sign → Attest → Store → Monitor → Update on change

• Generate: At every build, tag, or release
• Sign: cosign sign-blob or in-toto attestation
• Store: Commit to repo, upload to Dependency-Track, or push to OCI registry
• Monitor: Regularly re-scan stored SBOMs against updated vulnerability databases
• Update: Regenerate whenever package.json, Cargo.lock, or equivalent changes

---

Provenance Verification

SLSA Framework Levels

Level	Name	Requirements
0	None	No guarantees. Ad-hoc builds.
1	Build is scripted	Build process documented, build-as-code.
2	Build service + provenance	Hosted build platform (GitHub Actions, Cloud Build), signed provenance attestation.
3	Hardened build	Isolated, ephemeral, hermetic builds. Two-person review. Reproducible.
4	Maximum	All SLSA 3 + non-falsifiable provenance. Current state-of-the-art (rare).

What to Verify

1. Builder identity — Is the provenance from the expected CI system?
2. Source repository — Does the source URI match the expected repo?
3. Build invocation — Was the build triggered by the expected workflow/event?
4. Material digests — Do the source code digests in the attestation match?
5. Signature validity — Is the attestation signed by a trusted key?
6. Key trust chain — Does the signing key chain to a trusted root?

Provenance Red Flags

• Missing attestation entirely (SLSA 0)
• Attestation from an unexpected builder
• Source URI mismatch (built from a fork or different repo)
• Expired or self-signed certificates
• Attestation predates or postdates the artifact
• Mismatched subject digest in attestation

---

License Compliance

License Categories

Category	Licenses	Policy
Permissive	MIT, Apache-2.0, BSD-2-Clause, BSD-3-Clause, ISC, 0BSD, Unlicense	✅ Safe for all use
Weak copyleft	MPL-2.0, LGPL-2.1, LGPL-3.0, EPL-2.0	⚠️ File-level reciprocity; usually acceptable
Strong copyleft	GPL-2.0, GPL-3.0, AGPL-3.0, EUPL-1.2	🔴 Viral; requires entire project to be open-sourced under same license
Unknown	No license detected	🔴 Default copyright — all rights reserved; cannot legally use
Non-standard	WTFPL, Beerware, custom	⚠️ Review manually with legal counsel

Detection Tools

• Syft: syft dir:. --output json | jq '.artifacts[].licenses'
• Trivy: License scanning built into trivy fs
• FOSSology: Full-featured OSS license compliance toolkit (for deep audits)
• ORT (OSS Review Toolkit): Automated compliance for large projects

Policy Enforcement

Define a license policy file (e.g., .license-policy.json):

{
  "allowed": ["MIT", "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "ISC"],
  "review_required": ["MPL-2.0", "LGPL-2.1", "LGPL-3.0"],
  "denied": ["GPL-2.0", "GPL-3.0", "AGPL-3.0", "UNKNOWN"]
}

---

Remediation & Reporting

Report Template

Every scan produces a structured report. Example Markdown output:

# Supply Chain Security Scan Report

**Project:** my-project
**Scan date:** 2026-06-09T02:07:00+01:00
**Scanners:** npm audit, grype, trivy
**SBOM:** sbom-my-project-2.1.0-20260609.cdx.json

## Summary

| Severity | Count |
|----------|-------|
| Critical | 2     |
| High     | 5     |
| Medium   | 12    |
| Low      | 3     |

## Critical Findings

### CVE-2024-12345 — protobufjs 7.2.4

- **CVSS:** 9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)
- **EPSS:** 0.45 (45% probability of exploitation in next 30 days)
- **KEV:** ✅ Listed (CISA Known Exploited Vulnerability)
- **Description:** Remote code execution via malicious protobuf message
- **Fix:** Upgrade to protobufjs >= 7.2.5
- **References:** https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12345

Remediation Priority Matrix

EPSS > 0.1	KEV Listed	CVSS	Priority
✅	✅	Any	Immediate (hours)
✅	❌	Critical/High	Urgent (24h)
❌	✅	Any	Urgent (24h)
✅	❌	Medium	Soon (sprint)
❌	❌	High	Scheduled (week)
❌	❌	Medium/Low	Backlog (month)

---

Quick Reference

# Fast dependency scan (auto-detect ecosystem)
bash scripts/scan-dependencies.sh

# Full scan with SBOM generation
bash scripts/scan-dependencies.sh --full --sbom

# Container image scan
bash scripts/scan-dependencies.sh --image nginx:1.25

# Generate CycloneDX SBOM
bash scripts/generate-sbom.sh --format cyclonedx

# Generate SPDX SBOM with signing
bash scripts/generate-sbom.sh --format spdx --sign --key cosign.key

# Verify container provenance
bash scripts/verify-provenance.sh --image ghcr.io/owner/app@sha256:abc123

# Verify artifact provenance
bash scripts/verify-provenance.sh --artifact ./binary --provenance attestation.intoto.jsonl

# CI mode (JSON output, non-zero exit on failure)
bash scripts/scan-dependencies.sh --ci --fail-on high

# License-only scan
bash scripts/scan-dependencies.sh --licenses-only

---

Common Pitfalls & Anti-Patterns

❌ Scanning Without Lockfiles

Running npm audit or pip-audit against package.json or requirements.txt without lockfiles only scans direct dependencies. Transitive dependencies (which account for ~80% of vulnerabilities) are missed.

✅ Fix: Always use lockfiles. Commit them. Scan the lockfile, not the manifest.

❌ Trusting CVSS Scores Blindly

A CVSS 7.5 vulnerability in a development-only tool (e.g., a test runner) that never touches production data is less urgent than a CVSS 5.0 vulnerability in a network-facing production dependency.

✅ Fix: Contextualize CVSS with asset criticality, attack surface, and actual usage.

❌ Ignoring License Compliance

Teams often focus exclusively on CVEs and overlook license violations. Using a GPL-licensed library in proprietary software can be as damaging as a vulnerability.

✅ Fix: Always run license detection alongside vulnerability scanning.

❌ One-Time Scans

A scan at release time finds vulnerabilities that may have been present (and exploitable) for weeks. The mean time to detect (MTTD) for supply chain attacks is measured in months.

✅ Fix: Scan on every push, every PR, and nightly on a schedule. Integrate into CI/CD.

❌ Blocking Deployments on Every Finding

Failing CI on every medium-severity finding leads to alert fatigue and teams disabling the check entirely.

✅ Fix: Fail on Critical/High with known exploits only. Track Medium findings as tickets. Use grace periods for newly published CVEs without fixes.

❌ Using Outdated Vulnerability Databases

Running grype without updating its database scans against stale data. New CVEs are published daily. Supply chain attacks appear suddenly.

✅ Fix: Always update databases before scanning (grype db update, trivy image --refresh).

❌ Generating SBOMs Without Storing Them

An SBOM generated and discarded is useless. SBOMs are only valuable when preserved alongside the artifact they describe.

✅ Fix: Commit SBOMs to the repository, attach to releases, or push to a dedicated SBOM registry. Treat them as build artifacts with the same retention as binaries.

❌ Assuming Provenance Exists

Currently, the vast majority of open-source projects and container images lack SLSA provenance attestations. Assuming provenance exists leads to false confidence.

✅ Fix: Distinguish between "provenance verified" and "no provenance available". Flag the latter as a risk, not a pass. Prefer artifacts with provenance when choosing between alternatives.

---

CI/CD Integration Patterns

GitHub Actions

name: Supply Chain Security
on:
  push:
    branches: [main]
  pull_request:
    branches: [main]
  schedule:
    - cron: '0 6 * * *'  # Daily at 06:00 UTC

jobs:
  scan:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      - name: Install syft & grype
        run: |
          curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anchore/syft/main/install.sh | sh -s -- -b /usr/local/bin
          curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anchore/grype/main/install.sh | sh -s -- -b /usr/local/bin
      - name: Run Supply Chain Scan
        run: bash scripts/scan-dependencies.sh --ci --fail-on high
      - name: Generate SBOM
        run: bash scripts/generate-sbom.sh --format cyclonedx
      - name: Upload SBOM
        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
        with:
          name: sbom
          path: sbom-*.cdx.json
      - name: Upload Scan Report
        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
        with:
          name: scan-report
          path: scan-report-*.json

GitLab CI

supply-chain-scan:
  stage: test
  image: alpine:latest
  before_script:
    - apk add --no-cache curl bash jq
    - curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anchore/syft/main/install.sh | sh -s -- -b /usr/local/bin
    - curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anchore/grype/main/install.sh | sh -s -- -b /usr/local/bin
  script:
    - bash scripts/scan-dependencies.sh --ci --fail-on high
    - bash scripts/generate-sbom.sh --format cyclonedx
  artifacts:
    paths:
      - sbom-*.cdx.json
      - scan-report-*.json
    expire_in: 30 days

Pre-Commit Hook

#!/bin/bash
# .git/hooks/pre-commit — Block commits with critical vulnerabilities
bash scripts/scan-dependencies.sh --ci --fail-on critical
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
  echo "❌ Commit blocked: critical vulnerabilities found."
  echo "   Review the scan report and fix before committing."
  exit 1
fi

---

Ecosystem Vulnerability Databases

Primary Databases

Database	Scope	API	Best For
NVD (National Vulnerability Database)	All software (CVE)	REST API (rate-limited)	Authoritative CVE data, CVSS scores
GHSA (GitHub Advisory Database)	npm, PyPI, RubyGems, Maven, Go, NuGet, Rust, Composer	GraphQL API	Developer-friendly advisories, fix versions
OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)	All ecosystems, unified schema	REST API	Cross-ecosystem queries, automated tooling

Querying the Databases

# NVD API (requires API key for production)
curl -s "https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?cveId=CVE-2024-12345" \
  -H "apiKey: $NVD_API_KEY" | jq '.vulnerabilities[0].cve'

# GHSA via GitHub CLI
gh api graphql -f query='
  query($cve: String!) {
    securityAdvisory(ghsaId: $cve) {
      summary severity identifiers { value }
      vulnerabilities(first: 5) {
        nodes { package { ecosystem name } vulnerableVersionRange firstPatchedVersion { identifier } }
      }
    }
  }
' -f cve="GHSA-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx"

# OSV API (no auth required)
curl -s "https://api.osv.dev/v1/query" -d '{
  "package": {"name": "lodash", "ecosystem": "npm"},
  "version": "4.17.20"
}' | jq '.vulns[] | {id: .id, summary: .summary, severity: .severity}'

When to Use Each

• NVD: Legal/compliance reports requiring authoritative CVE data. Slow, rate-limited.
• GHSA: Developer workflows, quick fix-version lookups. Fast. GitHub-native.
• OSV: Cross-ecosystem tooling, automated pipelines. Machine-readable schema.

Production scans should use Grype or Trivy, which aggregate all three databases internally.

---

OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10 Context

The OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10 (AST10:2026) highlights supply chain security as a critical concern for agentic AI platforms. Key risks relevant to this skill:

• AST01:2026 — Prompt Injection via Malicious Dependencies: A compromised dependency can inject malicious prompts into agent workflows. SBOM verification and provenance checks are defensive controls.
• AST03:2026 — Insecure Skill Design: Skills without supply chain scanning may themselves contain vulnerable dependencies. Self-audit with this skill.
• AST06:2026 — Excessive Agency via Compromised Tools: Vulnerable CLI tools (scanners themselves) can be attack vectors. Keep scanners updated.
• AST08:2026 — Supply Chain Poisoning: Directly the domain of this skill. Dependency confusion, typosquatting, and compromised registries.

See references/owasp-ast10-summary.md for the full summary.

---

SEO Metadata

<!-- SEO_META keywords: supply chain security, SBOM, software bill of materials, dependency scanning, vulnerability audit, license compliance, provenance verification, software composition analysis, OWASP, SLSA framework, supply chain scanner, npm audit, pip audit, OWASP Dependency-Check, Syft, Grype, cosign, slsa-verifier, trivy, CVE scanning, CycloneDX, SPDX, DevSecOps, agent skill, agentic security, container image scanning, dependency confusion, typosquatting, open source security, NVD, GHSA, OSV category: security subcategory: supply-chain difficulty: intermediate requires_network: true estimated_duration: 2-15 minutes (depends on project size and network speed) compatible_agents: any-agent-platform target_audience: DevSecOps, security engineers, open-source maintainers, compliance teams last_validated: 2026-06-09 -->