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Redis security

Skill jgamaraalv/delivery-loop/.claude/skills/redis-security

Continuous fullstack delivery loops — orchestrates frontend, backend, and quality subagents (behaviour drivers, engineers, UI/UX specialist, code/security reviewers, architects) in a test → diagnose → fix → review → secure → re-test cycle until the work is production-ready

Install
npx -y skills add jgamaraalv/delivery-loop --skill redis-security

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Redis production hardening — authentication (requirepass/ACL users), TLS, least-privilege ACLs, network restriction (bind, protected-mode, firewall), and disabling dangerous commands. Use when deploying, locking down, or auditing a Redis instance.

SKILL.md

3.1 KB, 725 tokens by cl100k_base, as published. Nobody here has run it

Redis Security

Production hardening for Redis: authentication, ACL-based access control, and network exposure. Cover all three together — any one of them on its own leaves an exploitable gap.

1. Always authenticate (and use TLS)

Never run a production Redis without a password. Pair authentication with TLS so credentials and data aren't sent in clear text.

# redis.conf
requirepass your-strong-password
tls-port 6380
tls-cert-file /path/to/redis.crt
tls-key-file  /path/to/redis.key
r = redis.Redis(
    host="localhost",
    port=6380,
    password="your-strong-password",
    ssl=True,
    ssl_cert_reqs="required",
)

If you can use ACL users (next section) instead of the single requirepass, do — requirepass is effectively the legacy "default user" shortcut.

See references/auth.md.

2. ACLs for least-privilege access

The default user with a shared password is fine for development. For production, give each application a dedicated ACL user with only the commands and key patterns it actually needs.

# Cache-only reader
ACL SETUSER app_readonly on >password ~cache:* +get +mget +scan

# Writer that can't run dangerous ops
ACL SETUSER app_writer   on >password ~*        +@all -@dangerous

# Admin (use sparingly, never for application traffic)
ACL SETUSER admin        on >strong-password ~* +@all

Useful command categories:

CategoryWhat it covers
@readRead commands (GET, MGET, HGET, ...)
@writeWrite commands (SET, DEL, XADD, ...)
@dangerousFLUSHALL, DEBUG, KEYS, etc.
@adminAdministrative commands

If app credentials leak, a tight ACL bounds the blast radius — the attacker can't FLUSHALL your DB just because they grabbed a cache reader's password.

See references/acls.md.

3. Restrict network access

The most common Redis breach is a public-internet Redis with no auth. Avoid that with three layers:

# redis.conf — bind to specific interfaces, keep protected-mode on
bind 127.0.0.1 192.168.1.100
protected-mode yes
# Firewall — allow only application subnets
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 6379 -s 192.168.1.0/24 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 6379 -j DROP

Anti-pattern: bind 0.0.0.0 + protected-mode no — exposes Redis to the whole network without protection.

Optional but recommended: rename or disable destructive commands so a compromised client can't trash the DB:

rename-command FLUSHALL ""
rename-command DEBUG ""
rename-command CONFIG ""

See references/network.md.

References

What ships with it: 4 files

3.8 KB alongside SKILL.md

.cursor-plugin/

references/

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